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Abstract 
 
Following 16 years of war in Afghanistan the number of U.S. military, Coalition forces 
and Afghan civilian fatalities has exceeded the number of Americans lost on 9/11 and has 
cost the United States nearly $841 billion dollars.  The results are that Afghanistan 
remains in turmoil and that terrorist attacks, the reason for the invasion, continues. The 
question is should United States assess a different approach that would result in less 
blood and treasure being spent to address the need to mitigate terrorist threats. Guided by 
the analysis of conventional- centric and asymmetric-centric approaches to a 
counterterrorism strategy, this qualitative study focused on evaluating the effects of U.S. 
national strategy for the Afghanistan war between 2001 and 2016. A narrative inquiry 
was employed that used extensive in-depth interviews with five implementers and five 
recipients of the American strategy based in Afghanistan. The participants were recruited 
from the U.S. Special Forces community that implemented American strategy in 
Afghanistan, and from Afghans that experienced the American strategy firsthand. Data 
were analyzed by employing an inductive coding method.  The literature review revealed 
an intention to use large military forces to conduct a conventional-centric 
counterterrorism strategy, but the narrative inquiry revealed a negative effect of the 
conventional-centric counterterrorism strategy.  Though more research in this area is 
needed the implications from the findings for positive social change that an asymmetric-
centric strategy could offer as a possible effective solution for countering terrorism. 
These recommendations may help national strategy developers develop a structure to 
develop future counterterrorism strategies. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
The fall of the Berlin Wall ushered in the end of the Cold War and set up the 
United States of America as the unipolar power in the world.  As a result, most countries 
were fast adopting a liberal democracy as their governing means (CITE).  It would seem 
that developing and maintaining a sustainable national strategy would be much simpler 
and easier to achieve following the threat that a nuclear war with the Soviet Union 
presented.  Yet, for the last 16 years (beginning with the attacks on September 11, 2001 
that were quickly followed by the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Arab Spring, 
and the Syrian Civil War) suggest that a unipolar strategy based on Cold War experiences 
cannot address the complexities of a world where non-state actors influence events, 
create crisis, and dominate the public’s attention (Preble, Ashford & Evans, 2016).  
Though strategists and policy makers generally embrace the status quo of 
implementing a “military first” strategy, there is evidence from results of current 
engagements that a new strategy which would address the complexities of the 21st 
century social and political challenges is needed.  Relative to the rest of the world, 
Americans enjoy a considerable degree of security that rarely requires the military to 
directly intercede (Hammes, 2005).  The Cold War grand strategy of employing a liberal 
hegemony of large numbers of forward-deployed troops proved successful in countering 
known threats and allowing American to progress through a relative secure environment 
(Preble, 2016). There remains the temptation to continue to rely on conventional military 
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might to solve 21st century threats that seems to have entrenched itself with strategy 
makers (Preble, 2016).      
The purpose of a national security strategy is to look beyond the dynamic 
challenges in order to provide a framework for the nation’s security efforts to include 
countering terrorism (Metz & Johnson, 2001).  This purpose is derived, and explained, in 
the strategic direction contained in the following documents: the National Security 
Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review Report, and the 
Strategy for Counterterrorism (Thomas, 2011).  The intention of a national security 
strategy is to serve as a foundation that provides guidance for success in existing and 
future conflicts against adversaries that challenge or threaten the nation (Metz & Johnson, 
2001). 
Strategy, like leadership, is one of the most frequently discussed, studied, and 
written about concepts in the modern world – especially as it pertains to armed conflict.  
An examination of strategy is presented in the book, Strategy: A History, in which the 
author states that the term strategy, as the layman understands it, did not come into use 
until the 18th century when published philosophers frequently referred to it under the 
influence of enlightenment rationalism through the application of reason (Lawrence, 
2013).  Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, a veteran of the Napoleonic Wars, cemented a 
legacy in strategy development through the influential work, Art of War, which is 
regarded as one of the greatest military textbooks of the 19th century (Freidman, 2013).  
Through this publication, Jomini championed the concept that the objective of a winning 
strategy is to move resources in order to conduct a decisive battle with an armed 
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opponent (Freidman, 2013).  Jomini’s teachings have been incorporated at the U.S. 
Military and Naval Academies as well as having influenced the works of many 20th 
century strategists (Banks, 2011). As a result of their pervasive influence, Jomini’s 
precepts have dominated the thinking of generations of American military leaders, 
statesmen, and (to some extent) strategic scholars (Banks, 2011).  The interpretation of 
Jomini’s works can be found in the mass mobilization of manpower and industrial war 
materials as a cornerstone of the American strategy (Freidman, 2013).  This method of 
mobilizing national resources to force a decisive battle (or, more aptly, an overwhelming 
application of force to destroy an enemy) established the American strategy for both 
World Wars whose battles are studied and cited as a source of martial wisdom today in 
U.S. academic and military education centers (Banks, 2011). 
Problem Statement 
In order to understand the challenges of strategists, it is necessary to know that 
strategic challenges are manifestations of variables and trends that pose direct security 
challenges to vital interests of the United States.  While these challenges individually 
present both a threat and opportunity, it is the combination of challenges that offer the 
greatest test for U.S. strategy (Abrahms, 2012).  Although global in nature, current 
challenges to the security of the United States converge dangerously, and immediately, in 
the Middle East/South Asia region (Abrahms, 2012).  The strategic environment in these 
locations is characterized by a dynamic set of political, economic, military, and 
social/cultural variables that form the basis for global influence.  These variables are laid 
out in an increasingly connected and contested information domain (Abrahms, 2012).  
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The resultant trends determine complex and somewhat unpredictable forces on the global 
stage that requires a viable and measurably successful national security strategy that 
enables the nation to respond to threats that these variables present to the nation 
(Abrahms, 2012).   
The prevailing threat that influenced American national strategy policy from the 
end of World War II through the 20th century was the “Soviet menace” of expanding 
their influence through both conventional and nuclear war (Kunstler, 2011).  This threat 
prompted a U.S. defense strategy based on bipolar superpowers that allowed for a 
continuity, resulting in the long-term planning and executing of that strategy (Kunstler, 
2011).  In other terms, the Soviet threat allowed for a strategy based on the symmetry of 
countering an adversary’s strength through direct matching of capabilities; consequently, 
a strategy was created based on developing tactics, manufacturing materials, and 
increasing the personnel requirements for the military that was dictated by their direct 
association with the Soviets’ similar capability (Freidman, 2013).  This strategy of 
symmetry created an arms race during which submarines were created to counter 
submarines, tank battalions to counter tank battalions, and nuclear weapons to counter 
nuclear weapons (Metz & Johnson, 2010).   
     Considering the threat that the Soviets directly presented to national security, the 
focus for strategists was the development of a military plan based on the symmetry of 
resources.  Fostering interest in an alternative strategy that would addresses an 
asymmetric enemy with the goal to mitigate strength through the asymmetric approach 
was not approached in halls of the Pentagon during the Cold War (Schiff, 2012).  The end 
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of the Cold War found military strategists lacking.  They failed to create a viable strategy 
for addressing an adversary’s asymmetric strategy of turning strength into a weakness as 
employed in the Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia conflict areas.  The core of this gap 
resulted in a misaligned assumption.  U.S. military strategists made decisions concerning 
lesser threats according to the then dominant belief that if America could handle the 
Soviets, it could easily counter any of the lesser actors (Orehek & Vazeou-Nieuwenhuis, 
2014).  What has been proven, instead, is that an asymmetrical war is not a lesser version 
of the Cold War and the strategy that was successful for defeating the Soviet threat may 
not be successful against an asymmetric foe (Metz & Johnson, 2010, pp. 6–7).   
Purpose of the Study 
During an interview with Lieutenant General H.R. McMasters (Linnemann,, 
2016, pp 17-25) on numerous perceptions and mistakes about the strategy of the War on 
Terror engagements. His most important observation was this: “There are two ways to 
fight the United States: Asymmetrically and stupid, ‘Asymmetrically’ means, you are 
going to try to avoid our strengths” Linnemann,, 2016 p 17).  The challenge of a national 
strategy that addresses the threat of asymmetric war is the requirement that such a 
strategy must be able to innovate to meet the changing environment, adopt new policies 
and procedures for meeting strategic goals, and adopt asymmetric warfare as a base for 
strategic policies (Linnemann,, 2016, p 20).  Such a strategy for the new millennium must 
be informed by an understanding of the asymmetric threat and the employment of culture, 
determination, and a “long-struggle” methodology of warfare, rather than maintaining the 
existing approach of a short, high-tempo conventional (or symmetric) method of warfare 
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that relies on a singular, tactical capability designed for a specific niche (Dunlap, 1998).  
In short, in order to prevail in a complex world, the United States must employ a strategy 
that is more capable of operating in the negative space of asymmetrical war.  Students of 
Clausewitz understand that a strategist must know the nature of war and, to be successful, 
must adapt to the battle at hand (Boot, 2013). 
Some scholarly circles have acknowledged that the beginning of the encounter 
with asymmetrical war began for the United States in 1983, when a vehicle-borne 
improvised explosive device detonated inside the headquarters building for the U.S. 
Marine Corps operations in Beirut, Lebanon (Hammes, 2005).  This building represented 
the American political power and involvement in peacekeeping activities in the Middle 
East, as well as serving as a symbol of American influence in the region (Hammes, 
2005).  Though the attack caused the death of 241 Marines and sailors, its impact was 
larger than this; it resulted in a decidedly diminished influence of American policy in the 
region, and in terror becoming a primary political tool for enemies of the United States 
(Banks, 2011).  The attack was regarded as a terrorist event and was briefly covered on 
Western media outlets.  Yet, among the target populations of the Middle East, the attack 
was communicated as a demonstration that American power was ineffectual and the non-
state actor, in this case, Hezbollah, was strong (Gunning, 2007).  The greater 
consequence was the perception that a global power had been neutralized.  This 
perception, in turn, sent the message to lesser non-state factions and organizations that 
orthodox-based power designed on the symmetry of forces is not sustainable in a world 
that can employ asymmetric methods to wage war (Boot, 2013, p. 123).  Because of the 
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withdrawal of American power in that instance, the Beirut attack is considered by 
academics and intelligence analysts as the singular incident that challenged the once 
successful national security strategy of using direct military and political might to coerce 
a society into conforming.  This strategy, it became clear, was now obsolete because of 
the introduction of a new conflict that required innovative methodologies and strategies 
(Toft, 2012).  The relevance of asymmetrical warfare has been demonstrated.  It is an 
effective method to employ many tactics, including terrorism, to overwhelm an adversary 
that relies on being superiorly funded, equipped, and trained and that is supported by a 
significant technologically-advanced and economically-driven society (DiPaolo, 2005). 
Researchers who study the causes and effects of terrorism have paid a great deal 
of interest to the social and political structures that create terrorism as well as the 
processes and technologies by which the academic circles that focuses on strategy.  This 
focus, as it applies to the development of strategy, combines academic findings and 
opinions with a host of other actors (mostly bureaucrats and analysts) to normalize a 
central theme in the policies and strategies as a single valid strategy in understanding the 
global impact of terrorism and developing action to respond to it (Stampnitzky, 2013).  
Post-9/11/2001, the current counterterrorism industry can be considered to stem from 
efforts to redefine or establish terrorism as a sole entity based on previous studies of 
conflict (Stampnitzky, 2013).  Therefore, current national strategy originates a cause of 
both national urgency following the 9/11 attacks and a created industry based on a small 
community of academics and professionals redefining a method and tactic as the threat 
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instead of the creators of the asymmetric conflict the nation finds itself in (Petraeus, 
2013). 
There is a clear need for the United States to develop new and innovative 
strategies for dealing with asymmetric warfare versus symmetric warfare.  It is 
problematic that strategists in the U.S. still cling to approaches to warfare that stem from 
previous conflicts.  The root of this problem began at the end of World War II, when the 
United States held political, martial, and economic supremacy compared to the rest of the 
world.  During that time, the United States also developed unparalleled diplomatic, 
economic, and martial influence, all of which challenged the strategies and actions of the 
former Soviet Union (Lind, 1994).  The successful strategy that allowed for matching and 
defeating the Soviet Union was also the weak link in the system: third generation 
warfare, which is based on the symmetry of forces that are committed to a major war in 
which the objective is to defeat and destroy the opposing nation-state (Hammes, 2005).  
This example of third generation warfare is dependent upon a nation’s military excelling 
in building a doctrine that establishes budgetary, planning, and training programs in skill-
sets aimed at defeating a symmetric enemy (Kilcullen, 2011).  For the non-state 
adversary (such as the terrorist, insurgent, or extremist), the model for defying a stronger 
nation-state seems to be impossible to implement; yet the insurgent, terrorist, or extremist 
fashioned the version of a fourth method of struggle (Hammes, 2005).  This method is 
focused on the principle that, in an asymmetrical war, all environmental elements are part 
of the conflict (Metz & Johnson, 2010).   
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Research Question 
“Strategy,” as defined by respected American strategist, Clausewitz (Gatzke, 
1942), includes the view that each individual engagement in a war is part of a progression 
in order to attain the larger goal of the campaign or war.  With this in mind, the strategist 
applying the Clausewitzian paradigm believes that the general principles for strategy are 
(a) to conquer and destroy the adversary’s armed power; (b) take possession of the 
adversary’s resources and sources of economic and political strength; and (c) gain public 
opinion (Gatzke, 1942).  When developing national strategy, there are aspects of 
asymmetric warfare that the strategist must consider; these aspects are currently separate 
from traditional warfare strategies.  The kind of traditional warfare that Clausewitz 
frames as an aspect of strategy is either enemy-centric or terrain-centric warfare, 
consisting of an enemy engagement wherein each side bears similar costs (Gatzke, 1942, 
p 254).  The Clausewitzian view of strategy unintentionally relegates asymmetric warfare 
to a secondary status. 
Furthermore, the term “strategy” is often misused; there is a tendency for persons 
in the field to manipulate the term to mean a general plan or course of action.  The reality 
of strategy is that it is comprised, not only of plans, but also of the authority of the 
national leadership, including the leaders of the state, military, private sector, and other 
critical institutions to form an all-inclusive approach that uses national power to control 
situations in order to attain national objectives (Yarger, 2015).  This characterization of 
strategy provides a richer, more comprehensive meaning: that strategy is, at its root, 
about control and is fundamentally concerned with the efficient application of different 
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types of power in order to achieve national objectives.  If we acknowledge the threat that 
terrorism and asymmetric adversaries pose to the nation, then the requirement for a 
national strategy that addresses the objectives in defeating that type of adversary should 
afford greater success.   
In this project, the researcher focused on discovering and expounding on the 
information that addressed this central question: How does the American strategic 
perception of an asymmetric adversary in Afghanistan affect the conflict outcome and are 
the Afghan public perceptions of the outcomes of the strategy a positive or negative 
influence in supporting a strong, stabilized democratic country that is free from terrorist 
influence?  This question is far-reaching, which allowed for a very broad investigation of 
this topic.  To mitigate the possibility of vagaries, the researcher used the following 
comprehensive questions to support and narrow the research inquiry: 
1. How is the effectiveness of conventional military actions in Afghanistan 
measured as an asymmetric conflict? 
2. What were the perceptions of the Afghan people and Americans implementing 
the strategy to combat the terrorist (asymmetric) adversary and the resulting 
stability created by the strategy from 2001–2016? 
3. What were the perceptions of the Afghan people on the presence of the large 
footprint of the international coalition’s forces from 2001–2016 and did it 
support or detract from the strategy of removing the threat of terrorism and 
stabilizing the country? 
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To answer this question, the research methodology used involved such elements 
as research “intention, investigation, location, target populace, as well as the 
establishment of sample and sampling procedures, research instruments, pilot testing of 
the instruments, data collection process, and data analysis procedures” (Creswell, 2013, 
p.??).  Through data collection and the application of a validation process, the primary 
researcher was able to put these elements into perspective.  The following section of the 
project is of importance to the creditability of the research as it indicates that the research 
was conducted in agreement with the required standards. 
Theoretical Foundation 
As it relates to political or social violence in terrorist activities, many scholars 
have attempted to apply conflict theory (symmetrical strategies in warfare) in order to 
understand conflict.  Though originally developed in economic theory, the assumptions 
of conflict theory have also been applied by social scientists investigating the reasons 
behind and outcomes of conflict (Vahabi, 2009).  During the Cold War, for example, 
deterrence was a practical strategy developed through the application of conflict theory in 
that it assumes that each state involved in a nuclear conflict ultimately wanted survival 
over ideological victory (Vahabi, 2009).  This required the combatants, not only to 
coexist, but also to develop a mutual dependence upon each other’s continued existence 
diplomatically, through information sharing, militarily, and economically (Vahabi, 2009).   
The examination of social conflict, as found in the study of terrorism, suggests 
that there exists a struggle conducted by a sub sect of a culture or nation that fights for a 
common cause such as liberation, succession from the majority, or implementation of a 
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religious or political ideology (Stringham, 2007).  The understanding that, unlike a 
market conflict – which is resolved within the boundaries of the rule of law – or a 
national conflict – which is conducted under the guidance of international law and 
established customs for national survival – the dynamic challenge of social or asymmetric 
conflict should be examined through the lens of asymmetric conflict theory in order to 
explain the use of violence (Stringham, 2007).  As an extension of conflict theory, the 
argument posed by Arreguin-Toft (2012) is that asymmetric conflict is rooted in conflict 
theory, but requires a deeper inquiry into its causes and effects.    
Arreguin-Toft (2012) asserts that, according to asymmetrical conflict theory, 
when the strong engage the weak in asymmetric, armed conflict, a long-term strategy that 
establishes an achievable goal becomes more important to achieving victory than 
employing mere power.  The use of the conflict in Afghanistan as the litmus test for 
investigating the contemporary security strategies and counterterrorism policies to 
determine if engaging in orthodox military approaches is, thus, a feasible approach to 
countering the impact of terror.  In this study, organizations that employ terror as means 
for social and political change were examined.  The literature demonstrates that, over the 
last 16 years, there have been some short-term accomplishments using the “heavy hand” 
and “high funding” approach of the third generation conventional military.  However, 
these successes usually came at the early stages of the conflict and were replaced by the 
long-term strategy of the asymmetrical adversary (Banks, 2011).  
 The literature also establishes the premise that applying the asymmetrical conflict 
theory (Toft, 2012) will help to explain that, as a struggle develops over a protracted 
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period of time, early victories will be thwarted by the adversary who adapts asymmetric 
methods, as demonstrated in Afghanistan.  In Afghanistan, the specific adversary is a 
collection of extremist, insurgent, and terrorist organizations that have endured 
American-led coalition countermeasures, learned from them the American-led activities, 
and responded with a more effective means of achieving chaos, creating terror, and 
encouraging lawlessness (Bolechow, 2005).  By enduring, waiting, and studying the 
conventional adversary, a terrorist can mitigate counterterrorism strategies through 
rapidly counteracting the static antiterrorism strategy.  This was demonstrated in 
Afghanistan with the rise of antidemocratic organizations that moved temporarily from 
direct action against coalition forces to asymmetric actions, such as the controlling of the 
media message for Al Qaeda and Taliban forces (Caldwell, 2011).  Such a response from 
an asymmetric adversary results in the absurd strategy of using manpower, technology, 
and funding for minuscule outcomes at an increasing cost of treasure and blood compared 
with the earlier accomplishments of the initial phases of the conflict (Caldwell, 2011).  
This indicates the necessity for a close examination of the employment of the current 
national strategies as an effectual process to neutralize an asymmetric adversary 
(Hammes, 2005).  There is a gap in the literature concerning this matter because 
researchers have failed to expound upon how a dominant diplomatic, intellectual, 
military, and economic power  (such as the United States) might use a conventional 
military strategy to defeat an asymmetrical adversary such as the Taliban and Al Qaeda 
(Armborst, 2010). 
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Nature of the Study 
The intent of this study is to employ a qualitative research method, centered on a 
narrative analysis approach that incorporates open-ended inquiries by using a semi-
structured cross-examination of the subjects as they detail their experiences and 
conceptions of the issue.  The narrative approach intertwines a sequence of events, taken 
from individual experiences, and allows for a cohesive chronicle of the impact of 
American strategy – both on the Afghan nationals affected by it and the American 
personnel required to implement it.  The narrative approach requires in-depth 
examination of the participant’s experiences, along with supporting documents that lead 
to the discovery of trends and themes that illustrate the individual’s life influences and 
the strategy that created it (Creswell, 2013).   
The current analysis required scrutiny of the information presented by the 
participants, centered on their perspectives and experiences of the American security 
strategy as it pertains to Afghanistan and the Central Asian States.  The primary 
researcher conducted this examination using a descriptive research survey design.  This 
research design was appropriate in that it allowed the researcher to exploit the qualitative 
data provided by the participants.  This design also made it possible for qualitative data to 
be thoroughly examined through identification, analysis, and interpretation of various 
conditions that are relevant to the policy guidelines (see Frankfort-Nachmias  & 
Nachmias, 2008).   
The study was restricted to no more than ten participants total: five participants 
were chosen at random from the Special Forces retired community and five Afghan 
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national participants that lived under the American counterterrorism strategy were 
interviewed.  A consistent approach was employed; participants were administered the 
questions in a uniform manner, while still allowing each subject to reply in as much detail 
as they desired.  This design was appropriate in that it allowed for comparison of the 
current situation and the expected situation.  The findings will be presented in the form of 
a table.  For this analysis, various instruments were used that supported an accurate 
survey, such as NVivo as the means to capture and organize the data.  Other survey 
resources, including interviews and checklists, were used.  Patton (2012) opines, “the use 
of a various number of research instruments is always encouraged so as to ensure that the 
data collected is accurate and holistic” (p.??).  Opinions from subject matter experts were 
pursued from the appropriate sources to ascertain the suitability of the research 
instruments. 
Definitions of Terms 
Asymmetric warfare.  The struggle in which two belligerents contrast in the size 
and ability of their economic, military, and social capabilities, yet the weaker side 
attempts to exploit the stronger foe’s weaknesses. The conflict relies upon the weaker 
adversary employing strategies and tactics of unconventional or irregular warfare.  In 
this, the weaker adversary employs a strategy that offset deficiencies in quantity or 
quality by neutralizing or making a weakness out the stronger foes reliance on 
conventional power.  Such strategies move beyond just being militarized and use all 
elements of society where, in contrast, symmetric war is based on two adversaries that 
employ similar conventional power and resources that rely on tactics that are at their core 
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similar, differing only in specifics and implementation (Toft, 2012).  Furthermore, a 
broad and irregular spectrum of military, paramilitary, and information operations 
conducted by states, organizations, or individuals as well as surrogate forces under their 
control, specifically affecting vulnerabilities within an adversarial government or armed 
force (Department of Defense, 2010). 
Antiterrorism.  Actions that are taken with the goal of decreasing the 
vulnerability of people and property to terrorist actions, including the response to affected 
areas and containment of areas by the military and civilian forces (Department of 
Defense, 2010). 
Center of gravity.  The foundation of political, social, and military power that 
handles moral standing, tangible strength in a conventional conflict, freedom of action to 
respond to social threat, and provides the will to act (JP 1-02 & JP 5-0, Aug 2011). 
Effects-based operations.  The method used by military or operational planners 
for attaining chosen strategic goals, outcome, or effect on the enemy (JFCOM Glossary at 
www.jfcom .mil/about/glossary.htm). 
Irregular warfare.  A form of asymmetric warfare that describes an armed 
conflict between governing state authorities and non-state actors for legitimate 
governance as well as social influence over the targeted population(s).  Employers of 
irregular warfare use indirect or asymmetric approaches in challenging the stronger more 
capable conventional state forces through a full range of military and other capabilities.  
The goal of the irregular warrior is to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and 
willpower to continue (DOD 3000.07, Irregular Warfare, Dec 2008). 
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Insurgency.  A methodical and systematic operation, the goal of which is to 
overthrow a constituted government through the use of asymmetric tactics that employ 
certain elements, such as subversion and indirect armed conflict (Department of Defense, 
2010).   
Jihad.  An Arabic word originally meaning: to struggle, endeavor, or apply 
oneself in support of Allah.  The term has become associated with violent extremists who 
employ the perception of jihad as a call to arms to justify their actions (Department of 
Defense, 2010).  
Measures of effectiveness.  The metric established by operational leaders to 
judge the success or effectiveness of a particular strategy, operational implementation, or 
tempo and assess the area or country’s system behavior for positive changes as well as 
indicators in the capabilities of adversaries and the operational environment in which 
forces are deployed within.  The purpose of the gauging the measures of effectiveness is 
to create a form of measuring the attainment of the strategic goal (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0, 
Joint Operations, 11 Aug 2011). 
National strategy.  The guiding stratagem or blueprint for improving and using 
the social, moral, economic, diplomatic, and informational resources of a nation that form 
a synergy with the tangible assets of military might to secure national objectives (JP 1-
02). 
National Defense Strategy. The National Defense Strategy is a proposal 
submitted by the Secretary of Defense for the employment of the Armed Forces of the 
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United States, as well as agencies and organizations, to achieve national security strategy 
objectives (DOD Joint Publication 1-02, June 2014). 
Strategy.  A plan, policy or approach to solving a problem in the case of a nation 
by using the mechanisms that make up the nation’s power.  The strategy involves using 
the nation’s resources in a synchronized fashion that is integrated with governmental 
agencies’ critical infrastructure and key partners to achieve national and multinational 
objectives (DOD Joint Publication1-02, June 2014 and DOD Joint Publication 3-0, Joint 
Operations, 11 Aug 2011). 
Terrorism.  The illegitimate use of violence or the threat of the illegitimate use of 
violence that’s purpose is to sow fear as well as to coerce a legitimate government or 
established society to accept particular political goals.  Terrorism is often inspired by or 
used in the name of religious, political, or other ideological dogmas that are the center of 
an illegitimate organization’s moral foundation.  Such organizations are, though inspired 
by religious or other ideologies, committed to the pursuit of goals that are usually 
political objectives (DOD Joint Publication 3-26, 2014).  The premeditated actions based 
on politically motivated actions that create violence intend to be enacted against civilian 
or noncombatant targets by an organization that is considered to be a subnational group 
or illegal agent as quantified by the United States Federal Code 22 USC §2656f as well as 
defined within the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Department of Justice, 
2014).  Terrorism may also be defined as the illegitimate use of violence against persons 
or property to intimidate or coerce the legitimate government, the civilian population, or 
any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives (Department of 
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Homeland Security, 2013).  This definition is used by the FBI and indicates that the 
mission of the FBI Counterterrorism organization is to identify a terrorist incident as it 
pertains to the criminal laws of the United States, which would result in the suspected 
terrorist being subject to arrest and prosecution (Department of Justice, 2013). 
Terrorist.  An individual that engages in an act or acts of terrorism. (Department 
of Defense, 2014). Also, a subgroup, by definition, is an extremist who uses terrorism for 
the purpose of targeting of noncombatant or innocent people to produce fear in order to 
terrorize regimes or societies in the quest of political, religious, or ideological goals.  
Extremists use terrorism to impede and undermine political progress, economic 
prosperity, the security and stability of the international state system, and the future of 
civil society (Department of Defense, 2014). 
Terrorist organization.  More than one terrorist who works in unison towards a 
common goal, usually under an organizational framework, with an establish hierarchy 
and position requirements.  The assembly of terrorists into a group makes this 
organization a united relationship that uses its organization for the purpose of 
perpetrating acts of terrorism (Department of Defense, 2014). 
Assumptions 
A key assumption held in this inquiry was that narratives from the participants 
would be provided honestly and candidly.  Based upon rigorous critique by a preliminary 
test of the questions and the instrument used to measure the responses, it was assumed 
that the data gained was identified with a high confidence rate.  Further, it was assumed 
that participants in the inquiry would complete the interview process and have the 
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information measured through the approved instrument based on the criteria established 
for the investigation.  
Scope and Delimitations 
The intent of this study was to employ a qualitative research method, centered 
upon a narrative methodology, that incorporated open-ended inquiries by using a semi-
structured cross-examination of the subjects as they detailed their experiences and 
conceptions of the issue based in their experiences (see Creswell, 2013).  In this analysis, 
the information provided by the participants was scrutinized for their perspectives of and 
experiences with the American national security strategy.  This analysis provides a view 
of each individual’s story as the foundation for the larger influences created by 
counterterrorism national strategy as it pertains to Afghanistan.  It was restricted to no 
more than 10 participants, with one group of the participants selected from the Special 
Operations retired community.  These individuals have experience conducting operations 
to implement American strategy in Afghanistan.  The second group of participants 
consisted of Afghan citizens with experience with American security policies and 
counterterrorism operations.  A consistent approach with the participants in this study 
was used through the administration of questions in an undeviating method, which 
allowed each participant to reply in as much detail as they desired to reflect their 
perceptions based on life experiences with the strategy.   
This study was based on the acceptance that any security strategy ought to 
recognize the impact of a modern asymmetric war and must correspondingly assimilate 
the doctrines of traditional strategists with the evolving methods of asymmetrical warfare.  
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It is impractical to apply a direct study of the United States’ mastery of the nature of all 
versions of modern war, but what can be examined is the impact of a strategist in better 
understanding the limitations of its conventional approach to strategic contemplation 
(Boot, 2016).  State and non-state adversaries that have abundant weapons, technology, 
or a resilient economy do not employ asymmetric conflict, but the victor of the conflict is 
the adversary that survives, adapts, and maintains their willpower by controlling the 
tempo and maintaining a resolve to win (Thorton, 2007).  With this in mind, the 
examination of data in this study was limited to American national security policies as 
they pertain to the conflict in Afghanistan.  Moreover, the study was restricted to the 
impact of the strategy on the local level of implementers and receivers of both the 
American and the asymmetric adversary activities as the strategy and counterstrategy 
activities took place.  The results of this study add to the literature by focusing on the 
examination of security strategy, as opposed to an asymmetric adversary, by investigating 
the topic through the lens of a narrative experience.  This examination also delineates the 
study by focusing it on the experiences of the individuals that lived through the effects of 
the strategy against the literature. 
Limitations 
One of the advantages of narrative-based research is that participants are allowed 
to weave a sequence of events that provide a storyline for their experiences, a timeline, 
and the size of the interview pool of participants is small – usually one to two individuals 
(Creswell, 2013).  As such, misinterpretation or bias in the findings might be in question.  
The characteristics and size of the target population of this study bring a level of restraint 
22 
 
to the possibility of bias.  The participants were drawn from professional communities in 
which objectivity is highly prized and expected.  Therefore, it was assumed that they 
would be objective in replying to queries about strategy in developing security and 
counterterrorism strategies as it relates to asymmetrical warfare.   
The participants shared their mutual experience of security strategies and 
counterterrorism operations with a focus concentrated on operations within Afghanistan.  
Through the demands of their profession, the participants exhibit superb expertise in the 
field of security strategies and counterterrorism policies, yet restraint was exercised in 
determining a conclusion from the data or agreeing to the findings of the data that was 
validation for a particular policy interpretation.  One potential weakness of the study 
might be the participants’ unwillingness to indicate any possible likelihood of failed 
behavior, especially if they perceived that their behavior was a direct reflection of the 
strategic policies they were implementing or received on a tactical level in Afghanistan.  
Through the confidentiality of the program and anonymity of the research design, this 
concern was mitigated. 
Due to the potential effort, access, and time constraints that were faced in the 
course of this study, the participant pool was limited solely to professionals with 
knowledge of security strategy implementation and experience in counterterrorism 
operations with a focus on operational experience within Afghanistan.  Applying the 
narrative methodology of qualitative research, the research had a small sample size to 
draw from; as such, the broad-spectrum of the data might be in question (Creswell, 
2013).  The very characteristics of the participant population convey a degree of 
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limitation.  The convictions of the participants’ viewpoints based on political ideology 
were also avoided so as to avoid bias in endorsing or judging a specific course of action 
as opposed to another.  It was ensured that the views or perceptions stated by a 
participant would not be used to construe, support, or reflect the senior leadership in 
leading the implementation of strategy and counterterrorism policy.   
Significance 
The intent of this study was to employ a qualitative research method, 
centered on a narrative analysis approach that incorporated open-ended inquiries by 
using a semi-structured cross-examination of subjects as they detailed their 
experiences and conception of the issue at hand.  The narrative approach intertwines 
a sequence of events that is usually taken from a number of individuals in order to 
form a cohesive chronicle of impact of American strategy (Creswell, 2013).  The 
narrative approach requires in-depth interviews, supported by the examination of 
supporting documents that leads to the discovery of trends and themes that illustrate 
the individual’s life influences and the strategy that created them (Creswell, 2013).  
In this analysis, the information presented by the participants was scrutinized, 
with a focus on their perspectives and experiences of the American security strategy as it 
pertained to Afghanistan and the Central Asian States.  This examination was 
accomplished using a descriptive research survey design.  This research design was 
appropriate because it allowed exploitation of the qualitative data provided by the 
participants.  This design also make it possible for the research to exploit qualitative data 
through identification, analysis, and interpretation of various conditions that are relevant 
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to the policy guidelines (Frankfort-Nachmias  & Nachmias, 2008).  Restricted to retired 
Special Forces soldiers that conducted operations to implement national strategy in 
Afghanistan as well as participants from the Afghan community that endured the actions, 
this methodological strategy provided a unique way to examine the means that the United 
States military uses to recognize the type of war it is engaged in.  The uniform manner in 
which the interviews were conducted provided a measured control over the data, yet 
allowed each contributor to reply in as much detail as they desired.  The primary 
researcher used various instruments in the analysis, such as NVivo, that supported an 
accurate survey as the means to capture and organize the data.  Survey resources used 
included interviews and checklist (see Patton, 2012).   
Summary 
The impact of the current asymmetric warfare environment consists of multiple 
actors and organizations across the globe supporting each other only through their mutual 
goals (Robinson et al., 2014).  The issue with asymmetric conflict is that, even though it 
is not as obvious as a massive conventional military attack, it does impact the nation’s 
interest.  This impact is compounded by the challenges to national strategy response to 
economic globalization that creates interdependence between nation states, as well as 
population groups that in turn create social competition between these same entities 
(Kunstler, 2011).  The rapid growth of interdependence between previously isolated 
entities is compounded by the infusion of asymmetric activities conducted by non-nation 
state actors (such as transnational terrorists, insurgents, and international criminal 
organizations) who serve to complicate matters of strategy and policy (Robinson, 2014).  
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The overlap of these groups becomes problematic, as globalization normally generates a 
shift in the previously established balance of power.  The era of globalization is notable 
because of the incredible scope and pace of the changes occurring both outside of and 
within existing power structures (Thomas, 2011).  As it relates to the asymmetric 
adversary, the shift in the balance of power, along with the need to stabilize the areas that 
threaten globalization, requires intervention to provide stability that results in successful 
U.S. military and political operations (Choi, 2015).  These operations, based on the Cold 
War strategy of proxy war, rely on the support and contribution of the host government in 
the country that requires stabilization (Choi, 2015). 
  The intensity of these operations depends on their objectives, goals, and the types 
of organization – some of which receive either direct support from the target population 
or apathy from the population in supporting the national government goals (Amir & 
Singer, 2008).  Due to the global nature of asymmetric threats in creating multiple on-
going conflicts, this study focuses on the most prevalent example of U.S. National 
Security Strategy in addressing the threat of terrorism from Afghanistan.  Thus, this study 
addresses, in particular, the strategy of the U.S. military during the Afghanistan conflict 
as an example of the development and execution of a national security strategy (see 
Breen & Geltzer, 2011).  Additionally, organizations using terror tactics employed 
around the world were examined to demonstrate the global nature of asymmetric warfare 
and serve as the basis for explanation.  Understanding the type of conflict, as it explains 
the prevalent threats, will allow strategy developers and conflict analysts to adapt their 
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approach in addressing the core of the conflict instead of a piecemeal response to the 
tactics of an adversary (Mack, 1975). 
When the United States declared the “War on Terrorism,” it led to military 
engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as numerous smaller engagements around 
the globe.  Preble’s (2016) question, “Has the United States botched the timeless warning 
of past experiences to know your enemy and design a strategy that destroys him?”  (p.??) 
requires examination. This inquiry into military strategy may provide an explanation as to 
what the United States has achieved in Afghanistan and, more singularly, whether the 
United States has successfully targeted terrorist organizations in Afghanistan.  This gap 
in the research led the researcher to examine terrorism research that included the broader 
impact of being part of an asymmetric conflict in which the adversary for the nation state, 
chiefly the United States, cannot compete on a symmetric level and, thus, engages the 
communities from which terrorists often emerge as well as the populaces that convey the 
impact of counterterrorism strategies. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
There are many opinions on war and the development of strategy to conduct war 
(Gray, 2006).  One argument posed by a number of professionals and scholars anticipates 
a global revolution in military affairs brought on by the application of advanced 
technologies and an innovative doctrine that predominantly advances the areas of 
information management, remote surveillance, and precision airstrike capabilities based 
on advanced sensors to the operator networks.  This would result in a speed of execution 
for military operations that is beyond all but the most advanced societies’ capabilities 
(Chew, 2014).  At the other end of the argument, there are those that propose that the 
dominant social trends, particularly ethnic conflict, population and resource imbalances, 
as well as the urbanization of population centers, combined with a general appreciation of 
Western military superiority, propel warfare toward terrorist organizations, criminals, and 
revolutionary insurgencies that employ brutal local conflicts (Gentile, 2013).  
Regrettably, a large number of professionals and scholars are advocates for a single view 
of warfare by transforming strategy as if one of these futures automatically excludes the 
other, yet the literature demonstrates that nothing could be further from the truth (U.S. 
Senate, 2014). 
Literature Search Strategy 
Investigating a subject that is as broad reaching as terrorism as well as the use of 
asymmetric conflict in terrorism requires the evaluation of numerous peer-reviewed and 
professionally sustained informational sources.  These sources are required to be 
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grounded by information provided from or referenced for official diplomatic instructions, 
national security policies, accounts of military campaigns, and activities that document 
government agencies responsible for countering terrorism such as the Department of 
Homeland Security and the Justice Department.  The Walden University Library and 
Research Center provided the primary researcher with the material used in this project 
through access to scholarly databases.  What follows is a review of those key texts. 
The Library of Congress maintains a register and valuation of numerous databases 
that are pertinent to the research of government policies, operations, and results as they 
relate to terrorism (The Library of Congress, 2017).  The core of these available 
databases is the “Social Science Research on Terrorism,” which provides detailed 
accounts of operations related to terrorist response – including cost, time, and measurable 
results.  A key feature of the Library of Congress is the portal access to numerous 
Internet-based databases that are relevant in research based on the social science view of 
terrorism, specifically for those searching for actual data (e.g., names of terrorist 
organizations, incidents of terrorist activity, and those with search capabilities).  The 
databases accessed during the course of this study were maintained primarily by U.S. 
government agencies, government-sponsored research centers, and international 
organizations.   
The Department of Justice operates the National Institute for Justice (NIJ), which 
maintains a database on terrorist incidents and indictments in the American Terrorism 
Study (National Institute for Justice, 2017).  Working closely with the FBI, the NIJ has 
collected information on incidents and indictments from terrorism investigations.  The 
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dataset includes material on 500 terrorists and over 60 terrorist groups indicted in more 
than 6,700 federal criminal counts.  NIJ has supported the data collection and analysis 
portion of the research, a portion of which has compared international jihad groups with 
domestic right-wing groups and showed attempts by domestic terrorists to forge alliances 
with international jihadist groups.   
The Rand Corporation is a major think tank for the United States and maintains a 
database titled the “Rand Database Worldwide Terrorism Incidents” (RDWTI), which is 
a compilation of data from global sources on international and domestic terrorist events 
ranging from 1968 through 2009 (The Rand Corporation, 2017).  Contributions from 
public and private organizations sponsor the maintenance of the RDWTI and its 
predecessors, the RAND Terrorism Chronology and the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident 
Database.  The RDWTI is a fully searchable and interactive database, with the intention 
of providing quality and comprehensive data for researcher on a scholarly level.   
The National Archives is a publically administered repository of all records of the 
United States (National Archives, 2017).  To accomplish the monumental task of keeping 
track of these records, the National Archive maintains the Archives Library Information 
Center, organized to provide access to information on American historical government, 
archival administration, and information management documents.  There is many diverse 
datasets employed by the library information center, but the two key areas used in this 
investigation were: the Central Intelligence Agency Records Search Tool (CREST) and 
the Digital National Security Archive.  The CREST database contains unclassified 
documents from the CIA Directorate of Operations reports on the role of intelligence in 
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the post-WWII period to 2010 and is an excellent source of informaiton concerning the 
activities of the United States military in Afghanistan post-9/11.  The Digital National 
Security Archive contains 38 collections consisting of over 94,000 declassified 
government documents that incorporate global events and U.S. policy decisions.   
Theoretical Foundation  
Of all the contemporary justifications for waging war, it is arguably certain that 
asymmetric is amongst the broadest, if not the most encompassing.  Some scholars state 
that asymmetrical conflict theory can be categorized through the examination of various 
existing and potential concepts of asymmetric conflict (Chase, 2011).  Employing 
asymmetrical conflict theory, scholars characterize four different subthemes through 
which asymmetry may be deduced as it applies to strategy:  “power distribution, 
organizational capability of the adversary, approach to conflict, and cultural norms of the 
environment that the conflict is waged within” (p.123).  This recent approach in defining 
conflict can result in a misunderstanding through the misapplication of the terms 
asymmetry strategy and/or asymmetric conflict, which distorts the adversary and leads us 
to make major strategic blunders (Angstrom, 2011).  This is demonstrated in the strategy 
of concentrating on threats rather than adversarial strategies.  By employing the 
asymmetric conflict theory over conflict theory, this study allows the strategy for 
Afghanistan to be understood through the strategic nature, goals, and overall concepts of 
American strategy in Afghanistan as judged by the operations the strategy dictates (see 
Peceny & Bosin, 2011). 
31 
 
In describing asymmetric war, researchers of current forms of conflict theorize 
that significant change in the character of war has occurred in which America, the 
champion of symmetric war, has not addressed (Chew, 2014).  Many of these studies 
have identified and analyzed the characteristics of modern interventions as the template 
for asymmetric war (Chace, 2011).  Proponents of asymmetric warfare have suggested 
that there are significant differences between modern (asymmetric) war and conventional 
wars of the past (Chace, 2011).  The challenge for strategists in approaching a modern 
asymmetric conflict is that war, as cognitively acknowledged to most people that are 
noncombatants, is a battle in which soldiers and machines meet to decide who wins, 
much like a football game.  The expectation is that, with war, there is a substantial event 
– such as one battle or campaign – that decides the issues through a dispute in 
international affairs (Chace, 2011).  September 11th, 2001 could be considered the day 
that conventional war as a mainstay of strategy ended with the need for strategy in its 
Clausewitzian tradition to recede (Chace, 2011).  Asymmetric warfare theorists identify 
this type of warfare with particular styles of conducting war – in contrast to the 
conventional style of post-Cold War United States strategies that focus on maneuver 
warfare.  Asymmetric warfare, to the contrary, employs all available systems ranging 
from political, economic, social, to finally, a military solution in order to convince the 
enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too 
costly for the perceived benefit (Hammes, 2005).  In essence, warfare, particularly that 
seen in Afghanistan, has evolved into a form of global insurgency against conventional 
powers (Hammes, 2005). 
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The one linking factor that is examined between symmetric, or conventional, war 
and an asymmetric one is that strategy is essential for success.  The core of conflict, 
whether it is symmetric or asymmetric, is the persistent threat or use of violence to 
achieve desired ends (CITE).  With this in mind, strategy has no permanent form and 
must always manifest itself to meet the challenges in order to achieve the objective.  This 
perspective is best summed up by Dolman: “strategy, in its simplest form, is a plan for 
attaining continuing advantage (Chace, 2011, p.??).  Dolman discerns that a strategist’s 
duty is frequently supported by an advantage that allows for the strategy to be successful.  
Yet, with an asymmetric adversary, this advantage can easily become a disadvantage 
(Angstrom, 2011).  The strategist must observe that an advantage may take the form of 
material, political will, or a superior understanding of how to convert resources to 
achieve its ends.  Understanding asymmetrical war and all the influences it has on the 
multidisciplinary aspects of modern conflict is a challenge for strategists that must 
manifest itself in a similarly wide range. 
The uninformed use of strategy may employ an absolute means for achieving an 
objective.  However, in the 21st century, the achievement of Dolman’s continuing 
advantage needs to be reexamined as a strategy that reminds us that warfare, and a 
successful strategy, is generational.  The current generation exploits asymmetric war for 
the purposes of successfully reaching their political goals (Angstrom, 2011).  In 
asymmetric warfare, the strategic environment is characterized by a rich set of global 
political, economic, military, and social/cultural variables that form the basis for global 
influence, played out in an increasingly connected and contested information domain 
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(Carter, 2014).  The resultant meta-trends exert extremely powerful, complex, and 
somewhat unpredictable forces on the global environment (Carter, 2014).  The leading 
factor in the global environment is the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), which 
outlines the focus of the power and direction of the military strategies of the United 
States and illuminates what challenges and threats the nation faces (Sanger & Baker, 
2010).  Table 1 identifies the focus of the national strategy since 1994 and demonstrates 
the changing factors and focus of the strategy.  Though terrorism is identified and interest 
in the security of U.S. citizens is made clear, the identification of asymmetric threats is 
not currently acknowledged, nor is the world prepared for them (Robinson, 2014). 
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Table 1 
Two Decades of National Security Strategies  
1994 -NSS 1997 -NSS 1999/2000 -NSS 
• Enlarging the community 
of democracies 
• Enhance our security 
• Promote prosperity at 
home 
• Promote democracy 
• Protect nation's essential 
and enduring requirements 
• Safeguard the lives and 
safety of Americans 
• Maintain the sovereignty 
of America, with the 
nation’s values, institutions 
and territory intact 
• Provide for the prosperity 
of the nation and its people 
 
• Defend vital interests of 
the nation 
• Ensure the survival, 
safety and vitality of nation 
• Support the national 
interests through 
humanitarian and other 
interests. 
2002 - NSS 2006 - NSS 2010 NSS 
• Defend the nation 
• Preserve the peace by 
building on common 
interests to promote global 
security 
• Extend the benefits of 
freedom across the globe 
• Champion the goals of 
human dignity 
• Strengthen the global 
alliances to defeat global 
terrorism 
• Work with the nations 
allies to resolve conflicts 
• Avert our adversaries 
from threatening America 
or its allies, with WMD 
• Incite a new age of global 
economic growth  
• Expand the development 
of allied nations by 
opening societies and 
constructing the 
infrastructure of 
democracy 
•  Modernize America's 
national security 
establishments 
• Take on the prospects as 
well as confront the 
challenges that 
globalization of the 
economy, cultures, and 
information create. 
•  Strengthen Nation’s 
Defense 
• Secure the Homeland and 
Combat the Threat of 
Terrorism 
• Construct the Capacity to 
Prevent Conflict 
• Avert the Increase and 
Employment of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction  
• Assure Access to Shared 
Spaces 
• Confront Climate Change 
•Protect the areas of Cyber-
security, Space Security, 
Air and Maritime Security 
• Increase the focus on 
Global Health Security 
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Conceptual Framework 
Within the last fourteen years, the United States has shifted to employing a 
strategy of population-centric counterinsurgency strategies such as were used in 
Afghanistan and Iraq – with inadequate results.  Though the countries of Afghanistan and 
Iraq are different in culture and infrastructure, both U.S. military campaigns against them 
sought to secure the population and build local support for the new governments (Preble, 
Ashford, & Evans, 2016).  The results were conflicts that were exceedingly costly in 
terms of blood and treasure, while neither yielded a definitive accomplishment of the 
national objectives.  What has become typical in asymmetric conflicts is that the conflict 
generates international and domestic political, military, and public aversion to large-
scale, United States-led operations.  Consequently, many U.S. citizens continue to 
question the efficacy of America’s counterinsurgency strategy.  Following the operations 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is the question as to whether the United States can and will 
develop a national strategy that will prevail over asymmetric threats to its security 
(Hammes, 2012). 
Previous Approaches to the Challenges of Asymmetric Warfare 
Academics and military professionals have attributed the complications in the 
military operations that resulted from the September 11, 2001 attack to be a case of 
myopia, of fighting an irregular or asymmetric war (Thomas, 2011).  The effects of the 
Vietnam War deeply ingrained in the U.S. military psyche, and overwhelming success 
that the 1990/91 Gulf War produced, the view became that, rather than make better 
preparations for asymmetric war, it was best to avoid potential quagmires and to consign 
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in the operations doctrine the concept of  “Operations Other Than War”(Thomas, 2011).  
Wariness to engage in an asymmetric conflict creates a reluctance, also, to develop a 
strategy along with supporting programs to comprehend and successfully prosecute them 
(Sobek & Braithwaite, 2005).  Ricks (2012) describes the reasons for the lack of a viable 
asymmetric doctrine, let alone a strategy, as a post-Vietnam, military-produced trend.  
Excellent battalion-level commanders that were once promoted to flag rank were not 
prepared for the changing demands of the post-Soviet era yet were expected to make 
decisions at the strategic level concerning asymmetric operations (Ricks, 2012).   
When strategy is debated in the academic environment, whether a course of action 
is a tactical perspective versus a strategic one is an academic exercise.  However, when 
applied to a real conflict, the choice of developing a tactical level strategy instead of 
developing a national strategic level becomes precarious in the development of 
methodologies that a strategy produces (Hoover Institute, 2015).  This is observed in 
tactical strategies based on clever moves with the goal of achieving surprise over a fixed 
enemy.  This element of surprise becomes the focal point instead of a national strategy 
that outlines the goal to achieve a sustained victory (Ricks, 2012).  The goal of a 
successful strategy is based on a desired long-term political outcome achieved over a 
temporary military one (Ikenberry, Slaughter, & Slaughter, 2010).  It is argued that, in 
Afghanistan, military strategy devolved into numerous strategies for a desirable political 
and military outcome (which was not reached) and thus failure transpired (Livingston & 
O’Harlan, 2014). 
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Challenges of Asymmetric Warfare and National Security Strategy  
The literature on the study of terrorism demonstrates that terror is a tool utilized in 
asymmetric warfare (Banks, 2011).  This suggests the argument that a different strategy 
in countering the asymmetric adversary is required, as opposed to the separate and stand-
alone counterterrorism policy (in which there has not been enough research conducted in 
examining the asymmetrical method of war as part of the national security strategy) 
(Erye, 2010).  War has been deemed by both scholars and professionals as a struggle 
where either a nation-state or a non-state actor will arm, plan, or strategize differently 
from the other based on resources, culture and (most importantly) the goals that are 
formed when entering a conflict (Paulus, 2009).  Asymmetric warfare is also recognized 
on the tactical level; it requires a particular kind of strategy and has been described as 
“Irregular Warfare” in many military doctrines (Balcells & Kalyvas, 2014).  Within the 
purview of military field commanders, asymmetric or irregular warfare is described as a 
type of military dispute where one side makes the attempt to exploit the characteristics of 
the other by challenging the ability to provide security and stability (Gentile, 2013 & 
DOD, 2010).  
The 9/11 terrorist attacks and the resulting war in Afghanistan are the best-
recognized recent models of asymmetric warfare in which a weaker foe attacks by out- 
maneuvering a stronger force through the employment of tactics and methods unforeseen 
by that stronger foe (DiPaulo, 2005).  A number of professionals and scholars describe 
asymmetric war as significant and insignificant clashes among nations or groups that 
have dissimilar military, economic, and political stratagems and capabilities.  Since the 
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reemergence of Afghanistan as the focal point in the counter-terrorism policies of the 
United States and is held as an example of that national strategy, new research into 
cultural, economic, military and political responses to terrorism, counterinsurgency, and 
other methods of asymmetric warfare have been conducted (Paulus, 2009).   
The Gap in the Literature 
Following the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 there has been a rapid 
outgrowth in the field of terrorism-based research resulting from the substantial increase 
in funding for terrorism-related research and education programs.  Prior to the 9/11 
attacks, the field of terrorism research was predominately based on historical accounts as 
they relate to political struggle.  Traditionally, the benchmark case is that of the 1972 
Munich Olympic attack and these types of attacks culminated in Al Qaida-centered 
attacks against U.S. assets at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia and the American Embassy 
in Kenya during the 1990s (Stampnitzky, 2013).  Following the 9/11 attacks, the field 
rapidly grew from a minor field of study within security or political studies into a 
significant field of study that has generated its own journals, centers of research with 
prominent scholars and experts leading the movement for research funding projects, 
conferences and degree based programs.  The significance of this rapid rise in the study 
of terrorism is the lack of a cohesive interpretation as to what terrorism actually is, how is 
it caused, and whether it is a political, martial or social science (Ranstorp, 2009).  Though 
there have been many critics as to the viewpoint of what generates qualified studies in the 
field of terrorism, there is a consensus that the field does not generate enough fieldwork 
such as is provided by a narrative study in which life experiences that incorporate 
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terrorism are investigated.  It is probable that the growing sense of unease found in recent 
scholarly studies about the development of asymmetric warfare has resulted from 
concerns about the global war on terror (WOT) (Ranstorp, 2009). 
Since 2001, a great deal of funding has been put forth to fund research in the field 
of terrorism studies;  this has resulted in the expansion of the field and created new 
scholars and professionals.  Yet, we are no closer to answering the question, “What 
strategy should a nation employee to defeat terrorism?”  The consequential 
unproductivity of focusing on a success strategy in regard to this topic is partially due to 
the United States government’s approach of providing funding for research without 
providing the essential information concerning national objectives within academia 
(Sageman, 2014).  This creates the gap between academia, professional environments, 
and the national security community.  This, in turn, leads to suppositions about what 
terrorism actually is and how to defeat it – with little empirical grounding in academia as 
well as in professional environments (Sageman, 2014).  A possible resolution for this 
unproductivity is to collect nonsensitive data and compare this data to the examination of 
the people that enforce national security strategy as well as those that receive the results 
of the strategy. 
Roots of the Afghanistan Strategy 
 In defining terrorism and the overlapping of terrorist studies with insurgency, the 
current discourse has shifted focus – from one of initial nation state internal conflict 
erupting past borders to one resulting in criminal activity that is classified as terrorism 
since the perpetrators have the goal of supporting political, religious or social objectives 
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of their cause as opposed to criminal gain (Stampnitzky, 2013, p. 46).  This shift caused 
experts to focus their arguments away from counterinsurgency and toward redefining 
terrorism as a main element of social conflict.  The result was a definition of terror that 
includes the obscurities of politics, morality and rationality as three motivators for a 
terrorist (Lampnitzky, 2013).  Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the field of terrorism studies was 
disjointed and, admittedly, a relatively new field for social science that can trace its roots 
to the study of insurgent of guerilla warfare based on the activities of post-World War 
conflicts.  The “War on Terror,” with the subsequent engagement in Afghanistan, 
resulted in competing definitions of “terror” – between organizations tasked with 
countering terrorism and policymakers, who do not seem to see the difference between an 
insurgent and a terrorist, as a consequence of the strategy of the United States during the 
conflict (Wainscott, 2015). 
This strategy, using the conflicting definition for terrorism, would steer the 
operations in Afghanistan by employing previous counterinsurgency and terrorism 
studies from the post-Vietnam period to present day (Wilson, 2007).  The connections 
between counter insurgency and terrorism, when used as methods to develop strategies 
when engaging in asymmetric warfare, are based on two factors proposed by Horne 
(2006) in that the techniques and goals to wage war by the groups are similar.  Thus the 
belief that an insurgency and terrorism are compatible allows for a singular strategy that 
combats both threats.   
The core to the development of the strategy is supported by two studies conducted 
by Galula (1964) and Trinquer (2006) that are based on their experiences in the Algerian 
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liberation war from France.  Both Galula and Trinquer ground their views on experiences 
gained from combating an insurgency based on a faction that grew from the local 
population of Algeria.  These early counterinsurgent experts provide two unique views on 
the requirements of developing a strategy against an asymmetric adversary that prevails 
in many academic and professional communities today.   
 Galula (1964) presents the argument that a military solution to countering an 
insurgency is counterproductive in that it ultimately alienates the host population that 
both the insurgency and counter insurgency depend upon for survival and success.  
Basically, it is Galula that provides the strategy (employed by the American Surge in 
Afghanistan): that a successful counterinsurgency program is based on a “Clear-Hold-
Build” strategy that is the cornerstone in U.S. and Coalition activities (Petraeus, 2013).  
The goal of this strategy is to deny the insurgency a base to operate and to convince the 
local population that the established government is a stronger and better option for them 
over the insurgents (Weisiger, 2014).  This philosophy has become a foundation of the 
2013 published DOD Counterinsurgency manual as well as the American operational 
goal in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014 (Cordesman, 2015).  Thus, the basic idea that 
success is dependent upon popular support requires the tactic of clearing a population 
base of insurgent activity, holding the base in order to prevent the insurgency from 
reentering, and building a physical, security, economic and political infrastructure that 
once successful in an area can be replicated in ever growing large spheres of influence 
(Wilson, 2012).   
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 Countering the view that asymmetric war is a competition for popular support is 
Trinquer (1964), who presents the argument that asymmetric war is not a battle for the 
popular support, but a battle to destroy the insurgent and the insurgent’s political power.  
Trinquer argues that terrorism and insurgency are directly linked.  He observes that 
insurgency spills beyond the borders of any nation or state and employs the techniques of 
terror through an increasing cycle of violence in order to obtain its goals (Trinquer, 
1964).  It is Trinquer, using experiences as a French officer serving in Algeria following 
service in Indochina, who points out that the population is but one aspect of the conflict; 
the center of gravity for modern war (asymmetric war), however, is the ability of the 
adversary to propagate the capacity to wage war.  Thus, Trinquer argues that a security 
strategy should be centered on destroying the adversary’s ability to wage war, including 
eliminating the enemy’s military, political or cultural organizations (Thornton, 2007).  A 
further aspect of Trinquer’s philosophy concerning asymmetric strategy (adopted by the 
United States government for a short period of time) is the employment of torture as a 
means to counter the fear created by terrorism (Burke, 2008).  Trinquer demonstrates that 
the actions of the French during the struggle for Algerian independence in the 1950’s 
were very effective at crushing an insurgency that depends upon local popular support for 
all of its need.  However, the techniques and tactics that allow the tactical victory were 
also the catalyst for strategic defeat by the global population, which withdrew support for 
the French forces in Algeria.  The result was that France granted Algeria independence, 
ultimately proving that winning battles alone will not guarantee success (Lee, 2006).   
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 The difference between the professional and academic camps about asymmetric 
strategy can be found in the differences between Galula’s and Trinquer’s theories.  This 
can be summed up in the differences between defining the type of struggle that they faced 
in Algeria.  Galula express that a counterinsurgency/counter terrorism strategy is a 
political, and ultimately a legal, issue between the government and the adversary; the 
solution is the use of law and order to create stability (Galula, 1964).  Trinquer, on the 
other hand, contends that counterinsurgency/counterterrorism requires a new use of 
military capabilities to defeat the enemy (Wilson, 2012).  This lack of clear definition of 
what the struggle is has created the effect of a war with no clear strategy for victory – or a 
clear vision of what success is and how will it be measured.  This lack of clarity in a 
measurable strategy will ultimately lead to an insurgency or terrorist victory, as the larger 
more powerful nation state loses popular support through fatigue of constantly struggling 
against an elusive enemy that continues to survive (Sullivan, 2007). 
Defining Asymmetric War 
Many definitions exist for asymmetric warfare.  A more general definition is: a 
dominion in which military activities that dictate that national security asymmetry is the 
operating, establishing, and contemplating strategy differently than the opponent in order 
to exploit advantages through the use of an opponent's weaknesses (Department of 
Defense, 2010).  The goal of this method is to gain the initiative that generates a greater 
freedom of action.  It can be a political strategy, military strategy, information-cultural 
strategy or a combination of all.  It contains dissimilar methods, skills, principles, 
establishments, time, or a combination of any of these (Porter, 2006).  Asymmetric 
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warfare can be a short-term or long-term struggle; it may be contained within a single 
country or span across a region – and even the globe (Cordesman, 2012).  The issue with 
asymmetric warfare is that it can be instituted as a grand strategy or used as a tactical 
means that allows a singular method for a discrete struggle; or, it can be practiced in 
conjunction with symmetric approaches that will have psychological and physical 
aspects.  The United States military has employed asymmetric activities on a tactical 
level as prescribed by the US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency (COIN) 
manuals.  These are actions that assist in mitigating negative impacts of operating in an 
asymmetric environment in which the United States military has shifted from a 
conventional force, capable of meeting and defeating a symmetric foe such as the former 
Soviet Union, to one in which small unit commanders are assigned to areas and regions 
within a combat zone (DOD, 2010).  Yet, the strategy that placed these small units in an 
asymmetric war has yet to address the goals or the desired end-state for the conflict 
(Cordesman, 2012). 
Defining a Strategy for Afghanistan 
During an interview with Colin Powell concerning the U.S. involvement in 
Afghanistan, his response to the strategy employed was:  "You can say, 'Go take that hill,' 
or, 'Take out the Taliban,' at the moment, but if your goal is to create a functioning 
democracy, is that the role that a military operation will achieve?" (National Geographic, 
2016).  This concept is found in the challenge of developing a national strategy that meets 
the national objectives, yet is achievable with the resources and culture it has to work 
with.  Not only is there challenge in working the Afghanistan culture but also dealing 
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with the subcultures of the diplomatic, intellectual, military and economic domains that 
exist in the United States (Biddle, 2008).  When addressing an asymmetric war, tacticians 
within those domains of the U.S. will argue that no country is more asymmetric in 
warfare than the United States.  Historically, the United States military has valued 
adaptability in warfare strategies – from George Washington’s changing the Continental 
Army’s training doctrine at Valley Forge to the Shock and Awe campaign in the opening 
hours of the Iraqi Freedom Campaign (Gray, 2005).  A key factor in the current version 
of American adaptability in war has been its growing reliance on employing technology, 
especially standoff technology to project its power.  This is based on the assumption that 
reducing American causalities, while increasing hostile casualties with overwhelming 
force, will result in a short, relatively bloodless war.  This is supported by agreement 
between strategists in academic and military domains that, once an adversary’s military 
infrastructure is defeated, a stable political and social infrastructure will follow 
(Linnemann, 2016).  Regrettably, the reliance on this predilection as basis for a national 
strategy has repeatedly directed the nation into making a strategic overreach in 
accomplishing objectives with a result in an unbalanced force structure, which ultimately 
results in costing the nation much in blood and treasure as well as a loss of faith in the 
national leadership (Crane, 2013). 
In 2014, the United States national budget for defense was over $610 billion – an 
amount the eclipses the next seven countries combined (Peter G. Peterson Foundation, 
2015).  The result is a nation that becomes more enamored with the advantages of 
technology and in the United States creating a disparity in conventional military spending 
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for high dollar technology to human based, asymmetric programs.  Regional adversaries 
find themselves unequal to matching, let alone defeating, the United States in terms of 
military power.  This, in turn, creates a modern version of a David and Goliath situation 
in which the regional adversaries take on the role of David.  As long as conventional 
inequalities exist, it is to be expected that less powerful adversaries will employ the 
“weapons of asymmetric warfare such as terrorism and insurgency” (Cordona, 2015). 
Understanding Afghanistan and Terrorist Organizations  
The core to all strategy development is to understand the adversary as it pertains 
to asymmetric warfare and to understand the target population that the adversary depends 
upon (Tarzi, 2005).  Ahmad Shah Durran unified the Pashtuns tribes in 1747, in effect 
creating the nation of Afghanistan as well.  During Great Britain’s colonial era, the 
country was used as a barrier against the Russian empire.  Afghanistan attained 
independence from British domination following the Great War in 1919, during which 
the country was rule by a monarch until it briefly experimented with democracy.  That 
experiment with democratic rule ended with a 1973 coup and, again, with a 1978 
Communist counter-coup (Meinshausen, 2010).  The Soviet Union invaded to support the 
tottering Afghan Communist regime in 1979, touching off a long and destructive war in 
which asymmetric insurgency war proved greater than the use of conventional symmetric 
forces.  After ten years of an insurgent-based asymmetric war, the Soviets withdrew in 
1989 (Meinshausen, 2010).  In 1966, following the political void created by Soviet 
withdrawal, a series of subsequent civil wars saw the country come under the Taliban, a 
hardline Islamic-based, Pakistani sponsored movement that emerged to end the country's 
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civil war and anarchy.  The Taliban allied with Al Qaida for both political and financial 
support as well as ideological fusion.  This fusion resulted in the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks that became the catalyst for a U.S. lead coalition conducting military 
action that toppled the Taliban and assumed the responsibility of establishing a modern 
Afghanistan government (Meinshausen, 2010).  In December 2004, Hamid Karzai 
became the first democratically elected president of Afghanistan and Afghanistan's 
National Assembly was inaugurated the following December (Jefferson, 2008).  
Despite a strategy to create a stable central government, the loss of the Afghan popular 
support in the provinces due to corruption and poorly executed national government 
strategy allowed for a resurgence of the Taliban.  This resurgence supports continuing 
provincial instability, particularly in the south as well as the eastern regions that border 
with Pakistan, where serious challenges remain for the Afghan Government (Robinson, 
2014). 
Afghanistan Tribal System 
In its most basic definition, an Afghan tribe is an extended family; each tribe can 
be traced back to a single man through a direct blood relationship (Meinshausen & 
Wheeler, 2010).  Tribal systems regulate the life of most Afghans with the tribal 
members being heavily dedicated to their associated tribe in a manner that, when called 
upon, they assemble in arms under the tribal chiefs and local clan leaders (Khans).  
Islamic law rules Afghan culture.  Each follower is compelled to bear arms at the ruler's 
call, though this is seldom required (Meinshausen & Wheeler, 2010).  The Afghan 
peasant or merchant goes to war for much the same mixture of reasons as the western 
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office worker or factory worker: partially having a desire for adventure as well as a desire 
to avoid losing honor in the eyes of his or her family and tribe.  The Afghan have an 
ingrained dislike for invading foreigners that equates to fighting an outsider as revenge 
against those that threaten his family, his tribe, or his faith (Meinshausen & Wheeler, 
2010).  It is the same Afghan culture, tribal system and socio-economic scheme that 
terrorist/insurgent/criminal organizations receive support and recruits from – as well as 
the national government military, police, and civil service workers (McChrstal, 2009).  
Both sides depend on the acceptance and support of the tribal system and socio-economic 
scheme.  
Terrorist Organizations in Afghanistan 
The Taliban is by far the largest and most active and effective terrorist 
organization in Afghanistan (CIA, 2012).  Its stated goal is to restore the fundamentalist 
regime it established in the mid-1990s in Afghanistan.  The origins of the Taliban begin 
in Pakistan with the backing of Saudi finances.  Because many Taliban members are 
Pashtun in their ethnicity, a large part of the organizations support comes from 
Afghanistan’s Pashtun community (Hammidov, 2006).  The chaos in the lack of central 
leadership created by the withdrawal of the Soviet Union allowed the Taliban to gain 
popularity among Afghans due to the constant warring and the lack of stability created by 
different Mujahidin elements in Afghanistan following the years of the Soviet 
occupation.  The Afghan people were tired of the fighting and lawlessness that had 
consumed the country and believed that the Taliban would end corruption and restore 
peace (Cordesman, 2012).  Taking on the role of an insurgent against outside invaders, 
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the Taliban has gained the reputation for being able to withstand both Afghanistan 
Government and American led coalition forces that try to eradicate it (Kilcullen, 2011).  
After fifteen years of conflict against the United States, the Taliban has demonstrated that 
it has the ability to provide financial, logistical, and military support to its fighters, 
followers, and allies.  Many local Afghans have observed, as have coalition forces and 
non-governmental organizations (NGO), that the Taliban carries out operations in 
Afghanistan with the support of other groups such as Al-Qaida and the Haqqani Network 
(Kilcullen, 2011).  These groups frequently work together to oppose Coalition Forces and 
the Afghan National Army because they have the common goal of ridding Afghanistan 
of what they consider to be their chief competition (Cordesman, 2012).  
The Taliban crosses the line from insurgent to criminal element through its 
significant ties to Afghanistan's opiate trade, which supplies 89 percent of the world's 
opium.  For example, in 2009, the Taliban netted $49-$78 million from Afghanistan's 
opiate trade, making it the group's largest source of internal funding (Harpviken, 2012).  
A growing body of reports indicates senior Taliban commanders in southern 
Afghanistan have expanded their direct involvement in the drug trade to include the 
transnational trafficking of heroin, which could provide them with year-round revenue 
( UNODC, 2010).  The Taliban is extending its capabilities from local insurgency to 
international criminal organization, which allows the organization to venture into regional 
and transnational terrorism by direct operations in Pakistan, Turkmenistan, and other South 
Asia nations – as well as provide planning, training and logistical support numerous terrorist 
organizations in the Middle East and Africa (Roy, 2012).  
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The Taliban as a Shadow Government 
The Taliban was restricted in its ability to maintain the dominant power it held in 
the region immediately following the U.S.-led invasion in 2001.  By 2006, with billions 
of dollars spent and thousands of lives lost in rebuilding Afghanistan, the insurgency had 
not only survived, but recovered enough to begin gathering momentum as the dominant 
political and economic force in Afghanistan (Bank, Nevers, & Wallerstein, 2007).  
During a discussion centered on Afghanistan and employment of national strategy there, 
Lieutenant-General Michael Maples (U.S. Army), functioning as the director of the US 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in 2006, told the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
that he expected 2006 would see double the amount overall level of violence in 
Afghanistan from 2005.  Despite intensive counter-insurgency operations by the end of 
2006, Jane's Terrorism & Insurgency Centre (JTIC) confirmed that there were 322 attacks 
in 2006 as opposed to the 176 recorded in 2005 (JTIC Report, 2007). 
The above-mentioned increase in violent acts was predominantly due the actions 
of the Taliban and represents the significant factors behind the Taliban resurgence 
(Holbrooke, 2009).  According to a joint Department of Defense and Department of State 
report released in November of 2006, the Afghan police force was largely incapable of 
carrying out routine law enforcement or providing a basic level of security and 
governance.  The authors of the report concluded that the official figure of 70,000 
trained police officers was inflated and estimated that only 30,395 officers were 
adequately trained and equipped.  The reconstruction of the Afghan National Army also 
proceeded slower than expected, with fewer than 40,000 troops mobilized by the end of 
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2006, out of a target of 70,000 (DOD Report, 2011).  The report demonstrates the lack of 
a critical component to the national strategy: the Host Nation must demonstrate that they 
are stronger and more morally grounded in the needs of the population than the insurgent 
(Biddle, Christia, & Their, 2010).   
Although the Taliban still lacked the capacity to challenge combined Coalition 
Forces and Afghan National Army (ANA) forces in open warfare, the increasingly 
sophisticated use of asymmetric tactics (particularly the deployment of improvised 
explosive devices or IEDs), and the introduction of suicide bombers employed for the 
purpose of threatening the stability of Afghanistan demonstrate that the Taliban adapted 
their strategy in order to survive and win against the Coalition and Afghan government 
(Holbrooke, 2009).  To support the chaos that the Taliban is creating through their 
asymmetric campaign shadow governments have been instituted with their own public 
support and justice directives.  These shadow governments, headed by a selected 
governor, are responsible for resource allocation for their specific provinces as well as 
administering justice through Shari'a courts (Paul, Clarke, Grill, & Dunigan, 2013).  
These shadow governments ensure activity is being conducted according to the Taliban 
High Council strategy for regaining and maintaining power in the region (Hammidov, 
2006).  
Adversaries and Populations 
A reoccurring disparity in the literature is the comparison between the types of 
adversaries and the social geopolitical environment that an asymmetric war will be 
conducted in.  A common element that all warfare shares is that there will be adversaries 
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opposing one another in order to achieve their goals (Hammes, 2005).  Thus, warfare 
requires an understanding of what the local as well as global populations’ perceptions of 
the adversary and of the problem that created the conflict.  This requirement is 
compounded by the perception of the role of the Unites States, which is key to 
recognizing the strategy needed to obtain national goals.  Whenever the United States, as 
well as its allies, engage in a conflict area, it is important to acknowledge the 
nontraditional asymmetric battle zones such as mass media and social networking that 
extends even to the most remote areas of the conflict area that are believed to be "off the 
grid" (Toft, 2011).  Those messages embed stereotypes and preconceptions of Americans 
and western coalition forces.  By virtue of their presence in Afghanistan (the longest 
asymmetric struggle since September 11, 2001) American and coalition forces are 
considered outsiders at best and, at worst, an occupying force (Meinshausen & Wheeler, 
2010).  In Afghanistan, the Afghan National Police (ANP) is often the focus of joint 
operations when engaging in tribal or local outreach operations because members of the 
ANP are mostly locals.  The Afghan National Army can still be considered outsiders 
because, usually, the units of the army are from other parts of Afghanistan.  As such, in 
an asymmetric environment, it is important to understand that partnering and working 
through local national representatives can mitigate a good deal of local suspicion and 
unrest as advocated through the U.S. Army and Marine Corps COIN practices and 
procedures (Meinshausen & Wheeler, 2010).  However, COIN does not solve the bigger 
problem of countering, mitigating and destroying terrorism. 
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The strategist that develops national goals in defeating terror as a form of warfare 
must understand the organizations and actors within the asymmetric conflict.  These 
opposing organizations in an asymmetric conflict operation are found in the following 
four major categories of adversaries, which are: criminals, terrorists, insurgents, and 
accidental guerillas (Jefferson, 2008).  Each category of adversary has a different set of 
goals and methods that they employ to achieve their goals.  Yet, each adversarial 
category must be considered individually as well as a single group of enemies in order 
deal with each in a decisive manner (Pool, 2010).  Many scholars, planners and 
professionals have made a mistake in assuming that there is no difference between these 
groups – as well as making the incorrect assumption that each group represents a separate 
and different problem.  These failures to understand certain distinctions have resulted in 
the improper application of strategy and the resulting tactics being employed 
(Hoolebrooke, 2009).  These misunderstandings of the adversary and their goals prevent 
successful accomplishment of the national goals and can be argued to generate 
undesirable consequences (Fawcett, 2013).  It is noted that criminals, terrorists, 
insurgents, and accidental guerillas do use common networks and share common short-
term objectives.  For example, a human trafficking network operated by criminals could 
also be used to move narcotics, weapons, or money in support of insurgent and terrorist 
groups (Fawcett, 2013). 
Characteristics of Criminals, Terrorist, and Insurgents  
A noted misstep in developing a strategy is when a “one size fits all” approach is 
used in determining that all adversary groups should be lumped together (Cordesman, 
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2014).  Though many of the types adversaries, as well as the subgroups may deem 
associated with the United States and the governing power of the conflict area as the 
common enemy, they are different, not only in their ideology and goals, but also in their 
strengths and vulnerabilities.  The result is the use of only one strategy that is incapable 
of properly addressing a transnational terrorist group such as Al Qaida and will 
strengthen a criminal organization such as the Haqqani Network (Banks, 2011).  
Typically, terrorists and insurgents are motivated by an ideological or dogmatic goal, 
whereas criminal groups are motivated by personal gain.  There are some groups, like the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) that began as a political terrorist 
organization with a socialist based political agenda and then evolved into profit based 
criminal enterprises when the political objective was not feasible (Weisiger, 2014).  
Many times, the criminal, terrorist, insurgent and accidental guerilla objectives overlap 
and each group can be found crossing the boundary defining criminals, insurgent, 
terrorist and guerillas as the situation necessitates (Toft, 2012).  One conundrum for the 
national security strategist is that criminal activity within a region is often misidentified 
as terrorist activity, as well as terrorist organizations, routinely engages in criminal 
activity, support insurgencies, and use accidental guerillas to further their goals (Tuck, 
2012).  Thus, the strategist must develop a detailed knowledge of the conflict area in 
order to determine if direct and indirect attacks are occurring as the result of a terrorist 
group, a tribal leader involved in organized crime, or as part of a tribal dispute with a 
neighboring tribe (Schiff, 2012).  A rocket attack (against a coalition base) may be 
funded by a local criminal leader and conducted by a local farmer (filling the role of an 
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accidental guerilla) in an effort to show his strength to a rival faction or to members of 
his own family or tribe (Dobins, 2010).  A strategy that requires these activities to 
automatically be labeled as terrorism will result in the counter operations being designed 
in a manner that will alienate the local population and support the terrorist 
organization that had nothing to do with the attack (Meinshausen, 2010).  Competition 
between criminal organizations, terrorist organizations, and insurgent groups frequently 
impacts the local population’s activities, which are compounded by the application of 
counter terrorism strategy within the conflict area (Hoolebrooke, 2009).   
While criminal groups are motivated for personal gain requiring support for 
illegal activities through the sale of their criminal activities, terrorist organizations are 
motivated to conduct similar activities, but for political gain (such as Al-Qaeda) and 
attempt to influence the political arena by targeting a selected population, such as 
political and civilian targets (Metz, 2010).  Typically, these terrorist groups fail to garner 
widespread support within the target populations that, under the established 
counterinsurgency strategy, is a positive result of countering their capabilities (DOD, 
2013).  Yet, the transnational terrorist group understands that the support of the local 
population may not be available to them, requiring that they develop techniques, tactics, 
and procedures to mitigate the requirement of local population support by using limited 
local supporters, planning operations in other locations, arriving the day of the attack to 
conduct the operation, and leaving after the attack (Robinson, 2014).  These methods 
reduce the requirement of engaging the local population for support and yields the benefit 
for the terrorist organization of having the host government or American military 
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routinely conducting reprisals against the select areas of the local population, which, in 
turn, results in popular support for the terrorist organization (Robinson, 2014).  Terrorist 
groups can be specifically targeted by law enforcement or the military without having a 
polarizing effect on the general population, but well-organized and lead groups such as 
Al Qaida understand the gaps between military and law enforcement capabilities and use 
these gaps to exploit their goals (Thornton, 2007).  Easily confused with terrorist groups, 
insurgent movements that pursue the goal of revolutionary change with successful 
insurgencies leverage wide-scale public support for their cause.  A strategy that employs 
control measures that would normally work against terrorist organizations when used 
against an insurgent movement may alienate the public and create a wider base of support 
for the insurgent movement (Priyedarshi, 2010).  These groups can be confused with 
terrorist organization as they use the methods associated with terrorism in that they can 
be both outsiders, as well as aligned tribally, to a location and their supporting 
infrastructure may overlap and look very similar (Pool, 2010).  An anomaly to the 
structure of the first three groups is the fourth group, known as the “accidental guerilla,” 
which describes fighters that are frequently local tribesman that become involved in the 
conflict because they are "overcome by events'' or "caught in the middle"" of a conflict 
(Kilcullen, 2011).  These individuals are typically locals who do not necessarily believe 
in the insurgent agenda, but will fight alongside the insurgents because they either believe 
they are fighting a common enemy such as an invader or for financial means to 
supplement their income.  While terrorists will willfully die for their cause, insurgents 
may or may not believe that self-sacrifice is required, and criminals and accidental 
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guerillas almost never adhere to suicide as a means of achieving their goals 
(Meinshausen, 2010).  The accidental guerilla can shift rapidly from supporting the 
terrorist to supporting the host national government or even directly supporting America 
if tribal, family, or personal gain support the shift.  The impact that an accidental guerilla, 
who are usually locals and thus a good metric for how the general population will support 
either cause, provides motivation for the terrorist/insurgent/criminal element employing 
the accidental guerrilla directly to conduct their war with the intention of using accidental 
guerillas to fight against asymmetric foes such as the United States (Kilcullen, 2011).   
Terrorist groups and insurgent movements are, in general, highly inspired to fight 
for the organization’s goals, often to the death.  They usually exhibit good discipline and 
better training than local tribesmen and will organize themselves into military-style units.  
Through international support, they have at their disposal a full array of weapons that 
may include more advanced weapons with which to wage war against their intended 
target in order to appear as strong as the governing and supporting militaries 
(Meinshausen, 2010).  Two significant factors that can force a terrorist group to shift 
their focus from their ideological goals toward criminal enterprises are greed and 
desperation.  The terrorist or insurgent groups fall victim to greed when the lure of the 
profitability of the criminal activity becomes more important than their ideological goals.  
This transition disconnects these groups from public support and makes them a more 
manageable threat.  Yet, the criminal activity does provide an ability to fund their goals, 
especially when the goals are modified from strictly ideological to one of gaining power 
(Deng, 2007). 
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Characteristics of the Accidental Guerilla  
The accidental guerilla is a local who, due to circumstance, environment or 
culture, has taken up arms against the host nation as well as outsiders.  Frequently, 
accidental guerillas in Afghanistan are armed with only personal small arms, typically 
Kalashnikov and Enfield rifles in various degrees of repair (Killcullen, 2011).  They may 
lack magazines and small arms ammunition for a sustained fight and often demonstrate 
poor training and marksmanship skills, as well as fire discipline.  They dress in traditional 
clothing and lack formal uniforms and field gear.  They usually seek to break contact 
immediately in confrontations with coalition troops.  Most are illiterate (a few are 
educated), but they know how to use and maintain technology ranging from 
Kalashnikovs to cordless phones to building Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).  They 
are intimately familiar with local and regional terrain and tribal power structures and are 
usually aware of outsiders that enter their village or area.  Accidental guerillas may lack 
motorized transport and logistic support.  They will almost always join whichever side 
they perceive to be more successful (Killcullen, 2011).   
The degree of participation by the accidental guerilla will vary and can be 
categorized as local nationals that will support insurgent group they align with (such 
as the Taliban, or Jaysh al-Islam, or Kataib Thawrat al Ishrin) because they believe in 
the propaganda, are ideologically motivated, and perceive that the insurgent group is 
winning.  They are also locals who accept pay from extremist leaders to fight or conduct 
violent acts on a temporary (but occasionally recurring) arrangement of a few days or 
weeks.  Extremist leaders seek out locals with financial burdens for recruitment.  Typical 
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financial burdens include gambling debts, sick family members, impending marriage, 
property purchase, and victims of extortion.  Accidental guerillas are locals who are 
coerced or deceived into working for extremist groups and may be forcibly recruited 
at gunpoint.  They may also believe that coalition forces will kill or capture them for 
any past anti-coalition activity, no matter how insignificant or long ago it occurred 
(Kilcullen, 2011).  This type of activity may not directly support the terrorist or 
insurgency, but many counterterrorist tactics will result in reprisal against the accidental 
guerrilla – which results in the local population turning away from American military 
objectives.  
Equating Counter-Terrorist Operations with Counter-Insurgency Operations 
The National Strategy for Countering Terrorism (White House, 2011) that defines 
the current national strategy to combat and eliminate terrorism, as well as the causes of 
terrorism, place focus on counterterrorism operations.  Using Afghanistan as the model 
for success or failure of this strategy, the United States employs both counterterrorism 
and counter insurgency operations to achieve the national strategy (Kilcullen, 2013).  
Counterterrorist operations tend to focus on eliminating members of a specific terrorist 
cell, often using dynamic operations resulting in direct violence.  Political leaders, as well 
as military professionals, who support the concept that eliminating the organizations 
network will eliminate the crisis caused by terrorism often celebrate this tactic (Gentile, 
2013).  Yet, when used against the insurgent, this approach has proven to be ineffective, 
as the elimination of the network does not eliminate the underlying problem and violent 
action motivates the host population to support the insurgency (Gentile, 2013). 
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National Security Decision Makers and the Strategic Plan 
In 2014, through a democratic process, Afghanistan established a new 
government.  As of October of 2014, the country instituted a Bilateral Security 
Agreement (BSA) and a status of forces agreement (SOFA) with the United States 
(Katzman, 2014).  For all of the political rhetoric that has been offered, Afghanistan is 
still the forgotten war at a time when the Taliban is making significant gains in 
reinstituting their authority.  With the official ending of the longest war in American 
history, the American experiment in nation building seems to have failed in that Afghan 
noncombatant casualties are intensifying, the Afghan economy is in crisis, and there still 
are no clear plans for any post-2014 aspect of transition which counters the Taliban 
strategic goals (Katzman, 2014).  
A significant observation made by both professional and scholars is that the 
withdrawal of Coalition Forces from Afghanistan at the end of 2014 severely strained the 
region's transportation/logistics infrastructure and this reduction in basic logistic support 
will hamper the Afghanistan national government as well as the provinces and district 
governments to maintain stability and control through commerce (Cordesman 2014).  
U.S. diplomatic rhetoric implies continued support for Afghanistan without really 
addressing either its weaknesses or its failures as a partner.  Though the Afghanistan 
National Army has assumed combat operations against the Taliban, as well as the 
supportive terrorist organizations such as LeT and Al Qaida, various analysts suspect that 
the National Government can maintain its power and control over the country against the 
Taliban strategy to retake its power (Hultman, 2012).  In December of 2014, the Loya 
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Jirga, Afghanistan’s traditional grand assembly of tribal elders, as well as local 
community leaders, overwhelmingly recommend a longer-term role for the U.S. military 
and its coalition partners in assisting the country in maintaining its security (Katzman, 
2014). 
As it relates to asymmetric war and end goals for the Afghanistan strategy, the 
surge's inelastic schedule weakened American leverage on Afghani political, economic, 
and military influence against the Taliban and with the anticipated drawing down of 
American forces, will reduce the Taliban's motivations to negotiate (Cordesman, 2014).  
With the drawdown of coalition forces, the Taliban has changed its objectives from 
surviving and resisting coalition forces to a strategy that involves confronting the 
Afghanistan government to establish itself as the dominate political, military, and 
economic power – not only in the country, but also in the region (Paul, 2013).  
Meanwhile, its military and economic advantages gained from alliances with associate 
terrorist or insurgent organization reduce its incentives to negotiate (Cordesman, 2015).  
The Congressional Research Service reports that insurgents are increasingly confident, as 
"ongoing withdrawals of coalition forces have largely corresponded with a weakening of 
Kabul's ability to govern outlying districts.”  An assessment of Afghan security forces 
authorized by the DOD calculates that the Taliban will pick up the pace of its campaigns 
and increase its influences into areas between 2015 and 2018 (Katzman, 2014). 
In the intervening time, the Taliban incursion in criminal affairs has produced 
revenues from a bumper poppy harvest, as well as other illegal trafficking.  This has 
resulted in the Taliban's incentives to reach a negotiated settlement being minimal.  The 
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venturing of the Taliban has resulted in more than a few of its factions demonstrating less 
an ideology-driven armed opposition group than a profit-driven criminal faction (DOD 
Report, 2014).  Though the news is a black mark on the success of the Afghanistan 
strategy, there is a ray of hope in that the Taliban was unsuccessful in achieving one of its 
major strategic objectives for 2014, which was the mass interference in Afghanistan's 
provincial and presidential elections (Cordesman, 2015).   
The Strategic Vacuum in Afghanistan 
The extent of the American strategy for Afghanistan and Central Asia is 
demonstrated mainly through actual world events as well as the media’s impact on 
American assessment to leave Afghanistan (Cordesman, 2015).  Former Defense 
Secretary Gates stated that the current national priorities retreated from Afghanistan as a 
strategic principal for national security, even as the Commander in Chief sanctioned a 
conventional military centered surge in Afghanistan in 2010 (Thomas, 2011).  Then 
following the surge, he designated a deadline of 2014 for a U.S. combat role to be over, 
regardless of the status of the Afghanistan strategy (Gates, 2014).   
It has been made clear that following 10 years of support, mentorship, and 
protection Afghanistan still lacks an effective government; this represents a failed or 
improperly employed strategy (Cordesman, 2012).  Afghanistan is rated as one of the 
most corrupt countries in the world; it has squandered its financial support and will 
sustain the budget and economic crisis the moment outside aid, to include military 
spending, is reduced (Cordesman, 2014).  The current professional, military, and 
diplomatic community judges that the national government in Afghanistan will be unable 
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to generate and sustain an effective military and law enforcement forces without 
significant financial aid, military advisors to support all levels of military, and law 
enforcement activities – including logistic communication and control support (Katzman, 
2014). 
American rhetoric, from presidential speeches to key leaders pledging support, 
implied a policy of continued support of the Afghanistan national government without 
appropriately addressing its failings in governing Afghanistan independently – or its 
failure as a partner in the war on terrorism by countering the Taliban and associated 
violent extremist organizations (Hoffman, 2007).  The reality of what the future strategy 
of the United States in Afghanistan is reflected in the January 2012 Defense Strategic 
Guidance (DOD, 2012).  This document states that the United States intended to leave 
Afghanistan, concentrate on other regions of the world with the Pacific being the leading 
area of concern, and thus basically fall into the habit of declaring victory when the 
strategy changes and focusing on another area without a long-term solution (Savun & 
Phillips, 2009).  The document further called for the United States only to engage with 
military or economic resources in such areas in which national interests are directly 
involved and only in proportion to the importance of those interests (Cordesman, 2014).  
It explicitly states the United States should avoid hostilities similar to the recent wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.  A supporting statement suggests that, in the future, the United 
States will avoid large-scale land-based conflicts that require American force 
commitments in a conflict area of limited strategic value and, instead, focus on 
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developing strategic partnerships where the partner would perform the central role of 
confrontation with our adversary (DOD, 2012). 
A Strategy for Disappointment in Afghanistan 
The critical issue for the development of strategy is found in 2009 when General 
Stanley McChrystal took command of NATO's International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) with the task of conducting an initial strategic assessment.  That assessment, and 
subsequent ISAF campaign, were based on the Obama Administration’s core goals of 
disrupting and defeating Al Qaida, reversing the Taliban gains in political and social 
gains, and strengthening the government in Afghanistan to take over the fight against the 
Taliban and its associated organizations (White House, 2011).  This strategy provided the 
prospect of more troops, more civilian expertise, more resources, and more high-level 
leadership attention.  However, it also limited the time-span of these resources, allowing 
the extreme violent organizations to survive and thrive if they could survive the surge, 
which was contrary to General McChrystal’s assessment (Cordesman, 2014).   
In December 2009, in a speech given at West Point, President Obama announced 
that a troop surge would take place.  Yet, he also stated that those surge troops would 
begin to draw down in July 2011 (DeYoung, 2010).  This statement created a direct and 
determined date for withdrawing, regardless of the current events, the status of Afghani 
forces to defeat the Taliban, and the Afghani government to govern in fashion that 
ensures the two goals (Cordesman, 2014).  In November 2010, at the NATO Lisbon 
Summit, the Afghan government and the NATO Allies, including the United States, 
agreed to pursue a formal process, called “Transition,” in which responsibility for 
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security would shift over time to the Afghan Government.  This process was to begin 
shortly thereafter – in early 2011 – and was to be completed by the end of 2014 
(Cordesman, 2015). 
President Obama announced parameters for drawing down U.S. surge forces in 
June 2011.  From the surge peak of about 100,000 U.S. troops, the U.S. troop 
commitment in Afghanistan would decrease by 10,000 troops by the end of 2011 and by 
a further 23,000 by the end of September 2012, declining to a total of 68,000 by that date.  
Afterward, the pace of further drawdowns would be "'steady'' and, at some point, the 
mission would change "from combat to support” (Katzman, 2014).  The NATO Chicago 
Summit held in May of 2012 added a new step to the Transition process established in 
2010.  One major new step was that the Afghans national government was meant to 
accept responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan by mid-2013 and lead in 
conducting security operations.  The international forces that were then the backbone of 
counter-terrorism/counterinsurgency operation, as well as nation building activities, 
would shift to playing a primarily supporting role (Cordesman, 2015). 
The counter to nation building activities is a strategy of reactive security as it 
reacts to terrorist attacks.  This counter results in negative response, by both the 
population of the country through increased spending (which the taxpayer must fund) and 
the target population of the strategy, through heavy handed security responses (Enders & 
Sandler, 2011).  The reactive measures result in actions that target terrorist organizations 
following a terrorist event, but usually fall within populated areas, which results in 
collateral causalities.  The consequences of the action result in new recruits and cultural 
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support for the terrorist or insurgent organization’s targets population (Chenoweth, 2013), 
making the strategy one that in the cyclic in requiring more resources for more reactive 
actions which in turn supports the asymmetric based terrorist organization while it 
weakens the liberal democracies ability to maintain security and stability both home and 
abroad, while receiving diminished resources as continued high operations drain the 
treasury (Chenoweth, 2013). 
An indicator as to how any well strategy for combating terrorism and conducting 
operations is working may be found in the Outside Continental United States (OCONUS) 
Contingency Operations (Flanagan & Schear, 2008).  The trends, demonstrated in Table 
2 (Cordesman, 2012), indicate that increase in both funding and troops allocated to the 
conflict, a decrease in both amount of money and number of troops is needed before 
sustainable security in Afghanistan may be accomplished.  These indicators track with 
the observation that major powers will grow weary when engaging in an asymmetric 
conflict (Duyvesteyn, 2008).  Thus, for the adversary who looks for metrics to indicate 
success, budgeting and manpower allocation reports are key for the development of their 
strategy (Duyvesteyn, 2008).   
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Figure 1.  Trends in OCONUS Contingency Operations  
 
 
Note: Adopted from The U.S. Cost of the Afghan War: FY2002-FY2013 Cost in Military 
Operating Expenditures and Aid Prospects for Transition, p. 7 by A. Cordesman, May 15 
2012, The Center for Strategic and International Studies. 
 
Strategic Challenges, National Interest Against Local Reality  
Current discussion on strategy for Afghanistan reasonably commences with the 
fact that the United States has interests in Afghanistan and the region.  In theory, U.S. 
national security strategy, as it relates Afghanistan and the region, should be concerned 
about the spread of violent extremism, including nuclear proliferation from Pakistan, as 
well as a destabilized Afghanistan being the fulcrum for a nuclear confrontation between 
Pakistan and India (Schroen, 2004).  This theory is successful and also allows for a stable 
Afghanistan, quelling these concerns by making sanctuary less available to violent 
extremists, encouraging state stability in Pakistan by lowering the temperature between 
Pakistan and Afghanistan, and by making Afghanistan less available as space for proxy 
contestation between Pakistan and India (Katzman, 2014). 
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In practice, observers and practitioners disagree about both the interests at stake 
and their relative weight compared with U.S. interests in the rest of the world.  The 
Obama Administration reasonably and consistently articulated two core goals for the war 
– to defeat Al-Qaeda and to prevent future safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
(Hoffman, 2013).  The Obama Administration made some refinements and changes in 
emphasis over time.  In his 2013 State of the Union address, President Obama described 
the goal as defeating the core of Al-Qaeda" with no mention of defeating the Taliban, 
Haqqani Network, or Let as transnational violent extremist organizations that threaten the 
stability of the region and the world (Kilcullen, 2013).  In a new and narrower 
formulation, between 2010 and 2011 in its reports to Congress, the DOD revised its 
description of the strategic architecture of goals, objectives, and activities, subtly 
narrowing the scope of ambition (Katzman, 2014). 
On May 27, 2014, President Obama made a statement at the White House that he 
would effectively end any major U.S. role in the war by the time he left office, regardless 
of the conditions that emerged (Cordesman, 2015).  Following the DOD Guidance Paper 
on National Strategy (DOD, January 2012), President Obama expressed support for this 
statement in previous strategy conferences in which he would only provide support 
similar to the number of post 2014 transition levels of military advisors, enablers, and 
counterterrorism officers that the International Stability Force (ISAF) and the United 
States Central Command (USCENTCOM) commander requested from a single year 
(Cordesman, 2014).  Since the American led coalition conducted a surge in 2009, the 
strategy has been the rapid transition over of security responsibilities to the Afghans.  In 
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2013, Afghani forces assumed the lead for combat operations.  This transition has 
allowed for a steadily draw down by American troops and Coalition forces (Cordesman, 
2015). 
State of the Strategy 
The basic premise of the strategy is to develop a competent set of Afghan forces 
that can defend the nation from insurgents and outside influences while, at the same time, 
reducing the insurgent threat that Afghan forces can manage in the future with very 
limited support from the international community (Arreguín-Toft, 2012).  By Afghan and 
coalition accounts, the basic logic of the campaign has proven to be sound with this 
assumption based on the overall improvement of Afghan forces training and effectiveness 
in dealing with the insurgency as well as the adaptation of Afghan forces in conducting 
widespread counter insurgency operations (Cordesman, 2012).  This assumption by the 
collation is arguably inaccurate, as it relates to on a report of Afghan forces falsely 
reporting their gains against insurgents during Operation Mashaak (in which success 
against insurgents was reported, but the reality is no insurgents where engaged) (Keeble, 
2011).  This type of action shows that a realignment of coalition activities from a strategy 
to succeed to one of withdrawing under false appearances.  
Many academics, as well as military and diplomatic professionals, contend that if 
the strategy is not working, it should be discontinued immediately (not gradually) given 
its extraordinary cost regarding lives being affected and resources being expended 
(Cordesman, 2015).  For Congress, the next steps in the war in Afghanistan, including 
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near-term policy decisions by the U.S. and Afghan governments, raise several basic 
oversight issues: 
1. Do the costs associated with a continued U.S. force presence in Afghanistan 
justify the means? 
2. Resources spent on Afghanistan strategy should be used in "'re-setting" the 
American military and restoring its readiness as it transitions from a 
Counterinsurgency force. 
3. How will the accountability for a sound strategy that protects U.S. interests be 
measured and enforced? 
4. How do the non-military U.S. government agencies integrate their areas of 
responsibilities in support of broad U.S. political strategy for Afghanistan? 
5. How will the appropriate prioritizing of this effort equate to conflicting 
national security exigencies? 
The key to these questions is the Congressional Report: “The Cost of Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11” (2014) that details 
the cost in manpower and resources to support the strategy for Operation Enduring 
Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom (Belasco, 2014).  Figure 1 provides the initial 
investment, the follow-on increase in manpower and resources with the sudden decline of 
manpower and resources as the nation moved away from centering its strategy on 
winning the conflict in Afghanistan, as well as Iraq with a focus on withdraw.  This 
supports the asymmetric conflict theory through the argument that an adversary does not 
try to destroy the strong foe by directly overpowering them, but relies instead on the foe, 
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in this case the United States, to tire from constant conflict, with victory always just 
outside of the foe’s reach.   
 
  Figure 2.  Boots on the Ground In-Country, FY2001-FY2017 
In thousands of U.S. troops 
 
Note: Adopted from The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror 
Operations Since 9/11 p 9 by A. Belasco December 8, 2014, Congressional Research 
Service Report RL33110. 
How Does This Strategy End? 
Most agree that the war in Afghanistan, with all its asymmetric warfare related 
challenges and underlying cultural, religious, and political foundations, is unlikely to end 
in a decisive triumph on the battlefield (Schiff, 2012).  There is broad disagreement that 
persists regarding what way the conflict may be best resolved so that a long-term basis 
for stability in Afghanistan, as well as a U.S. centric perspective, will protect U.S. 
interests over the long-term (Tuck, 2012).  The current prominent approach to 
asymmetric strategy is the war termination approach, otherwise known as the Doha 
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process, which is based on a rather narrow concept of reconciliation (Sobek & 
Braithwaite, 2005).  This approach has become a high-level, top-down arrangement 
between the Afghan leadership and senior Taliban leadership that employs a relatively 
short timeline to identify common ground between the primary belligerents (Tarzi, 2005).  
So far, use of this approach has shown the use of discrete confidence building measures 
in specific functional or geographic areas as positive steps toward a formal agreement 
(Tuck, 2012). 
The launching of the Taliban political office in Doha, Qatar on June 18, 2013, 
was a major event in the Doha process.  However, there are many interpretations of this 
process that explain it went terribly awry and infuriated many Afghans (Ross, 2007).  
This failure was compounded by the Taliban insisting on portraying the office as the 
political representation of the Afghan people and themselves as representatives of the 
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the country's formal name under Taliban rule (Katzman, 
2014).  This self-declaration of representing the Afghan people has created a firestorm 
among the local tribes that are not Pashtun, which is how they identify the Taliban, as 
well as the academic and business consortiums, resulting in further discourse and 
political stalemate in the Kabul as well as support for the Afghan forces in the field 
conducting counter insurgency operations against the Taliban (Katzman, 2014).   
Looking Forward to the Results of a Strategy  
Ever since the Taliban’s revival in Afghanistan in 2005 or 2006, Kabul has been 
combating the insurgency with direct combat support, material assistance, training, and 
advice from the American lead International Security Assistance Force (Coalition). With 
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cessation of the Coalition combat mission at the end of 2014, the Afghan National 
Security Forces (ANSF) will have to battle a still-unbroken Taliban without key 
Coalition-provided enablers it has thus far relied on (DOD Report, 2014).  Strategically, 
Afghanistan’s security forces are hampered by a national strategy copied by the 
American method that emphasizes a security force presence in and the defense of 
virtually every province and district in a country larger than France (Cromartie, 2012).  
Tactically, the ANSF have continuing problems, including lack of cooperation between 
army and police forces (which is a key element of a successful counter-insurgency 
operation), predatory behavior antagonizing the local population through graft and 
cultural friction point, the pilferage of supplies and pay and a high operational tempo 
contributing to exhaustion and low morale in many combat units (DOD Report, 2014).   
Looking forward, Afghanistan’s economic weakness makes the current level of 
security force spending close to the highest in the world when measured against the 
country’s gross domestic product (Vrooman, 2005).  This alone makes any strategy 
requiring Afghanistan to carry out American strategy unsustainable.  Kabul's economic 
constraints will compel a reduction of security force personnel to reduce costs and other 
counterinsurgency programs that support nation building.  This reduction would be an 
unparalleled action by a government confronting a regime-threatening insurgency 
(Cordesman, 2015). 
Challenges Created From A Strengthen Adversary and Weakened Ally 
The literature has indicated that tackling the issues created by violent extremist 
groups like the Taliban, LeT, and Haqqani Network, let alone Al-Qaida without a 
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flexible, but achievable, strategy creates great challenges, not only for the directly 
affected area, but the region and, ultimately, the globe.  Because such groups do not 
adopt a fixed order of battle, their center of gravity is less easily defined than are nation-
states.  A violent extremist group's ideology and the environment in which it operates 
make them poor candidates for a strategy based on finding and neutralizing a center of 
gravity for such groups because they do not draw back to defeat mechanisms and, thus, 
do not lend themselves well to critical vulnerability selection.  By contrast, a group's 
credibility with a local population is potentially a more useful concept for scoping future 
operations as it satisfies established prerequisites, allows for the development of discrete 
vulnerabilities, and allows for flexibility in planning.  The core to building creditability 
with populations requires a synergy among, not just the multiple military disciplines, but 
also the diplomatic, economic, cultural, and social disciplines (DiPaolo, 2005).  
Diplomatic work on the local level is the backbone of successful national strategy 
yet this work building trust and relationships is frequently trumped by contrary US 
actions, such as the United States’ responses to the Arab Spring have sent unintended 
messages to Central Asian States and associated asymmetric group such as the Taliban, 
LeT, and the Haqqani Network.  This is represented in the open source reporting 
demonstrating that the Taliban is initiating new attacks on Afghan children (Giustozzi, 
2009).  This can be relative as many Afghans do not view the new and resurrected 
Taliban as the example of a just organization, but they are perceived as more consistent in 
providing security and insuring basic community services than is the Afghan National 
Government (Cordesman, 2015).   
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The national strategy that relies on the Afghanistan National government to take 
the fight to the enemy must adapt to the loss of asymmetric enablers and declining 
funding at a time when Taliban military operations are more aggressive and ambitious 
than in the past and as insurgents seek to exploit more permissive battlefield conditions 
and spread perceptions of the group's ascendancy during the ongoing international 
drawdown.  The success of the Taliban strategy is demonstrated by the thousands of 
fighters it a massed in 2014, after years of mostly small scale tactics hit-and-run guerrilla 
warfare with the strategy that intended it to outlast the American and Coalition military 
presence (Cordesman, 2015).  It is expected that this trend will continue through 2018 as 
the insurgency shifts to a more conventional military footing to directly challenge the 
Kabul government and the Afghanistan National Army.  As the American transition takes 
place, regardless of the current events, the Taliban will demonstrate their ability to seize 
ground from the national government, even temporarily.  This show of force by the 
Taliban highlights to Afghans the group's growing relative military capabilities and 
reinforces perceptions that local security forces cannot provide durable security. 
Conclusion 
The literature establishes that there is a gap in American strategy, one that is 
demonstrated through the last 15 years in which the American Security Strategy has 
waned from the original mission of destroying Al-Qaida and preventing threats to the 
nations to one of transition away from war at any cost.  This change is due to a loss of 
focus in strategic insight that was created from a lack of perception and attention to the 
art of strategic thinking (Robinson et al., 2014).  Using the same paradigm of strategic 
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development, professionals and scholars have reported that the requirement for victory is 
taking all available assessments into consideration in order for the Afghanistan National 
Security Forces to successfully support the U.S. strategy of preventing Afghanistan from 
ever again becoming a haven for terrorists that threaten Afghanistan, the Central Asian 
States, and the Middle East, as well as the world, they will need a sizable force of about 
373,400 persons, with some structural and posture adjustments, through at least 2018 
(Katzman, 2014).   
Current assessments of the ANSF indicate that this force is not likely to defeat the 
Taliban militarily, but that if it can hold against the Taliban insurgency through 2018, the 
likelihood of a negotiated settlement to the war will increase.  So, too, however will a 
negotiated peace achieve the goals as outlined by the national strategy (Schroden, 
Norman, & Meyarle, 2014).  The Afghan security ministries that support the national 
security forces will require international support to maintain the current levels of 
capability and, more than likely, significant support to keep some sort of capability 
(Cordesman, 2012).  The need for more than senior advisors to include lower level 
tactical and logistical support at least to 2018 and that this assistance mission will need 
authorities similar to those of the mission in Afghanistan today (Cordesman, 2014).  
The literature has demonstrated that the current strategy of transitioning security 
from American and Coalition forces to the Afghanistan government in order to achieve 
the goals of American national strategy requires a sustained commitment of the 
international community to Afghanistan.  American strategists claim that this long-term 
commitment is likely to mitigate tensions in the region and increase prospects for 
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regional cooperation.  However, scholars have warned that withdrawal or reduction of 
international community support is likely to have consequences that are contrary to the 
strategy of the United States, including a renewed civil war in Afghanistan, the growth of 
violent extremist groups, and an increased instability in the region resulting in tension 
between nuclear armed Pakistan and India as well as Russia and China (Cordesman, 
2015). 
The literature denotes that a national strategy must incorporate an understanding 
that it has the ability to influence the regional and asymmetric global conflict by actions 
taken on both a tactical and strategic level and should strive to take actions that will 
promote positive consequences (second and third order effects).  It is easy to overlook the 
influence that a short-term operation has in the conflict area in asymmetric warfare.  The 
long-term approach must ensure that short-term activities, such as a security force, may 
launch dozens of direct military attacks a day to disrupt a designated adversary.  
However, the actions result in only short-term success and yield little support from host 
nation population since the operations disrupt the daily lives of local villages.  The 
realistic view of what does work, how it works, and why it would not work need to be 
implemented.  
There are multiple cultures to understand in an asymmetric environment; yet, the 
two with most impact are the extremist/insurgent/terrorist and that of the local 
population.  A strategy that includes an understanding of the enemy, yet does not take the 
goals and objectives of the people into account will fail.  The result will be an adversary 
that gains strength at the end of American commitment and a population seeking stability 
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and security regardless of who it comes from.  A strategy that implements tactical 
programs informed by an understanding the culture through partnering with local 
representatives and redeploying counterparts conveys the cultural nuances of the 
immediate environment of operations.  Yet, nation building and cultural understanding 
are not enough to achieve the strategic goals if stability and security are lacking.  The 
strategic goal is not only to defeat the extremist/insurgent/terrorist by taking away their 
popular support or (more importantly) by mitigating the popular fear they create, but to 
defeat the means, motivation, and methods that an asymmetrical adversary employs to 
create or support the extremist, insurgent, and terrorist. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
In this study, the primary researcher conducted a narrative investigation to 
discover the impact of the national security policies as they relate to the Afghanistan 
conflict by examining the application and results of the policy.  The researcher weighed 
the impact of the strategy through the perceptions and experiences of both those that have 
endured and implemented the policy.  With this qualitative study, the researcher strived 
to determine the magnitude of the security policy as it related to achieving its objectives.  
The problem that the researcher intended to solve with this study was the fact that, after 
16 years of conflict, the Afghan people no longer support the strategy as well as follow-
up policies.  An in-depth study of the results of the strategy via an examination of the 
policies and operations was intended for a better evaluation of the strategy.  The National 
Command Authority was examined as a structure in the development of current and 
future security strategy designed to the specific needs of the asymmetric warfare.  
Collecting and analyzing this data can assist in creating an environment conducive to 
developing a successful strategy and strategy implementation in the form policies and 
programs for those responsible for defending the country. 
The significance of employing a qualitative research method as opposed to a 
quantitative method is that the qualitative approach was best suited to acquire and explain 
the data needed to answer the proposed research questions.  Of the different research 
designs available in qualitative research, the narrative design is the preferred method for 
examining real world issues, such as those resulting from the impact of a national 
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security strategy upon the people that it is designed to secure (Creswell,  2013).  The 
narrative approach of examining a specific situation, in lieu of trying to examine a very 
broad topic requiring an impractical survey, is a method that allowed the researcher to 
achieve the goal of this study.  Applying a narrative methodology allowed the primary 
researcher to narrow down a very broad field of research into one researchable topic that 
was manageable to address the research questions. 
In this chapter, all issues related to participant confidentiality will be addressed, 
the research design for the study described, an explanation given for the rationale in 
employing the method of inquiry, and a rich description of the theory that justifies the 
analysis.  One element to explaining the purpose and scope of the analysis was the 
selection and justification of the sample population.  The role of the researcher will also 
be discussed, including data collection procedures.  Finally, this chapter will include the 
data analysis framework, along with issues of the quality assurances for the work 
conducted, the impact of ethics upon the study, and the measures taken to ensure the 
protection of participants. 
Research Design and Rationale 
The selection of the appropriate research design is required in order to maximize 
the opportunity of attaining valid answers to the proposed research questions as it 
provides the scholar with a blueprint to guide the research process through the 
examination of topics, populations, methods, and purpose of the study (Babbie, 2007).  
This chapter of the study was designed to demonstrate my rationale for the concepts, 
methods, and traditions of the research employed therein.  The objective of this chapter is 
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to validate the selection of the research methodology to achieve the desired outcomes of 
the investigation.   
Research Question 
This research project focused on discovering and expounding on the information 
that will address the central research question of: How do the American strategic 
perceptions of an asymmetric adversary in Afghanistan affect the conflict outcome and 
are Afghan public perceptions of the outcomes of the strategy a positive or negative 
influence when it comes to supporting a strong stabilized and free from terrorist influence 
democratic country? 
This question is far reaching, which allowed for a broad area to research and 
influence the answer.  The following comprehensive questions were used to support and 
narrow the research inquiry: 
1. How is the effectiveness of conventional martial actions measured in 
Afghanistan as an asymmetric conflict? 
2. What were the perceptions of the Afghan people and Americans implementing 
the operations of the strategy to combat the terrorist (asymmetric) adversary 
and the resulting stability created from the strategy from 2001–2011? 
3. What were the perceptions of the Afghan people on the presence of the large 
footprint of international coalition forces from 2001–2011 and did it support 
or detract from the strategy of removing the threat of terrorism and stabilizing 
the country? 
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Central concept.  The most appropriate strategy to allow a scholar to collect and 
organize data from participants is qualitative research.  In particular, the narrative 
method presents the opportunity for the scholar to be positioned to collect experiences 
without being constrained by a structured questionnaire interview in the study 
(Creswell, 2013). One of the major objectives of explanatory research is to build 
theories that researchers can then use to explain a phenomenon to predict future 
behavior or associated events (McNabb, 2008). 
Qualitative research is the most all-inclusive method with which to observe the 
impact of experiences that belong to a single person (Giorgi, 1997, p. 236).  According to 
Creswell (2013), a grounded qualitative inquiry affords the scholar an elevated level of 
quality that allows the project to focus on the core of the research problem.  The 
qualitative research method is the application of narrative research that can provide a 
specific contextual focus, such as asymmetrical battles or the affected population of a 
nation embroiled in a terrorist/insurgent conflict (see Ollerenshaw & Creswell, 2002).  
The benefit of selecting the narrative approach was the ability it afforded to guide the 
research through an explanatory research lens.  The explanatory lens studies the impact of 
a strategy to a conflict area by using the testimonies of those affected (Beverly, 2005).  
This design allowed the collection of data to be tailored to the Afghan experience by 
collecting of Afghan nationals’ perspectives and experiences, which demonstrated 
Afghans are the direct recipients of strategy activities that can determine if the strategy 
was either a success, a hindrance, or contradictory to the national goals (see Chase, 
2005). 
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Research tradition.  The employment of qualitative research results is an extensive 
methodological approach that requires a submethodology to be selected from many 
research methods to be employed (McNabb, 2008 p.274). Descriptive research is 
accepted as a mean to conduct the most transient on means to produce a detailed yet 
systematic analysis of the (McNabb, 2008 p.275). 
The qualitative research method allows the scholar to focus on multiple methods; 
this involves an interpretative approach to the target population (Denzin & Lincoln, 
2000).  A pool of information was collected, as a practical foundation for the study, 
through interviews that included perceptions of strategy and policies as well as the 
experiences of the participants.  Employing a qualitative study better assisted in the 
researcher’s comprehension of the participants’ experiences and how they developed 
their perceptions (see Bogdan & Biklen, 1992).  Seidman (2006) explains that qualitative 
research gives a better perspective of the participants’ actual setting and how the 
participants live their personal lives.  
Qualitative methodology uses various methods of research, such as narrative, 
biography, grounded theory, ethnography, or phenomenology (Creswell, 2013).  The 
commonalities in each design are that they are focused on participants who share the 
context of the subject, yet the researcher employs an outsider-based interpretation and 
control of the study (Creswell, 2013).  The objective of this research effort was to 
examine the experiences of persons that implement strategy and policies as well as 
persons that received the actions of the strategy.  Examining the works of McNabb 
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(2008), it was understood that qualitative research has at its core, three broad 
classifications:  interpretive research, explanatory research, and critical research (p. 275).   
The core to narrative research is the validation of the personnel affected by the 
target issue through the examination of real life experiences as the means to measure the 
research topic (Yin, 2014).  The employment of life experiences is an advantageous part 
of the social science investigation, yet the scholar may not always depend upon the data 
to stand-alone for evidence and support for the conclusions of a report.  Therefore, 
scholars can use targeted documentation, such as relative government testimonies, fiscal 
reporting, or other such data, to support the narrative.  Utilizing chronology as the means 
to establish a beginning, middle, and an end for the data collected provided me with a 
basis for selection in my ability to collect accounts of the impact of strategy and policies 
to discover the success or failure of the strategy.  For these reasons, it was determined 
that a narrative research design was appropriate for this study.   
Role of the Researcher 
The cornerstone for accurate research is the delineation of the role of researcher in 
collection, analysis, and final deposition of data (Creswell, 2013).  The researcher has the 
role of the primary collector and moderator throughout the phases of the data selection, 
data collection, data analysis, and report writing.  The primary researcher was located in 
the United States during most of the research process.  There were no trips to Afghanistan 
in order to collect data; however, some data was acquired from secondary sources, such 
as published documents and information from Afghanistan.  Key components for the 
researcher in this study were the logistical, ethical, and personal issues that required the 
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restricting of the considerable amount of sources for information that were available to 
me.  This restriction required the filtering of bias from previous research on the topic.  To 
mitigate this, a strict research protocol was used, applying the fundamentals of content 
analysis and attentive to the identified units of analysis.  Another challenge was filtering 
the information collected through Afghan understanding of the interviews and ensuring 
adequate documentation of experiences to ensure the data were not corrupted.  This 
possibility of corruption was mitigated through the use of triangulation of the interviews, 
reports, and documentation. 
Mitigating bias.  The qualitative method provided a meant by which to 
generalize a topic in order to capture a more diverse population (Lewis-Beck, Bryman, & 
Liao, 2004).  For the purposes of eliminating the bias introduced by the scholar, a 
grouping process was employed to understand the experiences of those that implement 
national security strategy as well as those that are affected by the activities that the 
strategy creates.  To reach the objectives of the study, the qualitative study was the best 
method to conduct this study.  The reality of modern war, especially one deemed a “war 
on terror,” is that it is defined as asymmetric (Hammes, 2005).  An adversary will employ 
the tools of the asymmetric conflict, chief of which is the control of culture through 
communication, shadow governments, and infiltration of religion to intermingle among 
the people with the goal of mitigating the advantages of the host nation’s government – in 
this case, Afghanistan (Bergen, 2009).  The potential for researcher bias was seriously 
considered and measures were taken to ensure that bias was both accounted for and 
mitigated.  An example of employing a mitigation technique is, for example, realizing 
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that fifty percent of the participant pool is from the Afghan culture, whereas the 
researcher is not.  To mitigate a possible communication bias between two cultured, the 
researcher selected Afghan participants that were formally educated, demonstrated a high 
working knowledge of American style English language, and worked with American 
forces or government officials in Afghanistan.  
The research focused on two groups of participants: Afghan nationals, which the 
previous paragraph addressed, and former U.S. Government personnel that implemented 
American strategy in Afghanistan.  A bias that needed to be addressed as it pertains to the 
second group is the primary researcher’s military background and practical experience 
with the Afghan conflict, which could have created an inadvertent bias.  Contrasting with 
other vocations, the profession of arms demands a constant moral contemplation 
concerning the legality and purpose of its practitioners.  This moral contemplation is a 
balance of the expected military gain as it reflects achieving a strategy to the unintended 
damage and injuries that are result from the actions.  This moral discipline includes the 
application of the rules for the employment of legal and moral acceptable application of 
weapons and methods with at its core the avoidance of civilian casualties (U.S Army).  A 
soldier is required to make moral judgments as to what is right or wrong (MCDP 1-1, 
1997).  While conducting objective research, the inadvertent lens of a Marine’s moral 
judgments about the data can lead to researcher bias.  To mitigate this bias, controversial 
topics (such as the effect of Islam on good governance), perceptions or conflict 
resolutions of the war (such as whether Afghanistan a just war), and/or American 
activities in Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal as a precursor to the rise of the 
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Taliban.  This study focused, not on the personal, but on the research questions at hand.  
To end with, this study made use of cultural experts to review the final analysis and 
findings to ensure that bias was minimized and different cultural viewpoints were 
respected. 
Methodology 
The employment of qualitative research results in an extensive methodological 
approach that requires a sub methodology to be employed, selected from many research 
methods. In order to answer the research question, it is assumed that qualitative research 
is the most all-inclusive method to obtain the impact of the experiences sustained of a 
period of time (Giorgi, 1997, p. 236).  According to Creswell (2013), a grounded 
qualitative inquiry affords the scholar an elevated level of quality that allows the project 
to focus on the core of the research problem.  Descriptive research is accepted as a means 
by which to conduct the most transient on means to produce a detailed yet systematic 
analysis of the (McNabb, 2008 p.275). 
Qualitative methodology utilizes various methods of research such as case 
studies, biography, grounded theory, ethnography, or phenomenology.  The 
commonalities, however, in each design are that they are focused on participants that 
share the context of subject, yet the researcher employs an outsider based interpretation 
and control of the study (Creswell, 2013).  The objective of this research effort was to 
examine the experiences of persons that implemented the strategy and policies as well as 
the persons the received the actions of the strategy of the United States military in 
Afghanistan.  Cortazzi (1993) proposes that narrative research, with its centric asset of 
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providing a chronology for a sequence of events, is the factor that places narrative apart 
from other types of research.  The core to narrative research is the validation of the 
personnel, affected by the target issue, through the examination of real life experiences as 
the means to measure the research topic.  The employment of life experiences is an 
advantageous part of the social science investigation, yet the scholar may need more that 
the data for evidence and support for the conclusions of a report.  Thus, using targeted 
documentation from the Literature Review found in Chapter 2 (such as relative 
government testimonies, fiscal reporting, or other such data) to support the narrative in 
forming questions and sparking dialogue with the participants was useful.  Using 
chronology as means to establish a beginning, middle, and end for the data collected 
provides a basis for selection in the ability to collect the accounts of the impact of the 
strategy and policies to discover the success or failure of the strategy based on the impact 
of that the strategy had upon the participants experiences.  A narrative research study was 
realized to be appropriate for this study. 
Quantitative methods are valuable in clarifying relationships and differences 
between variables.  Although the quantitative method is limited, it can equate the 
interconnection and origins of relationships in complicated settings (Cronbach, 1975).  
Though sufficient in determining relationships in complicated settings, the quantitative 
approach was not appropriate to tackle the requirements of the research for this study.  To 
understand the participant’s perceptions and attitude in order to measure the success or 
failure of the strategy, a context-specific study is essential for accurate collection of the 
cause (Maxwell, 2013).  A quantitative research method would not be able to capture and 
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interpret the experiences of the participants since a quantitative study is limited in 
providing constructed variables (Maxwell, 2013) 
Population and Participants 
The principles of qualitative research sampling are to establish a process design in 
which the instrument becomes the researcher.  The researcher then develops a strategy of 
engaging persons or activities within specific situations (Maxwell, 2013).  With this as 
the guiding principle, the participants selected were national security strategy and 
counter-terrorism policy implementers and recipient of the actions created by the strategy 
and policies.  The participants were selected from two groups: implementers and 
receivers.  The implementer group consisted of participants selected from those with 
experience with the Special Forces community in Afghanistan.  The second group of 
participants was selected from Afghan nationals that lived under the American counter-
terrorism strategy in Afghanistan post-9/11.  A purposive sampling was used to gather 
participants to ensure that all participant groups were eligible to be part of the proposed 
study.  Neuman (2003) argues that the participants shall be representative of the centric 
population directly impacted by the subject.  Instituting a sampling structure facilitates 
the ability of the scholar to identify the limits of the participants’ experiences with the 
projects’ topic.  The sampling structure distinguishes between persons who are viable 
prospective participants and those who are not (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000).  Focused 
sampling allows for important aspects of the participant’s perspectives and experiences to 
be conveyed, resulting in the scholar achieving a deeper understanding of the topic 
(Patton, 2002).  
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Such a sampling structure demonstrates that the participants signify the target 
populace.  It defines the function and the inclusion of the population group concerning 
the needs presented in the study (Patton, 2002).  The sampling structure is in line with 
Berg’s (2001) discussion on how purposive sampling assists in identifying the individual 
required in answering the research question and their attributes by identifying the 
significance of their perspectives and experiences.  The participants’ personal 
experiences represented the recipient population and interjected insights to the issues 
presented by the study.  Though the original proposal for the study suggested the use 
participation of 12 or 14 participants, there was five participants from the implementers 
group and five participants from the receiver group used in the final analysis.  Though 
fewer participants than the originally estimated number participated, due to the nature of 
narrative methodology, this reduction did not impact the scope or saturation of the study.  
To achieve a thematic inundation on the subject: there are 10 participants divided into 
two groups.  The first group consisted of five former U.S. Special Forces soldiers, with 
numerous tours of duty in Afghanistan; the second group consisted of Afghan citizens 
that lived through the Soviet, Taliban, and American interactions with Afghanistan 
during various conflicts.  Using their testimonies in this qualitative research study, the 
narrative approach provided valuable data for this study (Czarniawska, 2004).  
Informed Consent 
As an outsider, especially with the Afghan population, it was difficult to secure 
the trust of the target participants.  It was vital to obtain their trust in order to conduct a 
successful narrative study (Maxwell, 2013).  Before scheduling the initial interview and 
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establishing the observation period, the participants were presented with the appropriate 
informed consent letter (Endicott, 2010) that expounded upon the need for and purpose of 
the investigation, as well as provided an explanation of the research process.  During the 
initial meeting, there was also a discussion that covered the introduction to the research 
project, the purpose of the study, expectations, and information needed from each 
participant.  Thus, the data that this research is based on (both direct and observed) is 
predicated upon the informed consent of the participants.  To ensure that the integrity of 
the research and confidence of the participants, the requirements of the Walden 
University Academic Review Board were followed, including the requirement that all 
participants are required to provide their full name on the consent letter.  The personal 
information that the consent letter contains was maintained in strict confidentiality.  The 
security of these documents, as well as others that may provide insider information on the 
participants’ activities will be secured by a locked filing cabinet located in a locked office 
with controlled access for a no less than three years and no more than five years.  Upon 
completion of this academic project, shredding will destroy the consent forms containing 
personal information.  
Confidentiality 
As the research employed the narrative approach, the establishment of trust 
between researcher and participants was paramount.  With this in mind, the informed 
consent letter that provided personal details about the participants will be kept in strict 
privacy and confidentiality.  To ensure the participants understood the confidentially of 
the information, the informed consent form contained information explaining how the 
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participants’ information will remain confidential and will only be released when 
personal approval is obtained.  The confidentiality statement explains, in detail, for the 
participants the reason their information is needed and that their information is protected 
and secure.  This statement of procedure illustrates the scope of protection against 
improper disclosure of information, which, in turn, improves the dependability and 
validity of the data that was collected.  To ensure the integrity of the study, the 
participants signed an informed consent form to provide proof that they understood and 
concurred with the participants’ and researchers’ responsibilities during the project.  Due 
to the structure of the narrative methodology in requiring personal interaction between 
the participants and the scholar, the study’s privacy and confidentiality has been 
stringently executed during this research project.  The basis of the research required that 
an environment of trust exist between the participant and the scholar; thus, an agreement 
was reached between members of the research project that the information stated during 
the interview would not be disclosed to others without obtaining the permission of the 
participant.  
Data Collection 
The use of the narrative method of research required investigating the 
participants’ life stories through multiple means of observation – from the direct 
interview with unstructured questions, to observations of reactions to statements.  The 
instrumentation that collects this data is commonly an audio recording device (Clandinin 
and Connelly, 2000), with which the participants recorded their stories, as well as a 
journal, with written observations made by the primary researcher.  The dynamics of the 
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data collected incorporated the participants’ experiences, as well as their perceptions of 
the research subject, required a data collection method that include observations, 
interviews, and audio materials (Creswell, 2000).  Clandinin and Connelly (2000) 
confirm that the core to the narrative research method is, not only the collection of life 
stories through observation and interviews, but also the need to chronograph the data into 
past, present, and future ideas.  To accomplish this, the scholar collected examined, and 
analyzed the data into a “re-story” of information (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000).  
Unlike a rigid interview process, observations are made and participants’ stories 
are recorded, but the manner and mannerism they engaged in while discussing the 
experience is also noted.  The face-to-face discussion with the participants employed an 
informal or semi-structured series of guided questions that were used only to spur the 
memories of the participants in order to support the researcher understanding the 
participants’ experiences with the American national security strategy and counter-
terrorism policies in Afghanistan (Czarniawska, 2004).  Employing face-to-face 
dialogues in qualitative studies has advantages and disadvantages (Maxwell, 2013).  The 
benefit of the researcher having direct contact with the participants is that non-verbal 
communications may be observed and documented, both of which add necessary material 
to the proposed study to accurately capture the essence of the storyline (Czarniawska, 
2004).  Though the time to transpose the observers’ notes to the correct timeline is time-
consuming, the overall cost for collecting direct and observed data was reduced through 
the data collection and transcribing phase being made simpler.  However conducting 
face-to-face dialogues with the participants with the challenges of time and replication 
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that narrative method of research require is often a hindrance in data collection and 
coding, since the data would be very narrow in scope as it is but a small group’s 
experiences.  Yet, this small group provided a lifetime of experiences and perceptions on 
the research topic that supported scope and scale of research conducted.  
Instrument Selection 
The principles of qualitative research sampling include establishing a process 
design in which the instrument becomes the researcher, who then develops a strategy for 
engaging persons or activities within specific situations (Maxwell, 2013).  The reason for 
this is that qualitative research requires data to be collected that cannot be obtained 
through a scientific measure, such as is used by a quantitative method.  The narrative 
approach is a people-centric research method that presents the goals, as Creswell (2013) 
stipulates, for decisive test groups that represent the context of the subject from the 
individual and the environment.  This allows the data to capture heterogeneity from the 
participant, which provides a critical exam of the theory through the lens of the data 
provide by the participant.  This method establishes a precise assessment for the goal that 
variances between situations or individuals depend upon the selection of the collection 
and coding instrument became the principal force for the qualitative scholar (Creswell, 
2013).   
Data management was provided by NVivo software, which is designed to sustain 
the qualitative process by affording a non-numerical and unstructured information index 
that is searchable, as well as to provide the researcher with a capacity to theorize (Nvivo, 
2017).  The simplicity of the product is reflected in the importation of data directly from 
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a word processing file such as Microsoft Word or a PDF document as well as photos, 
videos, surveys, and audio files, all of which can be coded directly to the assigned folder 
(Nvivo, 2017).  The data management element allowed the researcher to view the 
information through data groups that are visible to scholars as columns of data portions.  
The groups of information will correspondingly permit the scholar to include field notes 
as well as insert other documentation, such as updates of the information as the collection 
and analysis process takes place.  Support for the research is found in the program that 
arranges the data into themes and codes.  The program allowed for immediate feedback 
of files and codes that provides an establish control of the data and enhanced the quality 
control requirement (Nvivo, 2017).  The strong point for Nvivo is that, unlike other 
programs, it is not just an excellent data management tool, but demonstrates its value by 
the ease of learning the program for a social scientist that may not have experience in 
data manipulation.  This ease, in turn, reduces the possibility of false interruption of data 
through mismanagement of the tool. 
Data Analysis 
This project relied on the raw collected data to be transcribed and analyzed 
through the NVivo computer program to code and analyze the responses collected.  The 
determination of themes and trends in the data provided by the individual responses 
allowed the NVivo program to determine themes and trends – and reduced the 
introduction of false analysis caused by researcher bias (Nvivo, 2017).  One advantage in 
using the program is that coding data provided by the program was more valid and 
provided an easier means to verify the process, while the disadvantage in using the 
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program was that the each sentence is not coded, but the content of the source.  The semi 
structured interviews used to develop a dialogue between the participants and researcher 
based on the research questions posed in this study.  Each face-to-face interview was 
recorded and transcribed to ensure the validity and reliability of the obtained data, along 
with all field notes and corresponding documentation.  The NVivo qualitative software 
analyzed the transcribed interviews to categorize developing themes as well as elements 
of the information provided by the participants and the environment that added to the 
insight of those that have implemented American national strategy in Afghanistan and 
those that received the activities that the strategy created such as an Afghan national 
experiencing a “Secure-Hold-Build” operation in his clan compound.   
The core of the qualitative method of research is to solve the “how and why” of 
the research topic, with the narrative inquiry being employed to gain these answers 
through the discovery of knowledge based on a person’s knowledge, both experienced 
and perceived, on the research topic (Polkinghorne, 1995).  The stages for analyzing the 
data from the interaction with the participant’s and the observations of the environment to 
include documentation included:  
1. Selecting the participants, developing the interview questions to support 
dialogue, maintain observations notes of the environment and feedback from 
the participant during the interview, and determining appropriate 
documentation to review and interject into the dialogue. 
2. Select the raw data to be coded and analyzed by reducing and eliminating 
peripheral data to obtain the essence the experiences and perceptions of the 
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American strategy employed in Afghanistan as the basis for success or failure 
of strategy.  
3. Employ a diachronic organization process to place the data in a linear 
cataloging to formulate a beginning, middle and end of the narrative to 
identify core themes of the experience and perceptions of American strategy 
in Afghanistan. 
4. Interpret the data for identification and verification of central patterns, themes, 
and regularities as well as contrasts, paradoxes, and irregularities.  The 
interpretation of data is recognized as the researcher using the narrative 
inquiry process of melding the interpretation of the narrative created by the 
participant, while also constructing their meaning from their observations of 
the environment, and sources of influences that created the narrative. 
The narrative was created from both participants description of the experiences 
and perceptions of the encounters with the employment of American strategy in 
Afghanistan as it pertains to the American group and receiving the results of the strategy 
as it pertains to the Afghan group (Polkinghorne, 1995).  The process employed for this 
qualitative narrative study assured the participants that trust in the process would allow 
them to express their experiences as well as their perceptions.  The collected data was 
identified and analyzed appropriately.  Following the establishment of the pertinent 
themes and patterns, the assigning of variables was established.  The interpreted data 
included a final narrative relating the experiences and perceptions of the employers and 
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receivers of American strategy were presented to answer the research question posed by 
this investigation.  
Issues of Trustworthiness 
Evidence of quality.  For this research, the use of the term “validity” is to confer the 
strength of conclusions, as well as the overall quality of the research.  Validity is defined 
as the "best available approximation to the truth or fallacy of a given inference, 
proposition, or conclusion.”  (Yin, 2009)  Validity, when applied to research within the 
social sciences, encompasses four types: conclusion validity, internal validity, constructs 
validity, and external validity. 
Yin (2009, p. 40) discerns that the quality of a research design should be 
evaluated by employing a logic test and endorses the following four tests: 
1. Construct validity: Determine the functioning procedures for the concepts to 
be examined.  This is based on establishing operational sets of measures to 
establish construct validity is probably one of the greatest challenges in 
narrative research (Yin, 2009, p. 41).  This investigation achieved construct 
validity during the data collection findings. 
2. Internal validity: In this study, internal validity seeks to establish causal 
relationships among variables.  Yin (2009) declares that every time an event 
cannot be observed in case study research, an inference has to be made.  This 
investigation employed NVivo qualitative analysis software to support the 
identifying trends and relationships of the collected data.  The software 
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assisted in pattern matching, resulting in the development of logic models 
(Yin, 2009, p. 41).  
3. External validity: The purpose for employing external validity is to delineate 
the area that the investigation findings can be simplified (Yin, 2009, p. 40).  
External validity determines whether or not a study can be generalized beyond 
the narrative research.  This study used the asymmetric conflict theory that 
reproduced amongst the narrative cases to enhance external validity. 
4. Reliability: Reliability validates that this investigation can be replicated (Yin, 
2009, p. 40).  To enhance reliability, this investigation targeted the data 
collection phase using multiple sources of evidence, establishing a narrative 
study database using NVivo, establish a chain of evidence, and reviewed the 
findings.  This investigation ensured that as many phases as possible in the 
research design are explained and operationalized. 
Ethical Considerations 
In this research, the highest standard of ethics was ensured.  Though there were 
cultural differences amongst the participants, there was a set of moral norms that were 
applied to a conglomerate of activities, in turn based on a code of ethical conduct.  
Universal ethical codes are important in relation to cultural differences because ethics, in 
its purest sense, enables a person or an organization to decide whether or not to do the 
right thing when at an ethical crossroad (Roth, Todd, Stavropolus, & Babik, 1996).   
The uniqueness of this study is the comparison of a central phenomenon, 
(American strategy in Afghanistan) as it relates to two cultures.  Though there is an 
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argument that there are shared ethical values and traditions that cross cultures, there is 
also a preponderance of research covering global ethics that suggests different national 
cultures have different perspectives regarding ethical values and practices (Buller, 2000 
p. 27).  The ethical risk for this research was to view data through lens of one culture over 
another with the results of a skewed narrative data analysis.  To reduce risk, the study 
does not judge differences as erroneous, but rather as simply different and thus coded 
appropriately.   
The maintaining of security, confidentiality, and anonymity was a cornerstone in 
conducting research on participant’s experiences with the Afghan conflict.  To mitigate 
these concerns this study used data collected directly from researcher interviews, 
observations, or direct supporting report analysis due to the potential risk involved during 
data collection in an active conflict zone.  Further reduction of risk is that no information 
will be taken from vulnerable populations such as individuals under the age of 18 years 
old or over the age of 65 years old, as well as those that are detained personnel.  The 
researcher coded all data obtained from the interviews by employing NVivo and certified 
that all research was conducted in accordance with the Walden University endorsed 
Standards of Best Practices, provided by the American Association for Public Opinion 
Research.  No data was utilized from sources with questionable practices or a biased 
opinion on the research problem. 
Summary 
The first acknowledged modern counter-terrorism strategy of the United States 
was outlined by President Ronald Regan; it specifies that the United States will react 
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promptly and decisively to root out terrorism (Bank, Nevers, & Wallerstein, 2007).  
During Regan’s presidency, five major terrorist events occurred and, since this statement 
on counter-terrorism was made, every U.D. President has thereafter issued similar 
statements, resulting in the United States dedicating critical national resources in waging 
a war on terror.  No strategy has been developed, however, that addresses adversaries 
exploiting asymmetric warfare through terrorism.  Thus, no metrics have evolved to 
determine whether any particular strategy is successful.  As Arreguin-Toft (2012) 
demonstrates, by using the Asymmetric Conflict Theory to explain the significance of 
asymmetrical war upon the current political environment, and functions as a warning to 
decision-makers to get strategy correct, irrespective of relative power.  Arreguin-Toft's 
(2012) argument makes the perilous consequences of neglecting the significance of 
strategic collaboration clear.  Such strategies ought not be based on the Newtonian 
paradigm.  Instead, he proposes that choice incorporate the Asymmetric Conflict Theory 
to develop a process to defeat the asymmetric adversary (Toft, 2012).  The core reason to 
employ a qualitative method using narrative research methodology in this study was to 
determine what approaches to a strategic policy of employing conventional military 
forces may be used in effects-based operations to increase the effectiveness of military 
operations against an asymmetric adversary?  Basically, how can using a strategy based 
on employing a modified Cold War organized and trained conventional force defeat a foe 
that adapts to challenging the nations will within all environments that touch society.   
The purpose of this qualitative narrative inquiry is to scrutinize the experiences, 
as well as the perceptions, of people that are charged to employ the American strategy in 
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Afghanistan as well as the experiences and perceptions of the strategy as viewed from 
persons who were affected by programs created by the strategy.  The qualitative research 
will investigate the probability that the success or failure of a national strategy may have 
a relationship to experiences and the perceptions of the people that employ, as well as 
those that endure the activities that the strategy creates.  The objective of this study is to 
add to the field of knowledge concerning the development and implementation of 
successful national security strategy in the manner that allows for the mitigation of 
terrorism and strengthens individual and national security. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
The focus of this chapter will be to explain how data was collected and analyzed 
for this study.  This will include a discussion examining the process and methods used to 
collect as well as control the data and my methods of interpretation.  The purpose of this 
study was to determine whether there could be benefits in shifting U.S. security policies 
to include a greater focus on developing an asymmetric strategy to focus on the adversary 
as opposed to the manner in which the conflict has been conducted.  Two main research 
questions emerged from this idea.  First, can the strategy of focusing on the asymmetric 
adversary within an asymmetric field of conflict and the threat of terrorism reduce the 
terrorist organizations’ recruitment an provide a stronger, more permanent solution to 
terrorism than employment of conventional military action in individual areas of conflict?  
Second, what are the advantages for U.S. national security of employing this approach in 
altering domestic and foreign security policy to achieve a sustainable reduction of 
terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland and interests abroad? 
There will be four areas of review within this chapter.  In the first segment, 
context of the study will be provided, including an explanation of the role of the 
researcher while collecting the data.  The second segment will include a discussion of the 
collection of data as well as an explanation of the main codes and resulting application of 
how the conventional-centric main code was applied during the analysis of the 
documents.  In the third segment, data collection methods and coding under the 
asymmetric-centric main code will be explained.  Throughout the second and third 
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sections, statements obtained from the participants through the narrative inquiry-based 
interviews will be offered.  The final section will contain a summary of the processes 
employed to obtain the conclusion of the study. 
Setting of the Study 
The Walden University Institutional Review Board (IRB) granted approval to 
perform the acquisition and analysis of data to support this inquiry on May 10, 2017.  The 
IRB approval number for this research project is 05-12-17-0380121, which expires on 
May 11th, 2018.  The basis for this narrative inquiry was to obtain data through the use of 
informal interviews with those personnel that implement national strategy through 
policies and programs as well as Afghan nationals that receive the effects of the national 
strategy.  12 to 14 participants were to be interviewed, but, being unable to find an 
adequate participant pool, this study was limited to 10 participants.  The structure of the 
narrative process allows for a reduction in the number of participants that does not affect 
the outcome of the study; it also has a noticeable impact upon the saturation of the data 
collected (Creswell, 2013).   
The initial basis for this narrative inquiry questions was to obtain an experience of 
those who were subjected to the American strategy for the War on Terrorism through the 
Afghanistan War experiences of both the Americans involved in initiating the strategy 
and the Afghans that received the actions of the strategy.  To support this inquiry an 
examination of the strategy through a review of professional texts and scientific 
manuscripts that specifically concentrated on the current war on terrorism and 
subsequently focused on the counterterrorism/counterinsurgency operations in 
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Afghanistan was conducted.  The documents selected from the literature review involved 
official policy and U.S. government reports to Congress.  These documents provided a 
sound foundation in previous studies in asymmetric conflict as well as current viewpoints 
as to the policies and actions of the U.S. War on Global Terrorism and as its activities in 
Afghanistan.  Though referenced in this study, neither in-depth analysis nor coding of the 
literature was completed prior to the study.  Appendix D presents the coding tree, which 
will be discussed in-depth in this chapter.  Analysis of the documents supported the 
findings from the literature review and provided strong data that addressed the research 
questions.  There was a requirement to detail the actual experiences and preconceptions 
of those that have directly implemented or received the actions based on current strategy 
and policies.  Though the participants had numerous diverse experiences, it was initially 
determined that looking at implementers of strategic policies as well those that receive 
the actions of the policies would fortify the documents analyzed in satisfying the research 
questions. 
The purpose of this study was comparing, as well as contrasting, the findings of 
the analysis by examining the participants’ stories, so it was determined that the narrative 
research method was the most suitable form of research methodology to employ.  A 
narrative study is a research methodology of examining the individual’s experience of the 
world and events that includes capturing both the experience as the perception of a life 
event (Creswell, 2013).  Employing the narrative inquiry in qualitative research has been 
demonstrated to provide a straightforward version of the facts that have directly affected 
the lives of the participants as well as the impact on their future decisions (Creswell, 
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2013).  This approach permits the participants who are involved in the research to present 
their experiences and perceptions in their own words (Creswell, 2013).  The requirements 
of this study necessitated that the research questions were designed as to stimulate the 
examination of the strategy implemented in Afghanistan as part of the counterterrorism 
policy.  With this in mind, narrative inquiry was applied as the final step in the collection 
and analysis of the data because this was the most appropriate method to confirm or 
reject the data analysis. 
The goal of the study was for the participants to provide a detailed account of 
their experiences about living and working in Afghanistan under the implementation of 
American strategies and its potential effect on mitigating terrorism.  The questions were 
articulated in a manner to allow the participant to express their account of their 
experience of living and working in Afghanistan.  The information provided by the 
literature analysis provided additional support for the interview protocol.  Background 
information about the participants will be presented, for the purpose of clarification, 
including what contacts the participant had with implementers of American strategy and 
specifically the intervention of American-led coalition activities from 2001 to 2015. 
Demographics  
 In this study, the experiences of two groups of participants were examined.  The 
first group consisted of five Afghans that lived in Afghanistan before and during the 
American invasion and occupation.  The Afghan participant pool was selected from 
educated Afghans that held various but respected positions within Afghan society.  These 
positions range from one lawyer, to two businessmen, one doctor, and a contractor 
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interpreter/student.  All of the participants worked with Americans as interpreters and 
advisors following the American invasion and participated in the American programs to 
stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan.  The second group of participants was selected from 
former U.S. Army Special Forces operatives that conducted several tours in Afghanistan 
to implement stabilization and nation building as part of the American strategy.  The 
Special Forces operatives were chosen because of the core mission of Special Forces to 
work with indigenous personnel within a conflict zone to ensure victory through the 
ability of the people of a nation being able to defend itself.  Their work allowed them to 
live alongside Afghans in a way that provides an insight into American policies and 
programs in Afghanistan as viewed from those that are on the ground implementing 
strategy in a way that no other group of Americans can provide.   
Data Collection 
 The opening discussion with the first participant group (Afghanistan Group 
[AFG]) began on May 19, 2017 and was concluded on May 24, 2017.  The second 
participant group (American Group [AMG]) interviews began on May 24, 2017 and 
concluded on June 9, 2017.  All members of both participant groups indicated that their 
predilection was to complete the interview process during one sitting in its entirety but 
allowed for the possibility of further interviews as needed for clarification.  Ann 
additional interview with the fifth participant from the AMG (AMG 5) was conducted on 
June 23, 2017, for the purpose of clarifying data points after the initial data were 
collected and analyzed.   
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 The interviews were recorded using a Sony PC compatible ICD-PX333 digital 
voice recorder.  The device employs voice-operated recording that starts and stops 
automatically with of a voice.  Each participant was allowed to examine the device and 
approve its use during the interview.  The device has a timer display, which enabled the 
researcher to make notes associated with the time indicated by the comment or 
observation requiring a notation. 
   The primary researcher supplied the protocol for the interview and the consent 
form was sent to all participants 5 days prior to the first scheduled interview.  The 
participants discussed the consent form and interview protocol with me to ensure that 
they understood the process and granted access under the protocol requirements.  The 
consent form was signed and returned on the day of the interviews.  As is the custom in 
conducting a research interview, the consent form and protocol documents were read to 
the participant immediately before the interview to assure that these materials and intent 
were accurately understood.  After the interview was concluded, the recording was 
transcribed using HyperTranscribe software that converted the verbal record into a 
written one to allow coding.  HyperTranscribe was selected based on the program’s high 
reliability, ease of use, and the security it provided.   
The significance of using a narrative inquiry is that it relies on the words of the 
account (Creswell, 2013).  One unexpected issue was the Afghan participant mastery of 
the English language.  All Afghans were formally educated and used the syntax of the 
English language in a more proper way than the American participants and the 
researcher.  Accordingly, the word “asymmetric” was substituted for any word with a 
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similar definition (such as irregular, unconventional, and, the most used word, guerilla).  
The relevance of codes will be briefly discussed in the summary of this chapter, as well a 
frequency chart provided, found in Appendix D.  A copy of the corresponding transcript 
was presented to each participant and all recordings and transcripts are secured and will 
be kept secured per the procedures delineated in Chapter 3. 
The Afghan group (AFG).  The first participant (AFG1) of the Afghan group was born 
in 1980 in Kabul, Afghanistan.  The participant was born into a family of seven siblings.  
As is the case of many families in Afghanistan, there were three generations living in the 
same home.  According to the participant, the importance of American policies was 
notable from the very beginning of their life.  The family had originally lived in a smaller 
village outside of Kabul.  During the father of AFG1’s early life in the farming village, 
the grandmother determined that her children would receive an education from the 
American International School in Kabul with a promise of better opportunities for her 
grandchildren.  The family then moved from the village to Kabul so that the participant’s 
father and his siblings could attend school.  According to the participant, the family 
sacrificed all of their lands to make an American education a reality.  The participant 
stated that this was the beginning of the attitude toward experiencing American policies 
that would ultimately be passed down. 
The second participant (AFG2) in the Afghan group was born in Kabul in 1971 
into a family of merchants.  He attended the Kabul Medical School and became a doctor 
of pediatrics.  He supported the Mujahidin during the Soviet war, but did not support the 
Taliban during their rule.  It was during the Taliban rule that he became taxi driver with 
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the experiences of talking to everyone in Afghan society.  When the United States 
invaded, he made use of his mastery of the English language to work as an interpreter for 
the Americans.  He worked with the Americans for ten years before receiving a visa to 
immigrate to the United States, where he works within his family business.  His ten years 
of working alongside Americans gave him ample life experiences concerning the effects 
of American policies and programs that it strategy create.   
The third participant (AFG3) in the Afghan group was born in Kandahar in 1977 
into a family of merchants.  His family traveled throughout Afghanistan as well as trips to 
Iran and Pakistan to sustain their business, which ranged from selling palm oil used for 
cooking to household goods and carpets.  This participant was also educated at the 
American International School in Kabul where he received his MBA with a specialty in 
international business.  This participant remembers the Soviet war through discussions 
with parents, but does have actual experiences with the Taliban during their rule as well 
as the impact that America has made to Afghanistan since 2002.  Upon graduating 
school, this participant also worked with American forces as both an interpreter and 
logistics contractor before receiving his visa to immigrate to America.  He currently 
supports his family business in Washington DC area.   
The fourth participant (AFG4) from the Afghan group was born in a village 
outside of Marjah Afghanistan in 1982.  His father was a farmer and truck driver who 
ensured his son was educated at Kandahar University, where he learned English along 
with receiving a degree in mechanical engineering.  When the Americans forces took 
Kandahar in late 2002, he volunteered his services as interpreter and guide.  He worked 
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for 8 years alongside American Marines and Special Forces Teams as they conducted 
national building operations.  He became an American Citizen in 2011 with the 
sponsorship of the Marines and Green Berets that he worked with and is currently 
working in Iraq as an interpreter for the Coalition forces as well as a student in the 
Northern Virginia area.  
The fifth and final participant (AFG5) from the Afghan group was born in Kabul.  
His father was a lawyer, and he followed in his family tradition by attending law school 
in the United Arab Emirates in 2004.  It was from his father that he learned English and 
later mastered the language while at Kabul University.  Upon receiving his law degree, he 
returned to Afghanistan to work with the Afghan National Government.  His duties direct 
placed him in a position to observe American policies and programs as they directly 
affected the Afghan population.  He is currently working in the United States, but plans 
to return to Afghanistan at a later date.   
The American group.  The first participant (AMG1) in the American group is the former 
commander of the Asymmetrical Warfare Group and a retired U.S. Army Special Forces 
Colonel.  He is a Special Forces officer who has been in the Army 24 years with 
assignments that included duties as an instructor at the coveted Army Ranger school, as 
well as commanded two Special Forces Operational Detachment A-Teams (ODA) as well 
as numerous other assignments during the10 years of the Global War on Terror.  These 
duties involve implementing counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency policies through 
direct action, nation building and various staff positions both abroad and in the United 
States.   
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The second participant (AMG2) in the American group is a former Team Sergeant 
in the U.S. Army Special Forces.  Before becoming a Team sergeant, his job function 
was within the ODA was Special Forces Medic in which he served four tours as a medic 
and one tour as a team sergeant in Afghanistan.  He is fluent in Farsi and Dari, the two 
major languages of Afghanistan.  The majority of the time he was in Afghanistan, he was 
assigned to sector within the Helmand and Kandahar provinces of Afghanistan requiring 
that he live with the Afghan troops an directly intermingle with the Afghan population 
while implanting policies and programs from a higher command. 
The third participant (AMG3) from the American group is a former Special 
Forces Warrant Officer.  Before becoming a Warrant Officer, he served as a 
communication specialist within an ODA.  Much like participant two, he served four 
tours as a communication specialist and one tour as Team Warrant Officer.  He is fluent 
in Farsi and has a working knowledge of Arabic.  He served his Afghanistan time in the 
Kandahar and Kabul providences.  His duties required that he interact on a daily basis 
with local the Afghan population as well as live with as trusted advisor with the Afghan 
Government forces as they implement American policies and programs.   
The fourth participant (AMG4) from the American group is a former Special 
Forces Intelligence chief.  Before becoming an intelligence chief, he performed the duties 
of a Special Forces engineer with the task to help rebuild many of Afghanistan's 
infrastructures.  He also has many tours in Afghanistan with three tours as an engineer, 
one tour as an intelligence chief and two tours as a contractor working for the U. S. State 
Department.  He speaks Farsi and Dari as well as French.   
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The fifth participant (AMG5) from American group is a former Special Forces 
intelligence chief with seven tours in Afghanistan.  He speaks Farsi, Pashtun, and Dari, 
which has allowed him to work alongside Afghan nationals as an advisor to the 
Afghanistan government as well as advised very senior district, province, and country 
officials.  He holds a Masters of Science degree in Internal Affairs from University of 
Maryland and is the most experienced of the participant in observing the cause and 
effects of American policies and procedures during the Afghans war.   
Data Analysis 
In order to analyze the experiences of the participants with American strategy and 
policy implementation as well as develop a foundation for the parameter questions 
utilized in the narrative inquiry, an examination of the transcripts was conducted.  The 
control of this study was through the establishment of three distinct categories.  
Anonymity was ensured through the assigned a designation that could not specify an 
identity of the person contributing direct statements and general discussion points.  These 
designations can be found later in this chapter.  The three stages of the analysis consisted 
levels of review.  Codes were developed into two general categories that support the 
theory and the research questions.  The parent code categories representing the theoretical 
basis for the study were conventional-centric (CC) and asymmetric-centric (AC) and 
aligned with definitions of these terms as found in Arreguin-Toft (2012). 
The research questions concerned the benefits that can be realized for national 
security through the provision of an asymmetric warfare strategy.  The nature of the study 
established the need to use the same codes in each phase of data collection.  To satisfy the 
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research questions regarding actions that would influence countering and mitigating the 
threat of terrorism through conventional centric (military) interventions or asymmetric 
centric (irregular warfare) interventions involving developing an asymmetric strategy that 
addresses multiple elements of the conflict.  The analysis produced sub-codes that, 
though necessary, were different, but shared characteristics for these areas.  There were a 
limited number of codes secondary to the specific target of the study.  More codes were 
not necessary to answer the research question.  These codes were specifically the research 
question and addressed the general nature of the research questions. 
For clarification of the process, please see Figure 3, which provides a diagram of 
the asymmetric centric (AC) coding framework used to analyze data in this study.  A 
similar coding framework was used for Conventional centric (CC) codes.  Figure 2 also 
illustrates the process for data collection. 
Figure 3.  Illustration of the Process for Data Collection 
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The coding process derived the distinction between American-centric based on 
the American group and Afghanistan-centric based on the Afghanistan group.  The most 
predominant aspect that determined what was categorized as conventional centric or 
asymmetric centric was the theme that arose from that specific portion of the data.  If the 
overall theme indicated that the experiences from actions or policy were directed toward 
direct action with enemy combatants or insurgents, then the data was placed in the 
category of conventional centric.  If the initial focus was applied directly toward terrorist 
organizations, then the data was coded under “conventional centric.”  The same process 
was applied to the asymmetric centric codes as well as the initial focus that determined 
that the actions applied toward holistic action and reaction toward the national threat then 
the data was coded toward asymmetric centric.  
The application of sub-codes was determined by examining the factors of the 
coded statement.  Many of these applications were quite simple in that most of the 
comments were specific in the sub-code areas.  This minimal design provided for a 
detailed examination and analysis of the documents.  The main codes chosen were 
simple, conventional centric and asymmetric centric.  The child codes (security, growth, 
and stability) were used under both of the main codes.  Likewise, the sub-codes were also 
used in both of the main codes.  This was designed to examine the data consistently for 
both of the approaches.  A full coding chart can be found in Appendix D, and detailed 
explanations of the specific sub-code findings are included within each section. 
Nvivo Mac software was chosen as the tool for processing the codes (QRS 
International, 2017).  The Nvivo Mac software is designed for coding systems from 
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simplistic to complex as well as assist in developing themes and grouping the codes.  All 
of the interview transcripts and field notes were converted into text or “.  txt" documents 
to be used in the coding software.  The design of the coding tool supports the researcher 
that may not be a cyber-authority, making the coding task more accurate.  Following data 
entry, the information is converted into detailed codes and grouped with the codebook.  
The manipulation of the program was assisted with a continuously available tutorial that 
provided interactive training program from the NVivo company.  The initial level of 
coding was performed first to gain an aspect as to what the data presented.  The codes 
were applied to the testimony and any additional statements made by participants. 
 Possible discrepancies in the software coding could have occurred due to 
language syntax employed by the participants.  The researcher who determined the code 
following the first stage is that the transcripts were manually coded using a highlighter 
with specific colors for designating each sub-code mitigated this possible discrepancy.  
Though the process is redundant, it does assist as a means to confirm many codes applied 
to the analysis as well as ensured quality control method outside of the software is 
employed that supports the placement the codes in significant categories (security, 
stability, growth).  The final step to the interview analysis coding process was a top-level 
application of codes.  The child codes were applied to the two main codes (conventional- 
and asymmetric-centric).  Following this level, a frequency report of each level was 
entered into an Excel spreadsheet.  The frequency report for the document analysis will 
be discussed in detail later in this chapter.  
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Coding is a method that is extensively utilized by the social scientist for 
qualitative research is to find and document the themes contained in the statements is to 
use the theme or "within words" technique (Saldana, 2009).  The analysis of these themes 
found within the statements requires numerous levels of examination to ensure the codes 
were accurately interpreted and applied with the intention of the participants and 
documents are entirely understood. 
Narrative Inquiry Process 
The asymmetric centric and conventional centric approaches are defined within 
this study as those actions encompassed by the War on Terror to include Operation 
Enduring Freedom, the American lead action in Afghanistan.  The asymmetric centric 
approach is a designator that concentrates the specifics of the asymmetric methods in 
many different aspects of power through force, cultural, economic and political avenues 
in countering the threats that create terrorism in the country rather than focusing actions 
solely on the conventional centric program that employs a singularly military solution to 
the problem.  Originally, a bias that the researcher may have identified was based on 
historical events; in other words, all actions from the U.S. military might be primarily 
conventional centric.  However, a majority of documents from the literature review make 
statements that lead to the asymmetrical-centric side of the study.  For example, 
documents DOD Document Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership (2014) and DOD Report 
on the Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan (2014) have overwhelming 
statements of asymmetric-centric themes. 
118 
 
In the DOD Report on the Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan 
(2014), presents the testimony of the military commanders of the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2009 operations.  This statement reflects numerous comments 
from the participant groups relationship of having non-military government agencies, he 
states, "we work together to figure out what's going to be required as we provide security 
to make it more durable, because the governance and development parts need to flow in 
almost simultaneously" (DOD, 2014, pg. 205).  This statement, from a military official, is 
only one of many that indicate the development of civilian government and the continued 
internal security and welfare are the intentions of the U.S. and the ISAF in general.  The 
official continues in his testimony stating that larger issues in the area of asymmetric-
centric reforms are in many cases a more in-depth time consuming issue (DOD, 2014).  
Analysis Through Theoretical Foundation and Conceptual Framework 
 The explanation for the responses that the participants give on their perceptions 
of the American strategy for the war, it is arguable certain that “asymmetric” is amongst 
the broadest if not the most encompassing.  This study has placed that the Asymmetrical 
conflict theory can be categorized through the examination of various existing and 
potential concepts of asymmetric conflict (Chase, 2011).  Employing the asymmetrical 
conflict theory in analyzing the responses of the participants can characterized three 
different sub-themes through which asymmetry may be deduced as it applies to strategy.  
These three sub-themes to strategy are “security, stability and economic growth which 
represents the arenas that the conflict is waged within.  Thus, this recent approach in 
defining strategy can result in a misunderstanding through the misapplication of the terms 
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asymmetry strategy and/or asymmetric conflict distorts the adversary and leads us to 
make major strategic blunders (Angstrom, 2011).  This is demonstrated in the strategy of 
concentrating on threats rather than adversarial strategies.  By employing the asymmetric 
conflict theory over conflict theory, the examination of strategy for Afghanistan to be 
understood through the strategic nature, goals, and overall concepts of American strategy 
in Afghanistan as judged by the operations the strategy dictates (Peceny & Bosin, 2011). 
Strategy through Security 
The indication that asymmetric-centric themes in providing a strategy for long-
term security and stability to allow Afghanistan to grow out of being a receptacle for 
terrorism are referenced in both participant groups in which the theme was noted 43 
times.  The language of the testimonies indicates that metrics being used by the Coalition 
is directed to the developing, maintaining, or protecting internal stability and security of 
the country with a reliance on the development and training of the Afghan National Army 
with a lesser degree of focus on the development of the National Police.  The army is not 
being raised as a field army that repulses foreign attacks but in line with working with an 
internal police force that is focused on a civil stability for the nation.  The child codes 
obtained from the Afghan group indicate that more interaction between the police and 
Afghan Army is missing, creating a lack of stability and security.  AMG5 participant 
gave a strong reference that the strategy is focused on recruiting and training the army as 
well the subsequent police force.  Though the strategy is focused on the Afghans 
protecting themselves from outside intervention as well as defeat the ongoing insurgency 
When asked about the operations of the Coalition forces with the Afghan National Army 
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and Police, the second Afghan-group participant stated, "I think the need for the coalition 
to build the national army while conducting operations is a requirement.  I believe this 
because the strategy to secure Afghanistan and its borders, which includes the need for a 
strong military arm to safeguard the nation against domestic as well as foreign 
intervention."  The participant demonstrated his passion for the need for a strong military 
that works with American and coalition forces.  He expressed this sentiment in the failed 
rollout of Afghan operations with the follow-up statement of, "The issue is that the 
strategy to develop an Afghanistan National Army did not take into account the local 
culture or the needs of the tribes.  This is demonstrated by the current culture that the 
Afghan National Army as it stands currently does not have a culture of soldiers being 
faithful to the nation or sees the United States as a partner against terrorism.  An 
explanation for this is based on the all of the Afghan-group participants indicating that 
the haphazard way that America has been conducting this war of ideas, which results in 
people not wholeheartedly accepting the narrative that America only wants to help and is 
not an invader.  The current culture, especially in the rural areas, cannot accept that 
America's goal is to help them obtain their freedom from the Taliban" (AFG2).   
The asymmetric centric core codes reveal that American and Afghan security 
operations working with stability operations (AC1b & AC2b) were the two most 
prominent themes.  Personal security (AC2b) was prominent with the term used ten 
separate times during the dialogue, which is supported, by term Afghan national security 
(AC1b) being revealed nine instances within the document.  The information depicted in 
the “DOD Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan" (2014) is 
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based on a detailed report to Congress that addressed the abilities of the Afghan national 
government to protect the people.  This report is predominantly focused on U.S. 
government programs that the support of Afghan national government actions in 
Afghanistan, which includes the use of conventional U.S. troops. The majority of the 
report involved U.S. troops conducting operations aimed at securing a designated area, 
with minor programs focused on training Afghan personnel with the goal of leaving the 
area recently secured under the protection of Afghan Security Forces.  
It is observed that this DOD Report (2014) contains multiple references in which 
the actual strategy of U.S. forces securing a particular area had the ultimate goal of the 
areas security to be left to the Afghan forces recruited across the country with the mission 
to provide area security and the rule of law.  A note source of information indicates that a 
large amount of the American troops were elementary aged children at the time of the 
9/11 attacks which was the catalyst U.S. actions in Afghanistan which leads to the 
observation that they may have an inadequate recollection of the 9/11 attacks.  The 
significance of this element of data is that the conventional based operations for seizing, 
securing and stabilizing have continued for so many years, that many of the military 
personnel fighting the conflict were in the first grades of elementary school when the 
2001 attacks on the U.S. occurred.  This point was observed by the AFG2 in that he 
states: "After 15 years after the initial U.S. intervention in Afghanistan indicating that the 
strategy in using conventional methods is either slated for this style of war."  
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Strategy Through Stability 
The participants’ interview results display a premise that stability is a key element 
of strategy by the issue that stability is mentioned eight times by the Afghan group and 
seven times by American group.  The codes frequency pertained in the conventional-
centric-local stability (CC3b) section.  The testimony is directed at the strategy of relying 
on Afghan Security Forces (ASF) as the linchpin of the U.S. strategy for establishing and 
maintaining stability in the region with only assistance provided by the U.S. or Coalition 
forces.  Though the discovery of the code is noteworthy, this testimony was in the area of 
personal security (CC2b) and not stability CCb3).  The goal of country and implication is 
that Afghanistan security is the major theme within these documents.  This was coded as 
being conventional-centric because the focus is on conventional forces, either traditional 
civilian government agency being the catalyst for security. 
An observation was made from both groups of participants that revolve along 
asymmetric-centric codes through the method that employed separate civilian programs 
to build the stability through welfare programs for Afghan citizens with a focus on non-
military agencies activities.  The analysis was centered on methods that employed 
separate civilian programs to build the stability through welfare programs for Afghan 
citizens that are administered by U.S. citizens.  AFG5 asserts that it is the civilian 
authority that is fundamental to the national security of Afghanistan even more than 
military power.  This theme is supported by the interviews with AFG1, AFG3, and AFG4 
as well as AMG1 and AMG5 participants, though not its intention the codes that the 
interviews provided demonstrate the lack of cohesion between conventional military 
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programs aims at establishing security and civilian-based programs aimed at providing 
stability.  The codes from all participant interviews to include both the Afghan and 
American groups indicating that there is a lack of cohesion through the use of 
conventional based war over an asymmetric one.  The coding suggests that regardless of 
the U.S. agency, the American focus is on the use of conventional centric approaches for 
establishing stability and security.  
A more detailed examination of the Afghan participant group interviews brings to 
light the collection of testimonials as to the need or impact American policies programs 
in relationship to stability for the various regions.  It must be noted that when addressing 
conventional centric approaches, participant AFG3 mentions that American policies are a 
deterrent to violence.  The participant further explained that civilian power is as 
fundamental to national security as military power is, yet the testimonies indicate the 
failure of the two working in unison, which is a requirement for asymmetric methods 
(Arreguin-Toft, 2012).  This testimony places the belief of the participant on the failure 
of the approaches and disjointed of the programs that were recommended and intended to 
become policy for this government agency.  The programs as relayed by participant 
AMG1 demonstrates that the strategy that non-military U.S. government agencies are 
more prone to develop civilian building programs as an approach to concluding the 
struggle was confirmed through coding.  The parent code regarding asymmetric centric 
strategies is found forty times throughout the document. 
The American and Afghan participant groups responded to interview questions by 
indicating the limited mention of security and stability as a global strategy as a result of 
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American activities in the U.S. as well as Afghan policy statements and documents.  The 
participants replied that, at first glance, it is hard to know exactly why the mention of 
strategy based on security and stability for Afghanistan is lacking.  Participant AMG5 
stated: "when you look at the business development sector, there is a fair amount of work 
in American asymmetric policies. “  The participant continued to be somewhat perplexed 
by the question stating, "I have not given much thought to that.”  After thinking for a 
short period, the participant did state, "In the first couple of years, early in the 
intervention in Afghanistan, 2001, 2002, 2003, there was a lot of focus on stability and 
democracy by ensuring every Afghan is franchised.  Sadly the emphasis appeared to be 
on numbers that reflected quantity over a deep-seated embedment into the culture that 
would be required for success." 
  During the interview process, the participants from both groups were asked about 
personal experiences and the personal influences of American strategies for Afghanistan 
as it relates to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency.  Interview Questions 1-10 were 
answered mutually through the narrative that followed.  These questions were related to 
the influence that American policies had on the Afghan's character and that influence in 
potential involvement in violent or peaceful activities.  The participant AFG1 and AMG5 
mutually identified that the early American policies experiences while foundational for 
removing the Taliban did not have an impact on the future in these areas.  It was 
sometime during the 2002 military campaign that American policies influenced these 
areas of security and stability.  Participant AFG1 was very explicit about the impact that 
American counterterrorism and counterinsurgent strategies had on current events 
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personally.  The statements indicated that the current strategy involving 
counterterrorist/counterinsurgent are directly proportioned to the effectiveness of nation 
building based on foreign aid for developing countries.  A specific target for this direct 
action as a result of a national strategy is the humanitarian and nation-building programs 
amount and type found in Afghanistan.  The American Group participants indicated that 
they are always thinking of using favorable asymmetric policies to aid in developing an 
environment of security and stability for Afghanistan.  The account maintained the 
comparisons to mastering a mystery of what works and what does not.  This accounting 
of policies and programs includes the allocation of funding to specific programs that are 
in most cases not interrelated with a single strategy or measure for success in nation 
building or countering the threats to security and stability.  So, according to the answers 
of the American Group of participants, there was most definitely an American strategy 
whose influence is locally positive yet overall on the strategic level has not been positive. 
Strategy Through Growth 
The additional analysis of child codes under the asymmetric-centric approach 
exposed that a preponderance of data from the codes falls along the growth category.  
Twenty-three codes were found relevant to the asymmetric-centric approach.  The 
quantity of indicators aligning with the growth (also mentioned by participants as 
prosperity) category is very close to the stability child codes that were applied 22 times in 
the interviews.  The growth categories 23 indicators found the category had 14 observed 
to be within the sub-code of the rule of law (CC2a).  The sub-code of personal security 
had eight indicators (CC2b).  The remaining code was concluded to be general to the 
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larger child code category (CC2).  It is observed that 20 separate instances political 
corruption was mentioned as a supporting argument.  These were unambiguous 
testimonials to desire for the empowerment of the Afghan citizens as the process of self-
rule.  The revelation of the empowerment testimony is in a general sense but was notable 
in several sections explicitly mentioning gender guidelines for education in Afghanistan 
three times within the document.  According to AFG4, "there should be a mutually 
created standard that respects our culture.  This will ensure common ground for the 
development of tribal and business owner assistance." 
  Child codes for asymmetric-centric-stability (AC3) were noted almost as many 
times as child codes under growth (AC2).  Of the 32 times that AC3 codes were applied, 
19 of them were applied under the sub-code of regional stability (AC3a).  Participant 
AMG5 formulated possibilities and experiences to Afghanistan stability with a non-
conventional military action such as American-Afghanistan business partnerships will 
lead to economic and cultural growth.  This particular sub-code was noted multiple times 
throughout the document and specifically several times in relation to Afghanistan.  
Supporting AMG5 comments is the "DOD Report on Progress Toward Security and 
Stability in Afghanistan” (2014) tracks indicate that the forces of instability and natural 
disasters will increase over the next decade in areas critical Afghan prosperity (DOD 
Report, 2014).  The testimonial along with this document reinforces the requirement for 
an asymmetric-centric approach to developing a strategy with its direct application to the 
security of the U.S..   
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The previous observation denotes there is a direct correlation of economic growth 
to Afghanistan internal protection.  The child codes that aligned with the asymmetric-
centric security (CC1) are found 12 times in the Afghan participant group document and 
nine times within the American participant group.  Deciphering the child codes and sub-
codes under security, American national security (CC1a) was applied eight times in the 
document and Afghan Security (CC1b) was applied twice.  The remaining two codes fell 
into the general category of Security (CC1).  A point of observation is that the report does 
support the testimonies of the Afghan group in continuing to work with other U.S. 
activities to secure regions that are characterized as high risk for U.S. interests. 
The literature review conducted in Chapter 2 provided an examination of the 
American strategy and policy process.  These documents also addressed the potential 
strategies and policies that could exist within the war on terror through established 
actions conducted by a conventional centric approach to directly focusing on the enemy.  
The literature demonstrated that American strategy and resulting policies are 
concentrated in a conventional-centric-U.S. security (CC1a) sub-code.  It should be noted 
that participant AMG1 cautions against the potential of alienating cultures through 
violations of basic human rights resulting from strategies and policies that directly 
confront those that support terror in a direct military fashion. 
Following the preliminary coding process of the participants demonstrated a 
portion of studying strategy to improve it was less than helpful in addressing the research 
questions initially proposed.  It is affirmed that a qualitative analysis of this study with 
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the goal to influence positive social change should take into account this the differences 
between the literature, reported information, and the testimonies of the participants. 
The American group of participants referred the funding for programs both 
military (conventional centric) and welfare (asymmetric centric) program with and goals 
that relate to the strategies and follow-on policies for Afghanistan.  The American group 
stated that funding is a key metric for establishing and maintaining security and stability 
in Afghanistan as well as the success rate for the growth programs that support the 
national strategy.  According to AMG5, "the United States redeveloped its strategy for 
Afghanistan from the asymmetric support actions focused during the Soviet occupation 
during the 1980's to a shift in the use of direct conventional activities in 
counterinsurgency operations following the attacks of September 11, 2001.”  
The bulk of the codes attached to these testimonies were asymmetric-centric.  
asymmetric centric approaches were utilized seventeen times during the AMG5 
testimony review. The child codes and sub-codes applied resulted as follows: 
asymmetric-centric-security (AC2a) was applied seven times, asymmetric-centric-
stability (AC2b) was applied five times, asymmetric-centric- Afghan domestic security 
(AC1b) was applied four times, and asymmetric-centric-local stability (AC3b) was 
applied once to the report.  A finding from the American group experiences that needs to 
be noted is the observation of a conventional-centric code being applied once, which is 
found the sub-code area of conventional-centric-counterinsurgency (CC2a).  While the 
sub-code was in the area of conventional-centric and related to counterinsurgency, a 
unique quality to this application was that the participant speaks of counterinsurgency for 
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not only conventional approach directly, but also for Afghan operations directly involved 
in the conflict.  The objective of the strategy of counterinsurgency measured in this case 
is naturally inferred to be for any program directly involved in the conflict, regardless of 
status. 
The question of strategy and the effects of the strategic policies for Afghanistan 
were posed to the participants.  In a follow-up interview, (May 24, 2017) participant 
AFG4 commented on the state of stability and growth in the country and the personal 
impressions on foreign influences on growth.  The response is summarized here:  "The 
United States has constructed numerous schools and built roads, yet it seems that all the 
programs are based on quantity which seems to the metric that they use.  But when it 
comes to the quality of a program that is based on the success it is difficult to measure.  
Thus nobody wants to touch it.  There is not much more to say, except for the success 
rate of economic growth within Afghanistan.  It seems that the solution is responding to 
Taliban or Haqqani Network attacks but I don't see actively setting up the compounds 
and villages to be empowered to reject the terrorist.”  Participant AMG4 addressed this 
issue in his statement about conventional strategy in his statement:  "Why, because all of 
the focus has been on using military controlled counterinsurgency operations while also 
trying to conduct counter-terrorism and nation-building.  Right now it is how many 
programs do we have, or how many organizations have their independent programs.  So, 
nobody questions the more important question, which is, ‘what are we accomplishing.’  
‘How is the program achieve our goals?’  ‘How many people can read?’  I am not talking 
about individual programs, but about all the programs as one strategy to achieve the 
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strategic goal.  My concern is that our leaders, as well as the nation, view all the 
programs as one big operation, yet in reality, each governmental organization is doing 
their own thing without thought as to how the program supports other programs and 
ultimately the war effort, and regrettably, those questions aren't asked  
Following the dialogue with the participant AMG4 the researcher asked if this 
was just a bureaucracy using the best practice possible for organizations involved in the 
process.  The reaction was, "It is the amount of funding that is being wasted by the 
GIRoA as well as the turmoil that the process creates?  But when it is examined in details 
how do we tell the warfighters that risk their lives or the taxpayers how we have been 
using their lives and wasting their tax money?  It is a great achievement to spend so much 
blood and treasure to liberate the Afghans from the Taliban and contain Al Qaida, but I 
think that level of reaching our goal is deceptive.  Misleading because we focus so much 
on the number of programs and money is involved in achieving success for the program 
that we forget about the quality of making the country truly secure and stable."  
Establishing Trustworthiness 
The practice of narrative inquiry as a means for research can be described as 
establishing validity grounded on the aspect that it encompasses the participant’s 
experience as well as perceptions of key events in his or her life.  Thus, through narrative 
inquiry, the credibility of any study lies in the recovery and interpretation of the 
experience and the perception of the person who experienced the events that the study 
covers.  In this study, as outlined in Chapter Three, the life experiences and, more 
importantly, the perceptions of U.S. intervention in Afghanistan were compared to the 
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policies that have been in place for the United States since Operation Enduring Freedom 
began in 2001.  The collection of these experiences were outlined in Chapter 3.  Through 
previous experience working with Afghan nationals and the U.S. Army Special Forces 
soldiers, a pool of willing participants became available to the scholar.  Communication 
with these participants was made after they were no longer affiliated with the U.S. 
Government, which allowed for unhindered relationships to be established and sequences 
of dialogues between the researcher and participant to be scheduled.  As part of the 
narrative methodology, the research processes included coding of the testimonies, the 
interview transcripts, and the researchers' field notes.  This coding was completed with 
the use of NVivo software and the interjection of manual observations from the 
researcher's field notes.  The coding process is defined in detail in a later portion of this 
chapter. 
Results 
The objective of the research was to focus on the evidence that addresses the 
central research question:  How does the American strategic perceptions of an 
asymmetric adversary in Afghanistan affect the conflict outcome and are the Afghan 
public perceptions of the outcomes of the strategy a positive or negative influence 
towards supporting a strong, stabilized democratic country, free from terrorist influence?  
The purpose of this question was to qualify whether Afghans and Americans perceive the 
current conventional strategy of employing large numbers of conventional troops on the 
ground as successful – or whether an asymmetric approach would be deemed more 
132 
 
welcomed.  The evidence is based on the results of the interviews as described in this 
chapter.   
The interviews had fewer conventional centric codes applied with the transcript 
analysis than the asymmetric centric codes.  These codes occurred 44 times in the 
interview transcripts.  The child codes revealed that security was prevalent with 28 codes, 
followed by stability that was applied seven times, and constancy applied nine times.  
The sub-code level exposed the impact of U.S. domestic security with this code applied 
16 times, followed by Afghan domestic security 12 times.  Then it drops to local stability 
six times, personal security four times, and economic opportunity three times.  The 
significance of these findings is that quite a few of the comments used in the analysis 
were chosen as conventional centric to explain or justify the current strategy.  To be fair-
minded with conveying the statements that are referenced, reports on current activities as 
well as an existing policy that have a directly reflected in the testimonies and public 
statements of military officials are included. 
Though there are numerous explanations for the reason that there are a lower 
number of conventional centric applications rather than asymmetric-centric applications, 
the leading one for this researcher is the asymmetric nature of the participant's duties 
while in Afghanistan.  There could be various reasons that explain the limited number of 
responses regarding conventional centric approaches, but the predominant point is from 
the participant's interview responses.  Nevertheless, these details were not immediately 
exposed in the analysis.  Various reasons that affect the outcome are discussed in detail 
under recommendations in Chapter 5. 
133 
 
Participant AFG1 stated that there are different opinions held by Afghans on the 
actions of Coalition Force, particularly about the Americans – ranging from attitudes 
about their presence in Afghanistan, to the results of their policies, and consequences of 
their actions.  For example, following the post-Soviet invasion, the country experienced 
turmoil in which the Taliban rose as the dominant power in the country.  The participant 
specified that the perception of the Taliban between the Soviets departure and September 
11 attacks were one of an era of "killing and violence, with family against the family."  
The participants from the Afghan group continued to express their recollections of 
the Post-Russian Taliban period; twenty comments are directly related to the security of 
the country in that section.  The discussion did present a unique view of the Taliban in 
that, during their direct rule, for many people, the threat of theft or assault by criminals 
was lessened, but fear from the Taliban using violence was constant.  The anti-Taliban 
feelings that erupted following the American actions of 2001-2002 was based on the 
knowledge that the Taliban provided security based on fear, not stability.  Participant 
AFG 2 utilized the phrase "very, very brutal" several times during his interview.  The 
participant presented his view of the activities conducted by the Taliban:  "Are a cultural 
offense to Afghans.”  It was during this portion of the dialogue that the participant AFG2 
made clear his perceptions of the Taliban in his statement that the Taliban was 
"destroying the humanity of the Afghans, while the American tried to restore it." 
The influence that the U.S. conventional military demonstrates in Afghanistan 
strategic policy is reported in the literature review found in Chapter 2.  From the many 
documents literature review, one document (Transition in Afghanistan: Losing the 
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Forgotten War?  The Need to Reshape US Strategy in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central 
Asia) references the conventional centric approaches employed or Afghanistan stability 
(Cordesman, 2015).  The surprise was that the majority of the results from the American 
Group of participants also indicated a similar opinion as to the one found in Cordesman 
(2015) document.  Upon examining the participants' testimonies, there was a fairly even 
application of codes between the child codes of conventional centric-security (CC1) and 
conventional centric-stability (CC3).  One category missing from the application in the 
American Group was coded under the child code conventional centric welfare (CC2).  A 
further examination of the statements reflects that the topic is not directly related to a 
particular experience.  This is a predictable aspect of the coding process based on the 
charge of the activity.  
A report published by the Congressional Research Office Afghanistan: Post-
Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policies in 2014 tasked with providing 
specifically examined concern and actions in Afghanistan to "increase the understanding 
of Afghan experiences with American strategy for security assistance” (Katzman, 2014).  
The document specifically addresses the use of state security and stability in the country.  
The report’s executive summary notes that the aggression and violent actions that the 
Taliban employ is a method of indoctrination to their ideological beliefs.  The report 
provided a foundation for the researcher to explore this subject with the participants but 
the dialogue provided an unexpected discovery.  Unlike other government or military 
inferred documents found in Chapter 2, the bulk of this report pertained to what this 
scholar interprets as asymmetric centric measures that were employed or should have 
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been employed in Afghanistan during U.S. involvement.  The testimonies from the 
dialogue that the researcher established with the participants resulted in asymmetric 
centric codes being used 17 times in their statements.  The bulk of child codes concerned 
within this document were in the asymmetric centric security category (AC1).  
Specifically, the asymmetric-centric-Afghan security (AC1b) was applied three times in 
the report, asymmetric centric-welfare (AC2) was applied twice (one time for each of the 
sub-codes, AC2a and AC2b), and twice for asymmetric-centric local stability (AC3b).  
The remainder of the codes applied was generally applied in the asymmetric centric 
category. 
A key point discovered through the interview process was the final two questions 
that each participant received regardless of the groups.  These questions, found in 
Appendix A, address the perceptions of the Afghan people as to American strategy of 
creating stability to combat terrorism and the large footprint of American forces.  The 
narrative that followed was significant in its simplicity in reaching the core of what the 
participants perceive about American strategy to this researcher.  Participant AFG1stated, 
"My experience has taught me that violence is not really about anything.  I always have 
this kind of message to my own family, which is that violence begets violence.  I don't 
think violence gets you anywhere.”  The statement continued to refer to the policy of the 
Coalition forces of pursuing the Taliban and Haqqani Network members.  Participant 
AFG1 stated, "what the strategy to remove the Taliban and build Afghanistan through 
violence, I think it created more violence that made the Taliban stronger, now when 
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America leaves the Taliban will be more powerful than before because it is perceived that 
they defeated America.” 
Participant AFG4 made a significant statement regarding a need to change U.S. 
policy towards more humanitarian interventions rather than military with the military 
working with non military agencies in providing security but not managing the programs.  
Participant AFG4 stated their needs to be opportunities in Afghanistan that economic and 
educational prospects by stating, "they join the Taliban in regions where people are 
hopeless such as Helmand and Kandahar.  In those regions, the government is not 
offering any services to them, where there are no clinics, where there are no schools.  So 
if you provide alternatives to the Taliban, then I don't see why anyone would join them.”  
Participant AFG4 completed the interview with a statement that, if people have the right 
incentives, they are less likely to join the ranks of the Taliban. 
Participant AMG5 addressed what he believes to be a gap between the policy of 
employing asymmetric centric programs in a unified method of nation building and the 
reality of conventional-centric method of using the military to solve all problems.  His 
statement, "I believe it is never too late to change direction but it would have saved a lot 
of blood and treasure if they had established an asymmetric strategy at the beginning.  
Being one of the members that originally was on the ground at the very beginning we did 
fine in defeating the Taliban.  What went wrong is that they just held on to the mentality.  
This is when it should become a little more asymmetric-centric.”  This was presented as 
being an asymmetric approach based on not relying on the conventional military as the 
primary mover for nation building.  Participant AFG5 made the opinion that the best 
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manner for the U.S. to eliminate the vast majority of troops in the country is doing a 
surge for the education and other supporting humanitarian endeavors.   
Summary 
The data that were collected in this study was obtained and structured in an 
organized manner that is consistent with the procedures outlined in Chapter 3 and 
approved by the Walden University IRB.  A two-step manner was employed to use the 
data acquired through the analysis of testimonies of Afghan and American participants in 
the conflict in Afghanistan.  This data was coded with the codes listed in Appendix D 
using NVivo software.  The process by which the analysis took place was a three level 
coding process.  The sub-codes or detailed level of codes were applied first, and then the 
child codes and lastly the two main codes of asymmetric-centric or conventional-centric 
approaches were applied.  This seemingly reversed system of coding provided a very 
detailed manner of analysis and review of the testimonies and documents to prevent the 
omission of any potential data that might have been missed. 
The first phase of data collection provided the foundation for guidance questions 
posed in a narrative inquiry of human participants that were both Afghan and Americans 
who have lived in Afghanistan and had direct contact with the operations involved in 
education in the country.  While narrative inquiry provides details more through the 
experiences of the people involved (Connelly & Clandinin, 1990), for consistency of the 
study, the same codes were applied to the transcript.  The data revealed some confusing 
results.  The most notable confusion disclosed by the data analysis is the difference 
between the stated intentions of the Afghan group supporting American conventional 
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military actions and the reality of shared experience through the viewpoint of the 
Afghans and American who has experienced life in the Afghan War.  It has been revealed 
that the difference lies with the actions taken since 2003.  A more detailed discussion of 
this will take place in Chapter 5, as well as one concerning recommendations and 
reflections gained through the study.  The analysis contained in Chapter 5 will include the 
implications for positive social change that the results revealed. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
  In this study, the benefits or deficiencies regarding the shift of U.S. Security 
Strategy to include asymmetrical alternatives to countering terrorism as opposed to a 
conventional were examined.  This study was conducted to determine whether an 
asymmetrical strategy could be an effective alternative to the continued use of 
conventional military action alone.  The war in Afghanistan has continued for 16 years, 
making it the longest armed conflict in the history of the United States (Taylor, 2015).  
“The Costs of War,” a project of Brown University’s Watson Institute, reports that, in 
total, over 149,000 people have died in the conflict since the 2001 invasion (Taylor, 
2015).  The report includes the deaths of American and Coalition forces to include 
civilian contractors and the Afghanistan government forces as well as the 26,270 Afghan 
civilian deaths and the 21,500 Pakistani civilian deaths (Taylor, 2015).  According to a 
separate report to Congress, the financial cost of the conflict was estimated, in 2015, to be 
approximately $668 billion in Afghanistan alone (Congressional Research Service).  
These figures alone make the cost of the war in Afghanistan in blood and money 
staggering.  By examining the potential benefits of asymmetric alternative, it may be 
possible to achieve not only a decrease in financial cost, but also, more importantly, a 
reduction in the human cost of the war, with the possibility of a victory in the War on 
Terror.  
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Restatement of the Problem 
  As the U.S. war on terror has continued since 2001, the strategy developed for 
national security should result in the elimination of terrorist groups and stability within 
conflict zones such as Afghanistan.  With this strategy of using conventional force to 
eliminate terrorist groups and achieving stability in Afghanistan, it can be reasonably 
expected that terrorist attacks will be reduced and the need for American interaction in 
Afghanistan will be diminished.  There are successes in the American-Afghanistan 
conflict, such as the institution of a democratic government system as opposed to the 
totalitarian rule of Taliban (Cordesman, 2015).  However, Afghanistan continues to 
experience insurgent attacks from both Al Qaeda and Taliban forces as well as the growth 
of the Haqqani Network into a regional terrorist force.  Thus, it could be argued that the 
Afghan War, at best, is still raging and, at worse, is a defeat for American strategy and 
power (Cordesman, 2015) 
Summary of the Study 
In Chapter 1, the theoretical framework for the study was introduced through an 
explanation of asymmetric strategy as opposed to a conventional warfare strategy, which 
employs traditional military methods to defeat the threat of terrorism.  This is a wide-
ranging subject so within this chapter, the explanation as to why Afghanistan was used as 
the field of research was investigated.  Also included in Chapter 1 were the research 
questions, the method of research employed, and the implications for positive social 
change that guided this project.   
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In Chapter 2, a comprehensive analysis of existing literature related to the war on 
terrorism, the American strategy results of Afghanistan conflict, and the examination of 
asymmetric strategy as opposed to conventional approaches were provided.  The direct 
relationship of the aforementioned to the involvement of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, the 
results of 16 years of war, and the status of the terrorist originations that the strategy was 
supposed to defeat were examined.  The literature review consisted of an examination of 
journal articles, texts, and reports on the Afghanistan conflict, combatting terrorism, and 
developing post-Cold War strategy for a post-Cold War environment.  This analysis also 
included how terrorist organizations recruit members and what the primary motivations 
of individuals are in becoming terrorists.  Much of this discussion was informed by the 
asymmetric warfare theory (Arreguin-Toft, 2012) and how it relates to the motivation for 
a terrorist organization to wage war on a global power. 
In Chapter 3, an explanation of the foundation of the research design for the study 
that included how the data were collected was presented.  The study was conducted using 
a qualitative methodology with a narrative inquiry approach.  The narrative inquiry was 
preceded by an in-depth analysis of documents that specifically dealt with strategies to 
include the policies and programs for that strategy in Afghanistan.  These were 
examinations, testimonies, and policy statements of government agencies and 
nongovernmental organizations.  The narrative inquiry design is based on gaining life 
experiences from participants that experienced the subject of research (Creswell, 2013).  
For this research study, interviews were conducted with persons who lived in 
Afghanistan and experienced first-hand the American policies and programs that the 
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National Security Strategy for Afghanistan caused.  The participant pool was evenly 
divided into one group of educated Afghans that experienced the American strategy and a 
second group that was made up of an equal number of American Special Forces soldiers 
that conducted numerous tours of duty working alongside Afghans in implementing the 
national strategy.  To provide a stakeholders’ point of view, a document analysis coded 
within the protocols established by Walden University IRB was used. 
The results of data collection were discussed in Chapter 4.  This chapter included 
an explanation of the three levels of coding that applied to the interview transcripts as 
well as the documents.  In Chapter 4, the results of the narrative inquiry that consisted of 
analysis of several policy documents and interviews conducted with the participants were 
further addressed. 
Interpretation of the Findings 
The research question developed to guide this study was: How does the American 
strategic perceptions of an asymmetric adversary in Afghanistan affect the conflict 
outcome and are the Afghan public perceptions of the outcomes of the strategy a positive 
or negative influence towards supporting a strong, stabilized democratic country free 
from terrorist influence?  This research question addressed the question of whether there 
were positive results from this approach and whether these measurements provided the 
means to eliminate or reduce the potential effects of terrorism in general.  The collection 
of data in the study yielded information that indicated that, at a minimum, a consistent 
asymmetric approach is a possible solution to stabilizing Afghanistan in order stop 
terrorism in the region.  The results of this study demonstrate, also, that further research 
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should be conducted concerning actual programs enacted and measuring their success 
against the national strategy to prevent terrorism.  In the literature review in Chapter 2, 
key documents related to strategy policies of the American government to include the 
military and nongovernmental agencies were provided.  This analysis revealed that it 
was, and continues to be, the intention of the U.S. government to pursue a single strategic 
approach to eliminating or reducing the terrorist threat in Afghanistan.  However, through 
the narrative inquiry, it was found that, while it may be the intention of the existing 
policy to provide a successful strategic approach for a stable Afghanistan, this is not what 
is occurring.  This finding will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.  
  The first stage of data collection resulted in the largest number of codes, in either 
an AC theme or a CC theme.  The examined documents showed that the organizations 
engaged in the Afghanistan conflict have a strategic policy that intends on using 
nonmilitary approaches to build a safe and secure Afghanistan.  In the literature review 
portion of the study, the history of the Afghanistan conflict as well as the interaction 
between the American Coalition; Afghans; and the adversaries to include the Taliban, Al 
Qaeda, and Haqqani Network were examined.  Those examinations also provided 
indications that because of the unique nature of the background of the conflict, this 
particular situation dictates an approach that is different from a conventional military-
centric approach.  
  The focus of the strategic approach to eliminating the threat of attacks from 
within Afghanistan is noble and apparently the intention of the American and Coalition 
forces.  However, the responses in the participants’ interviews contrasted that intention 
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with specific testimonials regarding the continued conventional military action.  The most 
obvious outcome of this portion of the research study was that while the intention was to 
provide a more military-centric approach, the Afghan citizens are not interpreting the 
continued presence of American or Coalition troops as an approach to helping them.  It 
can be explained that the respondents felt that the military conventional-centric 
approaches continued with little regard to the AC approach.  Again, it must be noted that 
this is simply the viewpoint of a small group of Afghans (now living abroad) as a 
comparison to the indications made by the document analysis.  This is certainly a 
limitation, but the participants’ contribution proved to be valuable within the overall 
context of the study. 
  While the study was a qualitative study that involved dissemination of 
information from multiple sources, there should be little question as to the intention of 
the documents.  The data was derived from the participant group interviews and included 
stakeholder documents that led to 166 codes applied to the AC approach over 44 codes 
applied to the CC approach.  Each of the codes was based on the words and phrases 
contained in the testimonies and documents resulting from the application of using Nvivo 
software for data analysis. 
  The most notable statements evaluated came from AMG of participants.  It might 
be assumed that those in AMG would have a more CC approach to any type of conflict; 
however, as discussed in Chapter 4, the AMG participants testified that an AC approach 
formed around providing basic human needs is the intention of the United States in 
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Afghanistan.  However, the respondent interviews indicated that although there may be 
an intention to use an AC approach, the reality is that this method is not being followed. 
 Further examination and coding of testimonies as well as documents from 
nonmilitary government agencies further indicated that the strategy of employing 
conventional forces using or indicating the use of violent actions through a CC strategy 
provoked those who suffer from it.  The results indicated that a CC approach that relies 
on direct violent response to terrorism would continue to incite the population toward 
supporting the adversary and away from establishing a stable Afghanistan.  In the results 
of this study along with testimonies and documents that make up the basis of the 
research, the psychological influences of human beings were not observed.  The data 
suggested that the more aggressive the counterterrorism activities are, the greater the 
potential grows for recruiting more terrorists.  The participant interviews indicated that 
the philosophy of revenge is a reality and that the continued “eye for an eye” view on the 
part of Al Qaeda and Taliban insurgents is based on the continued actions of the United 
States and the Coalition forces. 
Limitations of the Study 
  The narrative inquiry interview was in stark contrast to the conclusions drawn 
from the document analysis.  It should be noted that one limitation of the narrative 
inquiry was that a small group of Afghans and Americans were interviewed – and that 
they are all men.  The participants shared personal experiences with the American 
policies in Afghanistan, so the overall impact was not revealed.  This limitation is 
addressed further in the recommendations section of this chapter.  While the participants 
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do mention the incorporation of women into Afghan policy, the limitation does not allow 
for generalization of information.  
 The Afghan group participants experienced life in Afghanistan from the Soviet 
occupation through the civil war, and Taliban takeover as well as their involvement of 
American and Coalition forces beginning in 2001.  The information they imparted 
included the influence of the recent Afghan history and how terrorism has brought the 
country to the world stage of events.  The American Group provided in-depth knowledge 
of American and Afghan relationship in defeating terrorism.  Both groups report that the 
asymmetric method of strategy that had the most influence was the provision of 
education and the exchange of information.   
  Several comments made by the Afghan participants were related to young 
Afghans that are recruited for terrorist activities within Afghanistan.  These can be 
examined in the perceptions of the people based on their age and influences.  One notable 
statement within the narrative interview was the perception of the Soviet occupation 
during the AFG1 participant's elementary school days.  His only remembrance and 
perception of the Soviet troops in their tanks were giving him candy on his way to school.  
His statement also included that the adult perception of the Soviet occupation is probably 
very different.  This is monumental to the point of discussing recruiting young people 
into violent activities against certain targets.  Based on Arreguin-Toft's (2012) discussed 
in Chapter two, this particular perception could very well be one of the asymmetric 
activities employed by terrorist organizations.  Consequently, one conclusion made in 
this situation was that perception could be enormously consequential on decision-making 
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processes regarding future strategy.  As mentioned in Chapter one, a force using 
conventional based strategy will make the recruitment easier for terrorist organizations 
using an asymmetric method such as education and mentorship of the young. 
  Participant AFG1 relayed on American strategy of building Afghanistan into a 
democratic country with self-rule on the implications of education and other essential 
security, stability, and growth provisions for humans.  This is supported by the testimony 
of AFG4 on his travels throughout Afghanistan; the participant also communicated how 
his family endeavors that included educational opportunities for his extended family and 
friends to build a stronger and independent family.   
 The research question asked if the asymmetric centric approach would be a more 
viable alternative to the prevention of terrorism.  This is about the evidence provided in 
Chapter four, which refers to both the Afghan and American participant groups reference 
to the Taliban becoming stronger after it was almost eliminated in the early stages of the 
conflict.  The Taliban growing in strength is the critical indicator that a conventional 
centric strategy is failing.  The continued references to the perception of heavy handiness 
by military forces and the "eye for an eye" mentality reinforces that simple force only 
incites anger and, ultimately, continued attacks in a vengeful atmosphere.  A limitation of 
this study is the evidence that shows that human nature takes precedence over any other 
influence.  The participants from both groups noted, in many different places in the data 
acquisition process, that there are definite thought processes for humans in an area that is 
rife with terrorism.  One of the most notable quotes the given was from participant 
AFG1regarding the perception of the Afghan people on the American strategy: "I'll 
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answer the question on the success of American strategy and that is you are not winning 
the war in Afghanistan.  Why is Afghanistan not improving?  Why aren't you winning the 
war?  This is the question to ask.”  This statement could be interpreted to mean that the 
perception of the Afghans is that the United States and Coalition forces have little to no 
thought about the actual strategy for Afghanistan and its citizens.  As determined by the 
literature review and data collection, the impact of personal perception is vital in 
asymmetric war.  The asymmetric adversary requires that the population be it a regional, 
national or global based on believes that they are winning the conflict they engaged in.  
For Al Qaeda and the Taliban, it is making the Afghans, and the various tribes, clans and 
ethnic groups believe that they are defeating the Americans.  A strategy that addresses 
this perception would be required to for America and the Coalition forces to win.  If 
American is to win than a reexamination of the strategies should occur.  This includes, 
not only looking at the national strategy, but also taking action that will adequately 
protect the American people and reveal a more cost-effective and permanent solution 
than simply entering a sovereign nation with conventional military force.  After 15 years 
of war, there must be some movement toward a solution that does not Afghan and 
American lives.  A limitation of this research is while the data analysis disclosed that 
there should be an alternative, the actual activities taken have shown something different.  
This is not only evident in the literature review, but also in the contrasts made through the 
narrative inquiry.   
The participant interviews demonstrate that it is the perception that many 
Afghans, as well as Americans that have served in Afghanistan, that the U.S. is only an 
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occupying force, not a force of peaceful reform.  As presented in Chapter two this is the 
goal of the asymmetric adversary, and it appears they are winning, based on the 
perceptions of a small group narrative.  There is an indication that positives could come 
from this shift in strategy for the U.S., though the findings are inconclusive.  This is 
based on several factors.  First, the study itself had limitations in the area of participants.  
Since only 10 participants were willing to participate, the narrative inquiry portion of the 
study only has the experiences of these ten people. 
Recommendations 
 There are many different possible strategies, policies, and programs that the 
United States could employ in Afghanistan.  With the reduction to less than 10,000 
combat troops that has taken place since 2014 (and now the possibility of a new strategy 
requiring more troops and funding the strategy to be used in moving forward) are critical 
for the success of the Afghanistan.  Based on this research, the policy of the U.S. 
government is already dominated with statements that an asymmetric centric strategy was 
the intention for operations in Afghanistan.  Nonetheless, the determining factor is the 
type of forces and the amount of funding committed to the region demonstrate that for the 
largest part of the conflict conventional military action was the policy, which is primarily 
geared towards seeking out the enemy.  This is correspondingly supported by the 
contrasting viewpoints from the participants’ narrative.  It would be credulous to state 
that in the security condition created by the 9/11 attacks with the defeat of terrorist 
organizations could be solved with a 100% certainty by the use of an asymmetric 
strategy.  However, the research has shown some indication of the possibility of using a 
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greater emphasis on asymmetric strategy that employs a unified objective, such as 
employing education as an instrument in the war on terrorism.  Therefore, from a national 
strategy standpoint, further examination on the use of agencies such as USAID and non-
governmental agencies and the provision of all aspects of benevolent aid in these 
conflicts must occur in the future.  This change in strategy does not directly address 
amending the direction of terrorist organizations, but as revealed in the research may 
have an effect on the recruitment of future terrorists.  A significant statement from 
participant AFG5 considered relying on the use of force in defeating the Taliban.  The 
participant stated, "What was the strategy to eliminate the Taliban... just kill them all.  If 
the strategy was to kill the Taliban then why is there more Taliban?  What has been 
accomplished in the last 15 years?  A Stronger Taliban now than before.”  The deduction 
taken from this statement is that relying on a conventional based strategy increases the 
violence that, in turn, makes the Taliban stronger by recruiting newer members to carry 
forward.  The influence of long-term programs such as education and other humanitarian 
interventions could instill a more robust sense of self-worth that should reduce the 
opportunities for further recruitment.  The participant did state that continued 
humanitarian endeavors require a strategy committed to long-term programs that include 
but not limited to providing humanitarian approaches can influence change.  
 An additional recommendation for future study lies in the examination of 
incorporating women, both Afghan and American, into the strategy which includes 
operations, education, training and what impacts to success that may exist.  The narrative 
inquiry used only the general information about strategy in Afghanistan.  The 
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examination of experiences through the experiences of women who have either received 
ether impact of the strategy or implemented strategy may provide significant insights into 
the potential impacts of using symmetric actions as a strategy for the future.  This could 
entail a physical presence in the country to conduct the interviews.  This recommendation 
along with an examination of psychological influences of potential terrorists could reveal 
more in-depth data. 
 Another strong recommendation from the study is further research that delves 
deeper into of what an asymmetric strategy would consist.  Research that delves deeper 
into the topic employing both qualitative and quantitative methods may reveal further 
advantages to the use of asymmetric strategy as a means to succeed in conflicts of this 
type.  This study reveals some of the perceptions of current strategy and the potential 
solutions of the use of an asymmetric strategy to counter terrorism.  Participant AFG1 
made what may be one of the most insightful comments: "When the Russians came you 
helped those that would fight them, America was there and all the fighters knew it but not 
one of your Marines was in Afghanistan.  We, America and Afghanistan won that 
conflict, now the entire American might is here and we are losing.”  This statement 
resounded in his observation of the past when the United States used an asymmetric 
strategy in the Soviet conflict as to the present strategy of direct confrontation and 
wondering what the future will be for his homeland as America begins a new chapter in 
the fight for Afghanistan. 
 As previously stated, this study does not provide all of the answers, only answers 
to the research question.  Future studies should contain examinations into both the 
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emotional or psychological motivations of terrorist organization recruits, as well as 
deeper strategy analyses about what specific strategy, policies, and procedures could be 
used in the future. 
  Further recommendations are based on the narrative inquiry interviews.  Near the 
end of the each interview, each participant was asked what their recommendation would 
be to the United States concerning winning the war against the Taliban and other 
terrorist-supporting organizations in Afghanistan.  The recommendations were 
surprisingly quite simple.  The participants stated the same sentiment in their own ways, 
but their perspective could be summed up by participant AFG5’s response: "the list of 
things America could do would belong.  But the one true thing to do is to be realistic.  
There are too many things that cannot be changed, nor would they have to be 
changed…bringing democracy, which was a goal in the early days, was only measured 
by elections. Having elections does not guarantee a democracy.  More importantly, an 
election may not provide the leadership needed to win against the Taliban.”  Participant 
AMG5 made the most defining statement when he said: “Before democracy will flourish 
Afghanistan needs a strong leader that ensure the people are prepared for it.  If not the 
people will not support democracy.  You can’t just expect it to work if you haven’t done 
any of the groundwork for it.”  
 A further discussion point was centered on defeating the Taliban.  All the 
participants have fought the Taliban for the entirety of the conflict and the comment each 
made in one way or another is: “America hasn’t defeated the Taliban in 15 years of war.”  
When asked whether can the Taliban be defeated, the response from the American group 
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was “it was almost was defeated in 2002 and 2003.”  This discussion implied that the 
participants believe their defeat is possible – with an irregular approach.  “A military 
presence will be needed initially, but the Taliban (like any other terrorist/insurgent group) 
is very fluid.  It is not like Al Qaeda in that they are not outsiders, so they are not easy to 
identify whom the Taliban are and who they are not....  To defeat you have been to work 
on people’s attitude that they are losers which deter people from joining their ranks.”  
The key to the statement was summed up by the participant AFG5 when he said:  “After 
America pulls out of Afghanistan the people will see the Taliban as the victor with the 
power and they will be more likely to support them.  The keyword used was that it was 
‘survival.’”  
 With the withdrawal of American and Coalition forces that began in 2014, there is 
the possibility that the Afghan people believe that Afghan government may provide 
strength and stability for the Afghanistan.  Both of the participant groups believe this is 
one of the main reasons that Afghans do not speak out against the Taliban.  The 
perception of the participants is, again, only a small group’s perspective.  However, if this 
is truly the perception of Afghans after 15 years of conflict, then the study indicates a 
failure in understanding the type of conflict that Afghanistan has evolved into has 
occurred.  If the Kabul government collapses and the Taliban regain control, it is 
probable that they will again provide a safe haven for terrorist organizations.  If this 
happens, then, the entire Afghan experiment would have failed with not only a major 
waste of lives, funding, and resources, but a significant setback in the Global War on 
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Terrorism.  Therefore, the asymmetric strategy approach should be examined more 
thoroughly as recommended. 
Implications for Positive Social Change 
 This project is based on the events begun on September 11, 2001.  America, the 
victor of the Cold War now faces an adversary that disregards the need to match the 
symmetry in power against the United States.  Instead, this new enemy challenges the 
country to an asymmetric conflict that exploits the unbalance in power as a source to 
waging war and succeeds in obtaining its strategic goals.  The United States reacted by 
employing its vast resources of military, intelligence, economic, and diplomatic 
capabilities to overwhelm the enemy in the same fashion that it won the Cold War: by 
using energy, resources, and size to develop and implement a counter terrorism strategy 
based on preventing terrorist attacks by overwhelming the enemy (Savun & Phillips, 
2009). 
 The question is, how does the American counter terrorism strategy of preventing a 
terrorist attack relate to defeating an asymmetrical foe? In searching for an answer, this 
study has reviewed numerous findings on the impact of foreign policy to include military 
actions as it relates to terrorism.  Yet, few studies address the structure of the strategy in 
defeating the asymmetrical threat.  This is compounded by the additional question, after 
16 years of using the American conventional might in military, political, and judicial 
capabilities whether American dominance in conventional warfare is linked to an 
increase in terrorist activities against the American interest and instability in the region in 
which so much blood and treasure has been spent (Sobek & Brathwauite, 2005).  The 
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implications for social change are in the methodologies that American leadership 
employs to develop the strategies of national security as it relates to terrorism.  This study 
reveals the impact of asymmetric war as it is practiced against the United States, with the 
core of the study examining the asymmetries of the will of one opponent over another.  
Thus, social change is altering the way we look at the War on Terror – as not a war on a 
terrorist organization, but a conflict of wills in which an opponent believes he or she is 
fighting for a vital interest, such as survival, and will use all avenues of human 
interaction as means to achieve their goals (Khouri, 2008).   
 The first and most obvious observation is that an asymmetric strategy that not 
only counters but defeats an asymmetric enemy would have positive effects on the 
amount money and blood spent in any action of this type.  The document analysis 
indicates that the intention of the current strategy is to provide security, stabilization, and 
economic growth.  This was made apparent in the majority of the documents discussed in 
the Chapter two, as well as the primary motivation for the narrative inquiry.  To instigate 
positive social change, the objectives must be made a reality.  While the American 
leadership forms strategy based on America’s need for security through the intended 
strategy to build security, stability and economic growth for Afghanistan, the actions 
resulting from this strategy are not being perceived as such by the Afghans or the 
Americans implementing the strategy.  A shift in creating an asymmetric strategy that is 
directly reflected by the attitudes and perceptions of the Afghans and the people that 
implement the strategy into a reality will be necessary.  An asymmetric centric approach 
to a global counterterrorism strategy using Afghanistan as the initial test of the strategy 
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could save not only lives, but also become a concrete approach to solving similar 
conflicts in the future.  However, the data in this study alone does not support this 
opinion.  The strongest implication this study has on positive social change is that, while 
the U.S. strategy provides a semblance of social change, these objectives must be made 
into a reality of winning the war by the United States affecting positive social change in 
the country of Afghanistan. 
Conclusion 
 This research study was an analysis of data covering one part of a larger problem.  
The research questions centered on discovering the answer to one portion of an 
asymmetric conflict and that is: what is the perception that the Afghans and Americans 
who fight the war have about the American strategy to win it?  The research indicates that 
there are many positive ways to provide an asymmetric strategy by providing basic 
assistance to the people of Afghanistan.  The employment of conventional military forces 
in the role of counterterrorism/counterinsurgency has proven to be less successful in 
previous involvement by the U.S. in an effort to protect itself.  As presented in Chapter 
two, involvement in asymmetrical conflicts such as Vietnam and (more recently) in 
Somalia by U.S. conventional forces ended in less than favorable conditions.  Yet, the 
intentions of the United States are not the reality that the Afghan people perceive – nor is 
it the reality that is perceived by Americans on the ground in Afghanistan.  While some 
headway has been made in basic humanitarian aid, the focus has still remained on the 
conventional military intervention.  As the years progress after the withdrawal of 
American and Coalition forces, the world will see exactly how the internal workings of 
157 
 
the country will progress.  Based on the results of the analysis presented, this could 
possibly mean either Afghanistan will follow a democratic government model or revert to 
the Taliban rule of religious-based tyranny way.  Should control revert back to the 
Taliban, the actions of the past 15 years will have been wasted. 
This research demonstrates that, when facing asymmetrical adversaries, the 
United States need not seek a conventional military solution to conduct counterterrorism 
activities, but must instead recognize that an asymmetrical war is a war of will power, not 
firepower.  The results of the data from this study support what Kristensen  (2009) 
observes in that the United States and other nations will need to get past the reliance on 
the military sweeping the field of battle of its foes through fire power and technology and 
find a way to work out the different methods in responding to the long war that 
asymmetrical conflict represents.  Scholars in the field have demonstrated that an 
asymmetric battleground is very fluid and the best way to prepare for this is by allowing 
everyone (soldiers, diplomats, and especially the target population) to be as dynamic as 
they need to be in order to win (Morris, 2003).  Part of having an asymmetric strategy 
would include such things as being able to quickly respond and enact changes without the 
need for a long and disenfranchised chain of command approval.  By having the mind of 
someone considered to be free thinkers, and then being able to think outside the box, the 
asymetric conflict theory could be applied in rapid and successful fashion.  One such 
example might be that, instead of a instilling democracy, maybe  reestasblishing a 
democratic monarchy would provide a solution for a working government (Morris, 
2003).   
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  There are many lessons that can be learned from the last 16 years of American 
involvement in Afghanistan.  The greatest lesson that should be learned is that when 
conventional military actions involve a civilian population, all that is remembered is that 
there was death and destruction.  As a global leader, as well as a sovereign nation, the 
United States of America should take the lead in setting an example in protecting, not 
only itself, but all those who oppose tyranny.  A large part of this example is finding a 
more permanent solution than simply committing to conventional military action.  
A larger portion of this issue lies within the inconclusive results of this study.  
The fact that the United States has expressed its intentions of providing humanitarian 
support and has spent billions on aid, it has not followed through in a productive manner.  
For the United States to effect a permanent solution, not only for itself, but also for its 
global partners, protection from asymmetrical adversaries such as terrorist organizations 
will have to be properly perceived by persons around the globe.  The fact that the 
Afghanistan War has become the longest war in American history demonstrates that the 
intention may be present, but actions are not accomplishing the strategic goal.  At a 
minimum, the employment of an asymmetric strategy to counter an asymmetric adversary 
is an approach that should be researched further and examined for its positive 
implications. 
  
159 
 
References 
Abrahms, M. (2012). The political effectiveness of terrorism revisited. Comparative 
Political Studies, 45(3), 366-393.  
Acosta, B. (2014).  Live to win another day: Why many militant organizations survive 
yet few succeed.  Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 37(2), 135-161. 
Alex, P. (2010).  Frameworks for conceptualizing terrorism. Retrieved from 
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ftpv20 
Amir, H., & Singer, P. (2008). To win the war on terror, we must first win the war of 
ideas: Here’s how. Journal of the American Academy of Political Science, 618(1), 
212-222.  
Angstrom, J. (2011).  Evaluating rivaling interpretations of asymmetric war and warfare. 
In K. E. Haug & O. J. Maao (Eds.), Conceptualizing Modern War. London, 
England: Hurst & Company. 
Angstrom, J. (2011) Mapping the competing historical analogies of the War on 
Terrorism: The Bush presidency.  International Relations, 25(2), 224–242.  
Armborst, A. (2010). Modelling terrorism and political violence. International Relations, 
24(4), 414-432.  
Arreguín-Toft, I. (2012a). Contemporary asymmetric conflict theory in historical 
perspective. London, England: Routledge.  
Arreguín-Toft, I. (2012b) The meaning of ‘state failure’: Public service, public servants, 
and the contemporary Afghan state.  International Area Studies Review, 15(3), 263-
278.  
160 
 
 
Balcells, L., & Kalyvas, S. (2014). Does warfare matter? Severity, duration, and 
outcomes of civil wars.  Journal of Conflict Resolution, 58(8), 1390-1418. 
Bank, W., Nevers, R., & Wallerstein, M. (2007).  Combating terrorism, strategies and 
approaches (1st ed.).  Washington, D.C: Congressional Quarterly Inc. Press, SAGE 
Publications.   
Banks, W. (2011).  New battlefields, old laws: Critical debates on asymmetric warfare. 
New York, NY: Columbia University Press.  
Belasco, A. (2014) The cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and other Global War on Terror 
operations since 9/11.  Congressional Research Service Report RL33110.   
Biddle, F., Christia, F., & Their, F. (2010).  Defining success in Afghanistan-What can 
the United States accept? Foreign Affairs, 89 (48).  
Bolechow, B. (2005). The United States of America vis-à-vis terrorism: The super 
power’s weaknesses and mistakes.  American Behavioral Scientist, 48(6), 783-794.  
Boot, M. (2013) Invisible armies: The epic history of guerilla warfare from ancient times 
to modern.  New York, NY: Liveright Publishing.    
 Bassford, C., & Von Ghyczy, T.  (2001). Clausewitz on strategy: Inspiration and insight 
from a master strategist.  New York, NY: Wiley and Sons, Inc. 
Breen, M., & Geltzer, J. (2011). Asymmetric strategies as strategies of the strong. 
Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA.   
Buffaloe, D. L. (2006). Defining asymmetric warfare. Institute of Land Warfare, 
Association of the United States Army.  
161 
 
Burke, A. (2008).  Just war or ethical peace? Moral discourses of strategic violence after 
9/11. International Affairs, 80(2), 329-353.  
Carter, T. (2014). Explaining insurgent violence: The timing of deadly events in 
Afghanistan.  Civil Wars,13(2), 99-121.  
Carter, D. B. (2012). Terrorist group and government interaction: Progress in empirical 
research. Perspectives on Terrorism, 6(4-5). 
Caldwell, W. B. (2011).  Stability Operations Field Manual FM 3-07. U.S. Army.   
Chace, J. (2011) Defining asymmetric warfare: A losing proposition. Joint Force 
Quarterly, 61(2011), 124. 
Chenoweth, E. (2010). Democratic competition and terrorist activity. Journal of Politics, 
72(01), 16-30.  
Chenoweth, E. (2013). Terrorism and democracy. Annual Review of Political Science, 16, 
355-378.  
Chew, E. (2014).  How big powers fight small wars: Contending traditions of asymmetry 
in the British and American ways of war. Armed Forces & Society, 40(1), 17-48.  
Choi, S. W. (2015). Economic growth and terrorism: Domestic, international, and 
suicide. Oxford Economic Papers, 67(1), 157-181. 
Cigar, N., & Kramer, S. (2012). Al-Qaida after ten years of war: A global perspective of 
successes, failures and prospects.  Quantico,VA: Marine Corps University Press. 
Clandinin, D. J. (Ed.). (2006). Handbook of narrative inquiry: Mapping a methodology. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
162 
 
Clandinin, D. J., & Connelly, F. M. (2000).  Narrative inquiry: Experience and story in 
qualitative research.  San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Cordesman, A. (2015) Transition in Afghanistan: Losing the forgotten war?  The need to 
reshape US strategy in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia.  Center for 
Strategic and International Studies.   
Cordesman, A. (2014).  Afghanistan: The death of a strategy.  Center for Strategic and 
International Studies.   
Cordesman, A. (2012a).  Afghanistan: The failed metrics of ten years of war.  The Center 
for Strategic and International Studies.   
Cordesman, A. (2012b). The U.S. cost of the Afghan War: FY2002-FY2013. Cost in 
military operating expenditures and aid prospects for transition.  The Center for 
Strategic and International Studies.   
Cordesman  (2010) The Afghan War: Key developments and metrics. The Center for 
Strategic and International Studies Revised June 7, 2010.   
Creswell, J. W. (2013).  Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five 
approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Cromartie, A. (2012).  Field manual 3-24 and the heritage of counterinsurgency theory. 
Millennium Journal of International Studies, 41(1), 91-111.  
Czarniawska, B. (2004).  Narratives in social science research. London, England: Sage.  
Davis, P. (1999) Aggregation, disaggregation, and the 3:1 rules in ground combat.  Rand 
Corp., Santa Monica, CA.   
 
163 
 
DeAngelis, T. (2009). Understanding terrorism: Psychologists are amassing more 
concrete data on the factors that lead some people to terrorism – and using those 
insights to develop ways to thwart it. American Physiological Association, 40(10) 
30-35.   
Denzin, N. K. (1989).  Interpretive biography. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Department of Defense. (2014a). DOD and DOS need better procedures to monitor and 
expend DOD funds for the Afghan National Police Training Program.  DOD Report 
No. d-2011-080 and DOS Report No. AUD/CG-11-30.  Washington, DC: Joint 
DOD and DOS Inspector General Audit Results, DODIG Audit Report.   
Department of Defense. (2014b) Joint Publication 3-26 Counterterrorism.   
Department of Defense. (2014c). Sustaining U.S. global leadership: Priorities for 21st 
century defense.   
Department of Defense (2010) FM 3-24 Tactics in Counterinsurgency Manual.   
Department of Defense (2008) Department of Defense Directive 3000.07: “Irregular 
Warfare Operations,” December 1, 2008.   
Department of Defense Report (2014, April). Report on progress toward security and 
stability in Afghanistan.  Department of Defense Report to Congress: April, 2014.  
Department of Homeland Security (2013).  Creation of the Department of Homeland 
Security.  
 
 
164 
 
Department of Justice (2013) U.S. Citizen Indicted for Conspiring to Provide Material 
Support to Foreign Terrorist Organization, United States Attorney for Virginia, 
June 20, 2013.  
Department of State (2015). The quadrennial diplomacy and development review. 
DeYoung, K. (2010, May 27). Obama redefines national security strategy, looks beyond 
military might. Washington Post.   
DiPaolo, A. (2005).  Asymmetrical warfare: Today's challenge to U.S. military power. 
Armed Forces and Society, 477-478 
Dunlap Jr, C. J. (1998). Preliminary observations: Asymmetrical warfare and the Western 
mindset.  Retrieved August 18, 2014 from Walden University Library website: 
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://scholar.googl
e.com/&httpsredir=1&article=5697&context=faculty_scholarship 
Dugan, L. & Chenoweth E. (2012). Moving beyond deterrence: The effectiveness of 
raising the expected utility of abstaining from terrorism in Israel.  American 
Sociological Review, 77(4). 
Duyvesteyn I. (2008) Great expectations: The use of armed force to combat terrorism. 
small wars and insurgencies. 19(3): 328–351.   
Edwards, L. M. (2011).  The Afghan solution: The inside story of Abdul Haq, the CIA and 
how western hubris lost Afghanistan. Bactria Press. 
Enders, W., & Sandler, T. (2011).  The political economy of terrorism. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
165 
 
Enders, W. & Sandler, T. (2014). Terrorism and counterterrorism: An overview. Oxford 
Economic Papers, Vol. 1-20. 
Endicott, L. (2010).  Institutional Review Board (IRB) frequently asked questions 
[Online tutorial].   
Fawcett, B. (2013). Doomed to repeat: The lessons of history we’ve failed to learn. New 
York: HarperCollins.   
Findley, M. G., Piazza, J. A., & Young, J. K. (2012).  Games rivals play: Terrorism in 
international rivalries. The Journal of Politics, 74(01), 235-248. 
Flanagan, S. & Schear, J. (2008).  Strategic challenges: America's global security 
agenda, Institute for National Strategic Studies.  Washington DC:  Potomac 
Books.   
Freidman, L. (2013). Strategy: A history.  London, England: Oxford University Press.  
Gaibulloev, K., Sandler, T., & Santifort, C. (2012). Assessing the evolving threat of 
terrorism. Global Policy, 3(2), 135-144.  
Galula, D. (1964). Counterinsurgency warfare: Theory and practice. Wesport: Praeger 
Security International.  
Gassebner, M., & Luechinger, S. (2011). Lock, stock, and barrel: A comprehensive 
assessment of the determinants of terror. Public Choice, 149(3-4), 235-261.  
Gatzke, H. W. (1942). Principles of War. Harrisburg, Pa.: The Military service 
publishing Company. 250-279 
Gentile, G. (2013). Wrong turn: America’s deadly embrace of counterinsurgency. New 
York: New Press.   
166 
 
Giustozzi, A. (2008).  Koran, Kalashnikov and laptop: The neo Taliban insurgency in 
Afghanistan. New York: Columbia University Press  
Gray, C. (2006).  Irregular enemies and the essence of strategy:  Can American way of 
war adapt?  Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.  
Gregory, A. (2011).  What price war? Afghanistan, Iraq, and the cost of conflict.  
Goldsmith, B.E., Horiuchi, Y., & Inoguchi, T. (2005).  American foreign policy and 
global opinion: Who supported the war in Afghanistan? Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 49(408).  
Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1989). Fourth generation evaluation. Newbury Park, CA: 
Sage. 
Gunning, J. (2007). The case for a critical terrorism studies? Government & Opposition, 
42(3), 363-94.   
Hammes, T. (2004).  The sling and the stone: On warfare in 21st century.  St. Paul, 
Minnesota: Zenith Press.  
 Hammes, T. (2012). The future of counterinsurgency. Foreign Policy Research Institute, 
Fall 2012, 586-587.  
Hammidov, B. (2006). The fall of the Taliban regime and its recovery as an insurgent 
movement in Afghanistan. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 
Monogram.   
Harpviken, K. ( 2012) The transnationalization of the Taliban.  International Area 
Studies Review, 15(3), 203-229.  
167 
 
Holbrooke, R. (2009). U.S. policy in Afghanistan. Council of Foreign Relations, 
Transcript.  
Hoffman, F. (2007). Conflict in the 21st century: The rise of hybrid wars.  Potomac 
Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington, VA.  
 
 
Hoffman, B. A. (2013).  Counterterrorism strategy for the Obama Administration,  
Hoover Institute (2015).  General Jim Mattis brings insight and clarity to the nature of 
war.  Interview with General Jim Mattis, conducted by Peter Robinson on 
Uncommon Knowledge for the Hoover Institute.    
Hülsse, R. and Spencer, A. (2008).  The metaphor of terror: Terrorism studies and the 
constructivist turn security dialogue.  39(6), 571-592. 
Hultman, L. (2012). Military offensives in Afghanistan: A double-edged sword security 
dialogue. International Area Studies Review, 15(3), 230–248.   
Ikenberry, G. Slaughter, J, & Slaughter, A.M. (2010).  Forging a world of liberty under 
law, US national security in the 21st Century.  Princeton: The Princeton Project 
on National Security. 
Jefferson, J. (2008). Afghanistan and the troubled future of unconventional warfare. 
Digest of Middle East Studies, 45(8), 99-102.   
Kalb, M. & Saivetz, C. (2007). The Israeli–Hezbollah war of 2006: The media as a 
weapon in asymmetrical conflict.  The Harvard International Journal of 
Press/Politics. 12(43).   
168 
 
Katzman, K. (2014). Afghanistan: Post-Taliban governance, security, and U.S. policy.  
Congressional Research Service 7-5700. Published January 20, 2015 Washington 
DC.   
Keeble, R. (2011).  Operation Moshtarak and the manufacture of credible, ‘heroic’ 
warfare.  Global Media and Communication,7(3),187-191.  
Khouri, R. (2008). The strange failures of ‘the global war on terror.  The Belfar Center 
for Science and International Affairs.  Harvard University: Cambridge MA.  Posted 
Mach 1, 2008.  
Kilcullen, D. (2011).  The accidental guerrilla: Fighting small wars in the midst of a big 
one.  Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kilcullen, D. (2013).  Out of the mountains: The coming age of the urban guerrilla.  
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Krieger, T., & Meierrieks, D. (2011). What causes terrorism?  Public Choice, 147(1-2),  
3-27. 
Krulak, C. (1999, Jan 5).  The strategic corporal: Leadership in the three block war. 
Marines Magazine, 4. 
Kunstler, B. (2011).  Extreme asymmetric warfare of the future: Insidious, inevitable, 
iconoclastic.  World Future Review, 3(3),  5-16.  
Linnemann, M. R. A. (2016). Unconventional Art and Modern War. Military Review. pp. 
17-25 Retrieved August 18,  2016 from Walden University Library website: 
http://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-
review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20160630_art007.pdf 
169 
 
Livingston, I. & O’Harlan, M. (2014).  Afghanistan index also includes selected data 
on Pakistan.  Published January 10, 2104.  Brookings Institute, Washington DC.  
Mack, Andrew J.R., (1975). Why big nations lose small wars: The politics of 
asymmetric conflict, World Politics, 27(2), pp. 170–201.   
Mascarenhas, R., & Sandler, T. (2014).  Remittances and terrorism: A global analysis. 
Defence and Peace Economics, 25(4), 331-347.  
McChrystal, S. (2009).  McChrystal's initial assessment report of the situation in 
 Afghanistan, August 2009, Council on Foreign Relations.   
Metz, S. and Johnson, D. II, (2001).  Asymmetry and US military strategy: Definition 
background and strategic concepts.  CRS Report R41416.  7 December, 2010.  
Meinshausen, P. and Wheeler, S. (2010).  Tribes and Afghanistan: Choosing more 
appropriate tools to understand the population. Small Wars Journal.  
Orehek, E. &Vazeou-Nieuwenhuis, A. (2014). Understanding the terrorist threat: Policy 
implications of a motivational account of terrorism. Policy Insights from the 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1(1), 248-255.  
Özdamar, O. (2008). Theorizing terrorist behavior: Major approaches and their 
characteristics.  Defense Against Terrorism Review, 1(2), 89-101.  
Paul, C. Clarke, C. Grill, B. & Dunigan, M. (2013).  Counterinsurgency scorecard:  
Afghanistan in early 2013 relative to insurgencies since World War II.  National 
Defense Research Board, Rand Corporation.  
170 
 
Paul, C. Clarke, C. Grill, B. & Dunigan, M. (2013). Paths to victory: Lessons from 
modern insurgencies.  National Defense Research Board, Rand Corporation ISBN 
978-0-8330-8054-7.   
Paul, C. Clarke, C. Grill, B. & Dunigan, M. (2013). Paths to victory: Detailed insurgency 
case studies.  National Defense Research Board, Rand Corporation.   
Patton, M. Q. (2002). Qualitative research & evaluation methods (3rd ed.). Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Peceny, M. & Bosin, Y. (2011). Winning with warlords in Afghanistan. Small Wars & 
Insurgencies, 22(4), 603–618. 
 
Peter G. Peterson Foundation (2015). The U.S. spends more on defense than the next 
seven countries combined. Peter G. Peterson Foundation.  
Petraeus, D. (2013). Reflections on the counter-insurgency era. RUSI Journal, 82-87.   
Polkinghorne, D. (1995).  Narrative configuration in qualitative analysis.  International 
Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education 8(1), pp. 5-23.   
Pool, J. (2010). Expeditionary eagles: Outmaneuvering the Taliban.  North Carolina: 
Prosperity Press.  
 Porter, P. (2006).  Shadow wars: Asymmetric warfare in the past and future security 
dialogue. 37(4), 551-561.  
Preble, C. Ashford, E. & Evans, T. (2016).  Our foreign policy choices, rethinking 
America’s global role.  The Cato Institute.  
Priyedarshi , V. (2010).  Tracing the tenets of fourth generation warfare in terrorist and 
171 
 
insurgent groups: The case of Al-Qaeda.  India Quarterly: A Journal of 
International Affairs, 66(2), 167-181.  
QRS International (2017).  Introduction to Nvivo Mac: An explanation of how Nvivo 
supports the qualitative researcher 
Ranstorp, M. (2009).  Mapping terrorism studies after 9/11.  Critical Terrorism Studies: 
A New Research Agenda, 13(33).   
Rashid, A. (2008). Descent into chaos: The world’s most unstable region and the threat 
to global security. New York: Penguin Books.  
Robinson, L.,  Miller, P., Gordon IV, J.  Decker, J.  Schwille, & M. Cohen, R. (2014). 
Lessons from 13 Years of War Point to a Better U.S. Strategy.  Rand Corporation 
Published December 14, 2014.  
Ross, D. (2007).  Counterterrorism: A professional’s strategy. World Policy Journal, 
24(1), 19-31.  
Roy, K. (2012). Afghanistan and the future of war.  International Area Studies Review, 
15(3), 301-320.   
Sageman, M. (2014).  The stagnation in terrorism research. Terrorism and Political 
Violence, 26(4), 565-580. 
Sageman, M. (2004).  Understanding terror networks. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press Philadelphia.   
Sanger, D. and Baker, P. (2010).  New U.S. security strategy focuses on managing 
threats. New York Times.  
172 
 
Sandler, T. (2014).  The analytical study of terrorism: Taking stock.  Journal of Peace 
Research, 51(2), 257-271.   
Savun, B., & Phillips, B. J. (2009).  Democracy, foreign policy, and terrorism. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 53(6), 878-904.  
Schroen, G. (2004).  First In: An insider’s account of how the CIA spearheaded the war 
on terror in Afghanistan. New York: Ballantine Books.  
Schroden, J. Norman, C. & Meyarle, J. (2014).  Summary of an independent assessment 
of the Afghan National Security Forces. Published January 24, 2014. CNA Analysis 
& Solutions.   
Schiff, R. (2012). Concordance theory, targeted partnership, and counterinsurgency 
strategy.  Armed Forces & Society, 38(2), 318-339.  
Sobek, D., & Braithwaite, A. (2005).  Victim of success: American dominance and 
terrorism. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 22(2), 135-148.  
Stampnitzky, L. (2013).  Disciplining terror: How experts invented “terrorism.” New 
York: Cambridge University Press.   
Tarzi, S. (2005).  Coercive diplomacy and an ‘irrational’ regime: Understanding the 
American confrontation with the Taliban.  International Studies, 42(1),  21-41.  
Taylor, A. (2015, June).  149,000 people have died in war in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
since 2001, report says.  Washington Post.  
Thomas, J. (2011). Asymmetrical national security policy? Simple doesn’t mean stupid.  
Small Wars Journal.   
173 
 
Thornton, R. (2007).  Asymmetric warfare.  Threat and response in the 21st century. 
Cambridge, UK.  
Trinquier, R. (1964). Modern warfare: A French view of counterinsurgency. Translated 
by Daniel Lee.  London: Pall Mall Press.  
Tuck, C. (2012).  Afghanistan: Strategy and war termination.  Strategic Studies 
Institute, U.S. Army War College, Autumn 2012.  
Vinci, A. (2008).  Becoming the enemy: Convergence in the American and Al Qaeda 
         ways of warfare.  Journal of Strategic Studies, 31(1), 69–88.  
Vrooman, S. (2005). A counterinsurgency campaign plan concept: The Galula compass.  
Army Command and Staff College School of Advanced Military Studies.  
U.S. Senate (2014). Threats to national strategy senate hearing.  Testimony to Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee.  Recorded by C-SPAN on November 12, 2014.   
Waldman, M. (2009). Caught in the conflict: Civilians and the international security 
strategy in Afghanistan. A briefing paper by eleven NGOs operating in Afghanistan 
for the NATO Heads of State and Government Summit, 3–4 April.   
Wainscott, A. (2015).  Lisa Stampnitzky.  Disciplining terror: How experts invented 
“terrorism.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 27(3), 598-600.   
Weisiger, A. (2014). Victory without peace: Conquest, insurgency, and war termination.  
Conflict Management and Peace Science, 31(4), 357-382.  
The White House (2010). The national security strategy of the United States of America.  
The White House (2009). The way forward in Afghanistan.   
The White House (2011). National strategy for counterterrorism.   
174 
 
Whiston, W. (2001).  The wars of the Jews, or history of the destruction of Jerusalem by 
Flavious Josephus.  Translated by William Whiston, Project Gutenberg, Book IV.   
Young, J. K., & Findley, M. G. (2011). Promises and pitfalls of terrorism research. 
International Studies Review, 13(3), 411-431. 
Yin, R. K. (2008). Case study research: Design and methods, California: Sage. 
  
175 
 
 
Appendix A: Interview Protocol 
Interview Protocol and Interview Questions 
A key standard for qualitative data analysis and collection is the research 
discovering that everything observed, either deliberately or accidently, is potential data.  
The qualitative researcher would not restrict the scope of data collection in an inflexible 
manner, such as enforcing formal rules that decide which data is irrelevant without first 
reviewing what the data is.  With this in mind, this scholar will discover the frustration in 
collecting, organizing and analyzing data can create the complications of determining 
validity as well as having data overload.  The problem of data overload is in some ways 
more intractable.  The evaluator must continually make decisions about what data are 
relevant and may change these decisions over the course of the project.  The evaluator 
must work to focus the data collection process so that data is recovered, catalogued and 
coded and if necessary retrievable as the analysis takes place (Creswell, 2013). 
This narrative inquiry is designed to examine the life experiences regarding their 
perspectives of and experiences with the American national security strategy as a viewed 
through the analysis of individual’s story that is a foundation of the larger influences 
created by counter-terrorism national strategy as it pertains to Afghanistan.  The research 
will focus on two groups of participants, the Afghan nationals that worked with US 
Government personnel and the former US Government personnel that implemented 
American strategy in Afghanistan.  The manner for interviews will be in person and when 
the participants are separated by great distance in which personal interviews are not 
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practical that the interview will be via Skype on a secured internet connection. This 
environment and approach will allow the inquiry participant to be in his or her own 
comfortable setting and deliver all interview answers via Skype.  The participants are 
identified from a field gathered personal experience with US Army Special Forces and 
the Afghanistan citizens while serving in Afghanistan. 
The questions are meant to elicit a story of the participant’s complete life 
experiences.  This includes any life experiences prior to the intervention of the United 
States following the September 11, 2001 attacks and experiences after U.S. intervention 
with the policies and programs created to support the national strategy.  These will cover 
the years between 2001 and 2016.  Specific follow up questions such as “how did this 
influence your perceptions” or “how did this make you feel” may be added to each area.  
The data collection is a narrative inquiry and this will entail gathering many details 
concerning the life influences of the participant. 
No video will be recorded.  However, two digital audio recorders will be used 
during each interview session to assure that each interview is securely attained. It is 
planned that no more than three interview sessions will be needed and each interview 
session will not exceed 45 minutes but more interviews may be needed pending on the 
data recorded and analyzed.  As a means of supporting the data collection and analyses 
extensive field notes will be taken by the researcher to sync discussion points and add an 
observation element.  The field notes will contain observations made by the researcher in 
regard to body language, facial expressions, or a change in the tone of voice. 
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The participant consent process will include a signed consent, with a full 
description of the study.  All participant consent request will be read to the participant 
prior to each session in order to provide a clear understanding of the purpose and 
structure of the session. The participant will also be given the opportunity to read the 
main interview questions as well.  This includes a reassurance that the identity will be 
kept confidential and all research data will remain secure. 
Proposed Interview Questions 
The following questions will be used to guide the semi-structured interviews of the 
participants:  
1. What are your experiences with the American involvement in removing the 
Taliban and establishing the current Afghanistan government? (Affective) 
2. What is your current attitude towards American involvement in Afghanistan? 
(Conative) 
3. Do the American policies in security and stability program help you with your 
standard of living? (Cognitive, Affective, Conative) 
4. How do you think factors in American policies and programs from 2002 to 
present encourage you to support similar programs? (Cognitive) 
5. What are your perceptions with regard to the American policies and programs 
countering the Taliban insurgency and defeating terrorist like Al Qaida? 
(Cognitive) 
6. Do you feel like the policies and program helps you alleviate your problems in 
terms of long-term security and stability? (Affective) 
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7. Do you think that the application of the policies and program is fair and just to all 
Afghans in the rural as well as the urban areas of Afghanistan? (Cognitive) 
8. Do you think that American policies and programs can help in attaining and 
independent safe and security Afghanistan free of controlling terrorism, criminal 
and radical organizations that use terror and violence as means to maintain control 
over the population?  (Cognitive) 
9. What elements are still lacking in the American strategy to make Afghanistan a 
safe and secure independent state?  (Cognitive) 
10. Why do you think that American strategy to include the policies and programs 
that it created is successful in making Afghanistan safe and secure?  (Cognitive) 
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Appendix B: Invitation to Participate 
Telephone Script 
 
Hello, my name is Bob Hayworth, and I am a doctoral student at Walden University. 
 
Do you have a few minutes to talk? 
 
I will be conducting a study to examine the strategy that has been developed and 
employed by the United States to counter terrorism and utilized during the conflict in 
Afghanistan.  The core to the research is determining what approaches can a strategic 
policy of employing conventional military forces in effects-based operations increase the 
effectiveness of military operations against an asymmetric adversary?  Basically, how can 
using a strategy based on employing a modified Cold War organized and trained 
conventional force defeat a foe that adapts to challenging the nation’s will within all 
environments that touch society.   
 
I would like to invite you to participate in my study.  Your involvement will be limited to 
a 60 minute or less virtual videoconference and providing available documents for my 
review.  Confidentiality will be assured, and since your participation is voluntary, you 
can discontinue your involvement in the study at any time. 
 
If you are willing to participate, I would like to email a consent form for your review that 
delineates more information on the study to include some sample questions.  From what I 
have outlined, do you have an interest in participating? 
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Appendix C: Coding Tree 
 
Conventional-Centric Asymmetric-Centric 
 
 
 Security 
CC-1 
Growth 
CC-2 
Stability 
CC-3 
Security 
AC-1 
Growth 
AC-2 
Stability 
AC-3 
 
US Security 
CC-1a 
Rule of 
Law  
CC-2a 
Regional 
Stability 
CC-3a 
US 
Security 
AC-1a 
Rule of 
Law 
 AC-2a 
Regional 
Stability 
AC-3a 
 
Afghan 
Domestic 
Security 
CC-1b 
Personal 
Security 
CC-2b 
Local 
Stability 
CC-3b 
Afghan 
Security 
AC-1b 
Personal 
Security 
AC-2b 
Local 
Stability 
AC-3b 
 
 
Due to the nature of the study, a use of codes that are similar is necessary.  In order to 
answer the research question regarding strategy that creates actions that could have 
influences on terrorism through conventional-centric (military interventions) using 
applied violence (direct actions) to remove the Taliban or asymmetric-centric through 
building and assisting the citizens of the region (humanitarian, business develop, and 
special ops interventions), it is necessary to have the codes that are different, yet share 
attributes for these areas.  There are a limited number of codes secondary to the specific 
target of the study.  More codes are not necessary to answer the research question.  These 
are specific for the research question and will address the general nature of the research 
questions 
 
 
 
 
